Elia Kazan and the Hollywood Blacklist

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 21-42
Author(s):  
Sander Lee ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theories ◽  
Hollywood Blacklist ◽  
Do So ◽  
High Noon ◽  
Elia Kazan

In April 1952, Elia Kazan appeared before HUAC and named names. Although he refused to do so in an earlier appearance, this time, having been warned that his film career was in jeopardy, he named many of his colleagues and friends. While he is far from the only one to turn informer, his case garners the most attention for a variety of reasons. In this essay, I examine Kazan’s justifications for his acts, acts that contributed to the destruction of the careers of many of his talented colleagues and friends. I wish to discover whether his arguments are philosophically plausible and how the themes in his film On the Waterfront (1954) contribute to the debate over these issues. In contrast, I examine the film High Noon (1952), largely seen as an attack on the practice of informing. I examine how Utilitarian and Kantian moral theories might be used either to justify or condemn Kazan’s actions. Finally, if we stipulate that Kazan’s acts before HUAC were immoral, does this mean that we should boycott his art or deny him accolades that his work would otherwise merit?

Epilogue

2021 ◽  
pp. 241-242
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
African Country ◽  
Good Position ◽  
African Students ◽  
Intellectual Traditions ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Political Philosopher ◽  
Do So

At the end of the first chapter (1.5), I noted that, since having moved to an African country, I have considered myself to have had a moral obligation to engage with its intellectual traditions when teaching and researching. I would have rightly felt guilt had I taught merely Western ethics to African students and contributed only Euro-American-Australasian perspectives to journals published in the sub-Saharan region. Having been principally trained as an analytic moral and political philosopher, I have been in a good position to articulate normative-theoretic interpretations of African morality, to evaluate these moral theories by appealing to intuitions, and to apply them to a range of practical controversies. Now, it would be welcome if the relational moral theory I have defended in this book could explain why I had a duty to make such a contribution to the field. And indeed it does. I have had an obligation of some weight to teach and research African philosophical ideas as I am particularly able to do so for a reason that is by now familiar to the reader. In the way that a newly trained doctor has an obligation of some weight to give something back to his country before emigrating (...

How to Count Animals, more or less

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelly Kagan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Animal Ethics ◽  
Moral Deliberation ◽  
Hierarchical Approach ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Do So

According to a prominent view in contemporary philosophical discussions of animal ethics—a view the author calls unitarianism—animals have the same moral status as people do, so that otherwise similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration in moral deliberation. In contrast, this book lays out and defends a hierarchical approach, according to which people count more than animals do, and some animals count more than others. Surprisingly, although this idea is close to being commonsense, for the most part moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of these crucial differences in status. Accordingly, the author both argues for a hierarchical account of morality and explores what suitably status sensitive moral principles might look like. Particular topics examined include the modification of distributive principles to take account of status, whether animals should be given deontological standing, and the moral complications that arise in cases that either involve defending animals or defending people from animals. The book also considers what the basis of moral status might be, and it responds to some of the potentially troubling implications of adopting a hierarchical approach to morality.

The Political Philosophy of Biological Endowments: Some Considerations

1987 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Great Difficulty ◽  
The Political ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Gains And Losses ◽  
Do So

Is a government required or permitted to redistribute the gains and losses that differences in biological endowments generate? In particular, does the fact that individuals possess different biological endowments lead to unfair advantages within a market economy? These are questions on which some people are apt to have strong intuitions and ready arguments. Egalitarians may say yes and argue that as unearned, undeserved advantages and disadvantages, biological endowments are never fair, and that the market simply exacerbates these inequities. Libertarians may say no, holding that the possession of such endowments deprives no one of an entitlement and that any system but a market would deprive agents of the rights to their endowments. Biological endowments may well lead to advantages or disadvantages on their view, but not to unfair ones.I do not have strong intuitions about answers to these questions, in part because I believe that they are questions of great difficulty. To begin, alternative answers rest on substantial assumptions in moral philosophy that seem insufficiently grounded. Moreover, the questions involve several problematical assumptions about the nature of biological endowments. Finally, I find the questions to be academic, in the pejorative sense of this term. For aside from a number of highly debilitating endowments, the overall moral significance of differences between people seems so small, so I interdependent and so hard to measure, that these differences really will 1 not enter into practical redistributive calculations, even if it is theoretically i permissible that they do so.Before turning to a detailed discussion of biological endowments and their moral significance, I sketch my doubts about the fundamental moral theories that dictate either the impermissibility or the obligation to compensate for different biological endowments.

Preferences’ Significance Does Not Depend on Their Content

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-234
Author(s):  
Evan G. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theories ◽  
Do So

Moral theories which include a preference-fulfillment aspect should not restrict their concern to some subset of people’s preferences such as “now-for-now” preferences. Instead, preferences with all contents—e.g. ones which are external, diachronic, or even modal—should be taken into account. I offer a conceptualization of preferences and preference fulfillment which allows us to understand odd species of preferences, and I give a series of examples showing what it would mean to fulfill such preferences and why we ought to do so.

