The Experiential Defeasibility and Overdetermination of A Priori Justification

2008 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 271-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikael Janvid ◽  
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification

THE MODAL ARGUMENT FOR A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION

Ratio ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Horvath
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Modal Argument

Phenomenal Explanationism’s Global Ambitions

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain ◽  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Multiple Domains ◽  
The Way

This chapter further elucidates PE by explaining how it applies to multiple domains. Though the preceding chapter already touches upon some of these, here it is cashed out how PE can account for perceptual justification, memorial justification, testimonial justification, introspective justification, and a priori justification. Exploring the contours of PE in this way reveals just how powerful and unified the theory is. Along the way, it is argued that Declan Smithies’ forceful objections to PC fail to impugn PE. Additionally, it is shown that PE has the resources to respond to each of the challenges that Smithies claims are faced by any internalist theory with “global ambitions”––any theory that purports to be a comprehensive account of epistemic justification. (These challenges for instance include the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of stored beliefs.) The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that PE is a comprehensive account of epistemic justification that achieves its global ambitions.

Boghossian on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori Once Again1

2020 ◽  
pp. 227-239
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Learning Mathematics ◽  
The Way

This chapter replies to Boghossian’s Chapter 15 and amplifies the arguments of the author’s Chapter 14. In particular, it illustrates the loss of underived dispositions with an example from learning mathematics, when the novice gradually ceases to be tempted by a certain kind of mistake. It is also explains why the argument of Chapter 14 does not assume that introspection and postulation are mutually incompatible; rather, it notes the author’s inability to introspect the non-doxastic intellectual seemings Boghossian postulates and suggests that it is not idiosyncratic. Finally, a challenge is raised for Boghossian’s view of a priori justification as coherence with intellectual seemings. What prevents bigoted beliefs being justified a priori in the way he describes by the bigoted intellectual seemings of a consistent Nazi, for example? If nothing does, what prevents the Nazi’s so-justified beliefs as to what one ought to do from justifying the corresponding actions?

Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1

2020 ◽  
pp. 214-226
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Mental States ◽  
A Priori Justification

This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of understanding–assent links, in particular because he fails to show that the expert in his cases has lost underived dispositions to assent. The paper gives grounds for rejecting Williamson’s argument that intuitions, supposing them to exist, cannot be the source of distinctively a priori justification. Finally, it is argued that Williamson’s argument against the existence of intuitions (understood as sui generis states of intellectual seeming) flounders because it rests on a misguided and naïve dichotomy between ‘introspectable’ and ‘postulated’ mental states.

THE NO FREE LUNCH THEOREM: BAD NEWS FOR (WHITE'S ACCOUNT OF) THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Gerhard Schurz
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Prediction Methods ◽  
Free Lunch ◽  
Event Sequences ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
No Free Lunch Theorem ◽  
Uniform Probability Distribution ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
No Free Lunch

AbstractWhite (2015) proposes an a priori justification of the reliability of inductive prediction methods based on his thesis of induction-friendliness. It asserts that there are by far more induction-friendly event sequences than induction-unfriendly event sequences. In this paper I contrast White's thesis with the famous no free lunch (NFL) theorem. I explain two versions of this theorem, the strong NFL theorem applying to binary and the weak NFL theorem applying to real-valued predictions. I show that both versions refute the thesis of induction-friendliness. In the conclusion I argue that an a priori justification of the reliability of induction based on a uniform probability distribution over possible event sequences is impossible. In the outlook I consider two alternative approaches: (i) justification externalism and (ii) optimality justifications.

A Priori Justification

2006 ◽  
Vol 115 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-255
Author(s):  
J. Nagel
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification

Analyticity Reconsidered1

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Metaphysical Notion ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Way

This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained.

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