Moral Feeling and Moral Conversion in Kant's "Religion"

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-26
Author(s):  
Laura Papish ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Brophy

Agamben’s complicated engagement with Immanuel Kant celebrates the brilliance of the German idealist’s thought by disclosing its condemnatory weight in Western philosophy. Kant was writing in the midst of burgeoning industrial capitalism, when each new scientific discovery seemed to push back the fog of religion in favour of science and reason; meanwhile Agamben’s work develops in concert with the crises of advanced capitalism and borrows significantly from those philosophers who endured the most demoralising upheavals of the first half of the twentieth century. Whatever lanugo Kant was eager for us to shed in the name of individual freedom,1 Agamben sees in this crusade for civic maturity a surprising prescience: ‘[I]t is truly astounding how Kant, almost two centuries ago and under the heading of a sublime “moral feeling,” was able to describe the very condition that was to become familiar to the mass societies and great totalitarian states of our time’ (HS 52). To a remarkable extent, Agamben finds that Kant’s transcendental idealist frame of thought lays the philosophical foundation for the state of exception.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muawanah

Mental revolution starts from the education. Education is very important, as the strategic role of educations is to form children's mental nation. Development of culture and national character is realized through the area of education. Character development education is a continuous process and never ends (never ending process). As long as a nation exist, a character education must be an integral part of education over the generations. Implementation of character education should not be linked to the budget. It takes commitment and integrity of the stakeholders in the education sector to seriously implement the values of life in every lesson. Character education does not just teach what is right and what is wrong, but also inculcate the habit (habituation) of which one is a good thing. By doing so, students become acquainted (cognitive) about which one is good and bad, able to feel (affective) good value (loving the good/moral feeling), and behavior (moral action), and used to do (psychomotor). Thus, character education is closely related to the habit (custom) practiced and performed. Children do not need a curriculum, but a real life that support them. They learn from real life. What happens now, a lot of value or an existing teachings that are obscured, covered up with a lie that is packaged in an iconic form of advertising that is actually misleading.


Author(s):  
Honoré De Balzac
Keyword(s):  

Célestine and Hortense, who had become much more attached to each other by living under the same roof, spent nearly all their time together. The Baroness, impelled by a moral feeling that made her exaggerate the obligations of her post, devoted herself to the charitable...


Respect ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 192-204
Author(s):  
Stephen Darwall

In this essay, Stephen Darwall first develops a rich set of distinctions of different forms of respect that supplement the fundamental distinction of recognition and appraisal respect. He then applies it to Kant’s dictum from The Critique of Practical Reason that “before a common humble man … my spirit bows.” Darwall is particularly interested in what Kant says about the phenomenology of respect: how it occurs, how it feels, and the like. The framework Darwall developed earlier, allows him to show how respect as a moral feeling is not only a form of appraisal but also recognition respect, and how the moral feeling of respect relates to other forms, such as “social respect” and “honor respect.”


1869 ◽  
Vol 15 (70) ◽  
pp. 169-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Maudsley

Few are the readers, and we cannot boast to be of those few, who have been at the pains to toil through the many and voluminous writings of Emanuel Swedenborg. Indeed, it would not be far from the truth to say that there are very few persons who have thought it worth their while to study him at all seriously; he is commonly accounted a madman, who has had the singular fortune to persuade certain credulous persons that he was a seer. Nevertheless, whether lunatic or prophet, his character and his writings merit a serious and unbiased study. Madness, which makes its mark upon the world, and counts in its train many presumably sane people who see in it the highest wisdom, cannot justly be put aside contemptuously as undeserving a moment's grave thought. After all, there is no accident in madness; causality, not casualty, governs its appearance in the universe; and it is very far from being a good and sufficient practice to simply mark its phenomena, and straightway to pass on as if they belonged, not to an order, but to a disorder of events that called for no explanation. It is certain that there is in Swedenborg's revelations of the spiritual world a mass of absurdities sufficient to warrant the worst suspicions of his mental sanity; but, at the same time, it is not less certain that there are scattered in his writings conceptions of the highest philosophic reach, while throughout them is sensible an exalted tone of calm moral feeling which rises in many places to a real moral grandeur. These are the qualities which have gained him his best disciples, and they are qualites too uncommon in the world to be lightly despised, in whatever company they may be exhibited. I proceed then to give some account of Swedenborg, not purposing to make any review of his multitudinous publications, or any criticism of the doctrines announced in them with a matchless self-sufficiency; the immediate design being rather to present, by the help mainly of Mr. White's book, a sketch of the life and character of the man, and thus to obtain, and to endeavour to convey, some definite notion of what he was, what he did, and what should be concluded of him.*


1973 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Schindler
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-48
Author(s):  
Patrick H. Byrne ◽  
Keyword(s):  

Utilitas ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theo Van Willigenburg

I oppose the way John Skorupski characterizes morality in terms of the blameworthy and the role he consequently assigns to punitive feelings in directing one's will and shaping one's character. Skorupski does not hold that the punishment involved in blame- and guilt-feelings grounds the normativity of moral obligation. He defends a specific view of moral psychology and moral practice in which the blame-feeling disposes to the withdrawal of recognition, which involves some sort of casting the transgressor out of the community resulting in the suffering of repentance which is necessary to make atonement (at-one-ment) possible. I argue that this picture threatens to socialize morality. I defend the Kantian idea that the will is not aligned to obligation through castigation, but through our consciousness of our vocation as takers and givers of reasons. This highlights very different feelings as essential to the typically moral stance, feelings that are not necessarily punitive, like feelings of respect and reverence.


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