What Is Moral Standing?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Sher
Keyword(s):  
Moral Standing ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Moral Importance ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Normal Humans ◽  
Do So

People employ the concept of moral standing when they try to explain why (or, less frequently, deny that) all humans are of equal moral importance. They also do so when they ask whether animals, fetuses, or seriously and permanently impaired humans are of lesser status than normal humans. But what do claims about moral standing come to, and how are they related to other moral categories such as obligation, value, and rights? This chapter develops a conception of moral standing that is neutral among the competing moral theories and their competing vocabularies and concepts. The main thesis defended is that a being’s moral standing relative to a given theory depends not on how the theory’s principles say it should be treated but rather on whether claims about its interests are among the inputs to the arguments by which the theory defends its principles.

Hume's General Point of View, Smith's Impartial Spectator, and the Moral Value of Interacting with Outsiders

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-37
Author(s):  
John McHugh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
General Point ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Do So

Here is an appealing position: one reason to pursue interaction with people from backgrounds that differ from our own is that doing so can improve our moral judgment. As some scholars have noticed, this position seems pedigreed by support from the famed philosophers of human sociability, David Hume and Adam Smith. But regardless of whether Hume or Smith personally held anything like the appealing position, neither might have had theoretically grounded reason to do so. In fact, both philosophers explain moral judgment in ways that seem to present obstacles to the acceptance of the appealing position. This paper entertains the possibility that either of their moral theories contains resources to overcome these obstacles and implies the appealing position. I argue that Smith's theory does so more straightforwardly than Hume's does. This difference, I also argue, reveals something important about the Hume-Smith philosophical relationship. I close by sketching a way to fit the source of the appealing position in Smith's moral psychology with his focus on the desire for mutual sympathy.

Holding replication studies to mainstream standards of evidence

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duane T. Wegener ◽  
Leandre R. Fabrigar
Keyword(s):  
Replication Studies ◽  
Replication Research ◽  
Standards Of Evidence ◽  
Do So

AbstractReplications can make theoretical contributions, but are unlikely to do so if their findings are open to multiple interpretations (especially violations of psychometric invariance). Thus, just as studies demonstrating novel effects are often expected to empirically evaluate competing explanations, replications should be held to similar standards. Unfortunately, this is rarely done, thereby undermining the value of replication research.

Electron Microscopy of a Herpesvirus Isolated from Marek's Disease in Duck and Chicken Embryo Fibroblast Cultures

1968 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 222-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyvan Nazerian
Keyword(s):  
Inclusion Bodies ◽  
Chicken Embryo Fibroblast ◽  
Marek's Disease ◽  
Marek’S Disease ◽  
Duck Embryo Fibroblast ◽  
Multinucleated Cells ◽  
Viral Particles ◽  
Infected Cells ◽  
And Control ◽  
Do So

A herpes-like virus has been isolated from duck embryo fibroblast (DEF) cultures inoculated with blood from Marek's disease (MD) infected birds. Cultures which contained this virus produced MD in susceptible chickens while virus negative cultures and control cultures failed to do so. This and other circumstantial evidence including similarities in properties of the virus and the MD agent implicate this virus in the etiology of MD.Histochemical studies demonstrated the presence of DNA-staining intranuclear inclusion bodies in polykarocytes in infected cultures. Distinct nucleo-plasmic aggregates were also seen in sections of similar multinucleated cells examined with the electron microscope. These aggregates are probably the same as the inclusion bodies seen with the light microscope. Naked viral particles were observed in the nucleus of infected cells within or on the edges of the nucleoplasmic aggregates. These particles measured 95-100mμ, in diameter and rarely escaped into the cytoplasm or nuclear vesicles by budding through the nuclear membrane (Fig. 1). The enveloped particles (Fig. 2) formed in this manner measured 150-170mμ in diameter and always had a densely stained nucleoid. The virus in supernatant fluids consisted of naked capsids with 162 hollow, cylindrical capsomeres (Fig. 3). Enveloped particles were not seen in such preparations.

Debates in Dysphagia Management: How Do You Use Evidence-Based Practice in Your Dysphagia Patient Care?

2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 121-123
Author(s):  
Jeri A. Logemann
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Patient Care ◽  
Clinical Outcomes ◽  
Clinical Judgment ◽  
Clinical Decision Making ◽  
Evidence Based Practice ◽  
Clinical Decision ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Clinical Method ◽  
Do So

Evidence-based practice requires astute clinicians to blend our best clinical judgment with the best available external evidence and the patient's own values and expectations. Sometimes, we value one more than another during clinical decision-making, though it is never wise to do so, and sometimes other factors that we are unaware of produce unanticipated clinical outcomes. Sometimes, we feel very strongly about one clinical method or another, and hopefully that belief is founded in evidence. Some beliefs, however, are not founded in evidence. The sound use of evidence is the best way to navigate the debates within our field of practice.

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