Kantian Moral Theory and the Destruction of the Self

2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 242-244
Author(s):  
John Silber ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Self ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

Review: Kantian Moral Theory and the Destruction of the Self

Mind ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 111 (442) ◽  
pp. 403-406
Author(s):  
R. Norman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Self ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

The Green’s Gambit

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Hale
Keyword(s):  
Ecosystem Services ◽  
Endangered Species ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Endangered Species Act ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

This chapter argues that reasons are underdetermined and often left out of value-based discussions of nature. The chapter offers a rough sketch of Kantian moral theory – particularly the first two formulations of the Categorical Imperative – to suggest that the primary charge of environmentalism ought to be that of encouraging deeper justification of actions. It utilizes the Endangered Species Act, the argument from ecosystem services, and the case of a stolen kidney to suggest that cost-benefit analysis and related methodologies are insufficient for addressing the broad ethical considerations of environmentalists.

Reconsidering Ontology’s Relevance

2021 ◽  
pp. 24-42
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Self ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Kwame Nkrumah ◽  
Moral Claims

This chapter and the next are methodological, focused on how to justify a moral theory. Many African philosophers believe that ethical claims follow immediately from ‘external’, metaphysical ones about human nature that must be established first. For example, Kwame Nkrumah maintains that an egalitarian ethic follows directly from a prior physicalist ontology, and Kwame Gyekye contends that his ‘moderate communitarian’ morality is derived from a certain conception of the self. Chapter 2 shows how these and similar rationales fail to clear the ‘is/ought gap’, as it is known in Western meta-ethics, and also how strategies one might use to bridge the gap do not work. It concludes that a more suitable way to defend a moral theory is to argue ‘internally’ to morality by appealing to intuitions, i.e., by determining which comparatively more controversial general principle of right action easily entails and best explains less controversial particular moral claims.

Schiller's Critique of Kant's Moral Psychology: Reconciling Practical Reason and an Ethics of Virtue

1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Gauthier
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Friedrich Schiller ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Kantian Morality ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

Mention of the name of Friedrich Schiller among both critics and defenders of Kant's moral philosophy has most often been with reference to the well known quip:“Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure.Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person.““Sure, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely,And then with aversion to do what your duty enjoins you.''This attention, however, has served to obscure the fact that Schiller truly intended his remark as a joke, representing a serious, if understandable, misinterpretation of Kantian morality. Though Schiller's various attempts to articulate a theory of moral motivation include important divergences from Kant's account, they represent a response to a set of problems that arise in the context of Kantian moral theory. As such, they may be of greatest interest to moralists who are working within the Kantian tradition. In this paper, I clarify certain points of Schiller's critique of Kant's account of moral motivation and place them in the context of his broader project of reconciling Kantianism and an ethics of virtue.

Kant and Animals

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Animal Minds ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals ◽  
The Right ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

This is an edited collection devoted to the topic of the role of animals within Kant’s philosophy. It addresses key issues within both his theoretical and practical philosophy. It examines the place of Kant’s model of animal minds in the historical and contemporary contexts. It addresses the question of whether Kant’s philosophy of mind allows for animals to be capable of intentional representations of spatiotemporal objects. It explores how Kant treated the issue of animal nature as it manifests in humans and non-humans alike, and questions how Kant’s scientific theory attempted to accommodate animals within his broader Enlightenment worldview. It also addresses traditional worries about the moral status of animals within Kant’s and Kantian moral theory. Kant notoriously denied that we have direct obligations to animals, and the question persists as to whether Kantian moral theory provides the right account of the moral status of non-human animals. Several papers in this collection address the question and whether Kant’s views can be defended or ought to be rejected altogether on this basis alone. The collection considers the relevance of Kantian theory for our understanding of contemporary challenges facing human beings with regard to our relationship to animals.

‘Letting the Phenomena In’: On How Herman's Kantianism Does and Does Not Answer the Empty Formalism Critique

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-47
Author(s):  
Sally Sedgwick
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
The Common ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

AbstractIn Moral Literacy, Barbara Herman informs us that she will defend an ‘enlarged version of Kantian moral theory’ (Herman 2008: ix). Her ‘enlarged version’, she says, will provide a much-needed alternative to the common but misguided characterization of Kant's practical philosophy as an empty formalism. I begin with a brief sketch of the main features of Herman's corrective account. I endorse her claim that the enlarged Kantianism she defends is true to Kant's intentions as well as successful in correcting the objections she outlines. I then argue that there is another version of the empty formalism worry Herman does not address. Not only does she not address it, but her form of Kantianism provides fuel for its fire.

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