John Rawls’ Theory of Social Justice

1985 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 85-86
Author(s):  
John T. Wilcox ◽  
Keyword(s):  
1982 ◽  
Vol 32 (127) ◽  
pp. 190
Author(s):  
D. D. Raphael ◽  
H. Gene Blocker ◽  
Elizabeth H. Smith
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Stanley Souza Marques ◽  
Marcelo Andrade Cattoni De Oliveira

The article takes up the criticisms directed by Axel Honneth to the basic structure of the dominant conceptions of justice, but merely to point out the general outlines of his alternative project of justice normative reconstruction. If John Rawls and Michael Walzer structure theories of distributive justice very consistently and in order to get to the autonomy protection (already taken so) in a more sophisticated way, that to be satisfied it transcends the (mere) obligation of not interfering in the realization of individual life projects, Honneth proposes the radicalization of justice's demands. It is because he pays his attention to the mutual expectation of consideration. This point would be the new texture of the social justice. In this sense, the principles of fair distribution leave the scene to make way for principles which guidelines are directed towards the society basic institutions involved in a new goal: to set up favourable contexts for the success of plural reciprocal relationships.


Author(s):  
Maluleka Khazamula Jan

The main issue that bothers indigenous people is an unequal and unjust representation of their knowledge in relation to the formalized Western education system. Despite the affirmation of indigenous knowledge by the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Western formal education system defines what knowledge and teaching methods are authentic or not. The purpose of this chapter is to determine the value of the indigenous knowledge and their pedagogic methods for preschool and school teachers. The data collected has been critically analyzed through John Rawls' theory of social justice. There is an agreement between authors and teachers that indigenous people had education systems that sustained them for years. This chapter provides some recommendations on how these valuable methods of teaching can be incorporated into the mainstream education systems.


John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 148-160
Author(s):  
Rainer Forst

John Rawls famously claimed that “the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance” are “arbitrary from a moral point of view.” Luck egalitarians believe that a conception of justice that eliminates the effects of circumstance but not of choice captures that intuition better than Rawls’s own principles of justice. This chapter argues that the opposite is the case. We can learn from Rawls that one cannot overcome moral arbitrariness in social life by using a morally arbitrary distinction between choice and circumstance. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the incompatibility between these two approaches points to a deeper difference between a deontological and a teleological paradigm that is crucial for the debate between relational and nonrelational notions of political and social justice.


1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp

In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls suggests that a theory of social justice is satisfactory only if it has both of two characteristics (pp. 182, 6). First, it must be capable of serving as the “public moral basis of society” (p. 182). That is, it must be reasonable to suppose that it would be strictly complied with while serving as the public conception of justice in a society which is in favourable circumstances—a society in which the people would strictly comply with any public conception of justice if the strains of commitment to it were not too great, given the general facts of psychology and moral learning (p. 145, cf. pp. 8, 175-83, 245-6). Second, a theory of justice must characterize “ … our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium” (p. 182).


Author(s):  
Antônio Walber Matias Muniz ◽  
Fernanda Eduardo Olea do Rio Muniz

Resumo: Este trabalho visa discutir sobre a aplicabilidade das concepções de justiça às políticas sociais no Brasil. Busca-se constatar qual concepção de justiça melhor se identifica com programas sociais do Governo Federal brasileiro, decorrentes da implantação de políticas públicas de combate à pobreza e de redução de desigualdades. Faz-se isso considerando a instituição do programa "Bolsa Família" frente as concepções de justiça formuladas por filósofos e economistas tais como: Platão, Aristóteles, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Del Vecchio, Kelsen, John Rawls, Hayek e Amartya Sem, os quais compõem a base metodológica desta pesquisa bibliográfica. Conclui-se que, a concepção de justiça preconizada pelo economista Amartya Sen, ao defender decisões políticas capazes de ampliar a justiça social para minimizar injustiças intoleráveis, promover o desenvolvimento, movimentar a economia e respeitar os direitos humanos, melhor se identifica com o programa governamental "Bolsa Família". Abstract: This paper aims to discuss the applicability of conceptions of justice to social policies in Brazil. It seeks to verify which conception of justice is best identified with social programs of the Brazilian Federal Government, resulting from the implementation of public policies to combat poverty and reduce inequalities. This is done by considering the institution of the Family Grant program in the face of the conceptions of justice formulated by philosophers and economists such as Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Del Vecchio, Kelsen, John Rawls, Hayek and Amartya Sem. which make up the methodological basis of this bibliographic research. It is concluded that the conception of justice advocated by the economist Amartya Sen, when defending political decisions capable of extending social justice to minimize intolerable injustices, promote development, move the economy and respect human rights, is better identified with the governmental program "Bolsa Família".


Author(s):  
Janet L. Finn ◽  
Maxine Jacobson

This entry examines the concept of social justice and its significance as a core value of social work. Diverse conceptualizations of social justice and their historical and philosophical underpinnings are examined. The influence of John Rawls' perspectives on social justice is addressed as are alternative conceptualizations, such as the capabilities perspective. The roots of social justice are traced through social work history, from the Settlement House Movement to the Rank and Film Movement, Civil Rights Movement, and contemporary struggles in the context of globalization. Challenges for social justice-oriented practice in the 21st century are address. The discussion concludes with concrete example of ways in which social workers are translating principles of social justice into concrete practices.


Author(s):  
Rodney G. Peffer

I take up the "What is equality?" controversy begun by Amartya Sen in 1979 by critically considering utility (J. S. Mill), primary goods (John Rawls), property rights (John Roemer) and basic capabilities in terms of what is to be distributed according to principles and theories of social justice. I then consider the four most general principles designed to answer issues raised by the Equality of Welfare principle, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare principle, Equality of Resources principle and Equality of Opportunity for Resources principle. I consider each with respect to the more general normative principle that whatever theory of social or distributive justice we accept should be as ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive as feasible in real world circumstances. In this context I take up the problems of expensive tastes, expensive disabilities, lowered or manipulated preferences or ‘needs,’ and differential needs versus differential talents and abilities. I argue that the best solution is to adopt a modified version of Rawls’ theory which takes primary social goods as that which is to be distributed but which demands a Basic Rights principle that insures basic subsistent rights (as well as basic security rights) as the most fundamental principle of morality (and social justice), and then demands that Rawls’ Difference Principle be applied lexically to the ‘material’ goods of income, wealth, and leisure time, but done so that the social basis of self-respect is never undermined.


Author(s):  
John Tomasi

This chapter considers two concepts of fairness, starting the discussion by focusing on market democracy's thick conception of economic freedom in relation to social justice. Market democracy breaks with traditional classical liberal and libertarian traditions in founding politics on a deliberative ideal of democratic citizenship, even as it makes room for a variety of rival conceptions of the nature of public reason. The chapter offers a market democratic interpretation of John Rawls' notion of justice as fairness. It also examines what free market fairness says about a society in which citizens are experiencing the blessings of liberal justice, along with its alternative perspective to social democracy's emphasis on instilling in the citizenry a sense of democratic solidarity. Finally, it compares the interpretations of social democracy and free market fairness regarding justice as fairness and the difference principle, respectively.


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