Determinants of Political Success of Foreign Manufacturers With the U.S. International Trade Commission

Author(s):  
Kathleen A. Rehbein ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 63-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Thomas

Patent infringement by foreign firms in U.S. markets challenges the effectiveness of legal patents as barriers to entry for firms developing marketing strategy for innovations. The United States International Trade Commission, an independent regulatory agency with broad powers to investigate patent infringement and other international marketing issues, offers a possible remedy for this problem. Data from 195 patent infringement cases completed since 1974 are the basis for discussing issues related to the ITC's role as regulator over a 14-year period.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Sidak

In the United States, a patent holder can pursue several remedies against a patent infringer. Section 284 of the Patent Act provides that, upon a finding of infringement, “the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty . . . .” In addition, § 283 provides that a court “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent.” Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 also allows a patent holder to petition the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)—a federal agency that investigates matters of international trade and advises on international trade policy— to issue an exclusion order against an infringer, a remedy that denies the importation and sale in the United States of products that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent.3 In a case of patent infringement, a patent holder may thus seek damages for the infringement, an injunction, and an exclusion order.


Author(s):  
Hyejoon Im ◽  
Hankyoung Sung

Abstract This paper addresses the manner in which political and economic factors affect the voting behavior of House representatives on free trade agreement (FTA) implementation bills in the 108th and 109th Congresses in the U.S., using a simultaneous probit-tobit model consisting of contribution and voting equations. We find that representatives whose districts have relatively higher employment in 'trade-sensitive’ sectors are likely to oppose FTA bills. By comparing our results with the reports of the U.S. International Trade Commission, we discover that the voting behavior of representatives is more receptive to the sectors predicted to be adversely affected by an FTA than to those predicted otherwise. Another finding is that when FTA bills, for which partner countries do not share commonalities, are considered on the same day in the House, members’ voting behavior may be similar.


2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
John J. VanSickle ◽  
Edward A. Evans ◽  
Robert D. Emerson

U.S. growers filed an antidumping case against Canadian growers of greenhouse-grown tomatoes, alleging that U.S. growers were being injured, or threatened with material injury, by imports from Canada. The U.S. Department of Commerce determined that imports of greenhouse-grown tomatoes were being sold in U.S. markets at less than fair market value. The U.S. International Trade Commission determined the “like product” to be all fresh market tomatoes, concluding the domestic industry was not materially injured. Anecdotal evidence used by the Commission Department in determining like product ignores the wealth of knowledge that economics can add. An economic model is proposed for purposes of determining like product.


2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Muhammad ◽  
Sammy J. Neal ◽  
Terrill R. Hanson ◽  
Keithly G. Jones

The primary objective of this study was to assess the impact of catfish imports and tariffs on the U.S. catfish industry, with particular focus on the U.S. International Trade Commission ruling on Vietnam in 2003. Given the importance of Vietnam to the U.S. catfish market, it was assumed that catfish import prices would increase by 35 percent if the maximum tariff was imposed on catfish from Vietnam. With the tariff, domestic catfish prices at the wholesale level would increase by $0.06 per lb, and farm prices by $0.03 per lb. Processor sales would increase by 1.66 percent. Total welfare at the wholesale level would increase from $69.2 million to $71.7 million, an increase of about 3.63 percent, and processor and farm revenue would increase by 4.4 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively. These results represent the greatest possible benefit and suggest modest gains for the U.S. catfish industry.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document