scholarly journals Classical Foundationalism and Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism

2011 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 391-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Hasan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Classical Foundationalism

Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance

1991 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 159-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Kretzmann
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Classical Foundationalism ◽  
Eleonore Stump

Eleonore Stump argues in her article in this volume that Aquinas’s theory of knowledge is not classical foundationalism, as it has sometimes seemed to be, but, instead, a version of reliabilism. I'm convinced that her thesis is important and well-supported, and it has led me to begin a re-examination of one aspect of Aquinas’s theory of knowledge from the new viewpoint Stump’s work provides. I think the results tend to confirm her account while revealing further details of Aquinas’s reliabilism.My topic is not reliabilism itself. Instead, I am focusing on Aquinas’s account of the reliability of the fundamental operations of the two human cognitive faculties, sense and intellect. Accounts of cognitive reliability have a place in most theories about the justification of belief, of course, and so they are found in more than one sort of epistemology; but reliabilism might be said to need them most.

The Crucial Disanalogies Between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God

1990 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Grigg
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Evidence ◽  
Basic Belief ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Classical Foundationalism ◽  
Basic Beliefs

The antifoundationalist defence of belief in God set forth by Alvin Plantinga has been widely discussed in recent years. Classical foundationalism assumes that there are two kinds of beliefs that we are justified in holding: beliefs supported by evidence, and basic beliefs. Our basic beliefs are those bedrock beliefs that need no evidence to support them and upon which our other beliefs must rest. For the foundationalist, the only beliefs that can be properly basic are either self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses. Belief in God is none of these. Thus, says the foundationalist, belief in God is justified only if there is sufficient evidence to back it up.

Aquinas on the Foundations of Knowledge

1991 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 125-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump
Keyword(s):  
Middle Ages ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Western Thought ◽  
The West ◽  
Philosophical Thought ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
High Middle Ages ◽  
Classical Foundationalism ◽  
The Middle Ages

Aquinas is sometimes taken to hold a foundationalist theory of knowledge. So, for example, Nicholas Wolterstorff says, “Foundationalism has been the reigning theory of theories in the West since the high Middle Ages. It can be traced back as far as Aristotle, and since the Middle Ages vast amounts of philosophical thought have been devoted to elaborating and defending it‥ ‥ Aquinas offers one classic version of foundationalism.” And Alvin Plantinga says, “we can get a better understanding of Aquinas … if we see [him] as accepting some version of classical foundationalism. This is a picture or total way of looking at faith, knowledge, justified belief, rationality, and allied topics. This picture has been enormously popular in Western thought; and despite a substantial opposing ground-swell, I think it remains the dominant way of thinking about these topics.”

Plantinga and the Naturalized Epistemology of Thomas Reid

Dialogue ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. D. Todd
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Proper Function ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Christian Belief ◽  
Naturalized Epistemology ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
William Alston ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Fred Dretske ◽  
Classical Foundationalism

These two books are Volumes 1 and 2 of a three-volume work; the projected third volume, Warranted Christian Belief, has yet to be published. In the first volume, Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga surveys the current chaos in epistemology stemming from the breakdown of classical foundationalism and examines critically the efforts of several contemporary philosophers to introduce some order into the field, most particularly Roderick Chisholm, William Alston, John Pollock, Laurence BonJour and, to a lesser extent, others such as Richard Foley, Fred Dretske and Alvin Goldman. In this volume, Plantinga is trying not only to put out of play the views he rejects but also to provide the reader with anticipations of his own views in Warrant and Proper Function. Although there is an immense amount of overlap between these books, and there is much cross-referencing, they are not continuous; each can be read entirely independently of the other. Even should, through some misfortune, the projected third volume fail to be written, these two volumes are certain to stand for a long time as exceptionally important works. Warrant and Proper Function, in particular, is likely to generate a veritable Niagara of Ph.D. theses in a field many had come to see as having reached the point of diminishing nits.

A Myth resurgent: classical foundationalism and the new Sellarsian critique

Synthese ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 194 (10) ◽  
pp. 4155-4169
Author(s):  
Jeremy Randel Koons
Keyword(s):  
Classical Foundationalism
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document