QBism: An Analytical Review

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 199-216
Author(s):  
Alexander A. Pechenkin ◽  

A new interpretation of quantum mechanics, the interpretation which became popular in XXI, has been taken under consideration. This is the quantum baysinism (QBism) which may be taken as an extrapolation of the baysian philosophy of probability over the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The baysian philosophy of quantum mechanics has been compared with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, the interpretation which can been treated as standard as it is represented in the main textbooks. In contrast to the Copenhagen interpretation which proceeds from the triplets – nature, apparatus and observer (agent), QBism emphasizes the conscious of the observer: the quantum state is the observer’s state, and by means of the quantum conceptual technique the observer constructs his/her own image of quantum processes. By means of measurement the observer updates his/her quantum state, the measuring apparatus being an extension of the observer’s sensuality. From the point of the QBism’s view the phenomenon of decoherence which is widely discussed in the contemporary literature is not essential for the theory of measurement in quantum mechanics. The decoherence explains why the macroscopic phenomena don’t expose the interference behavior which is characteristic for quantum superposition. From the historicо-philosophical point of view Qbism can be traced back to American instrumentalism and operationalism.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
SAYANTAN GUPTA

In quantum mechanics, quantum suicide is a thought experiment, originally published independently by Hans Moravec in1987 and Bruno Marchal in 1988, and independently developed further by Max Tegmark in 1998. It attempts to distinguish betweenthe Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and the Everett many-worlds interpretation by means of a variation of theSchrodinger's cat thought experiment, from the cat's point of view. Quantum immortality refers to the subjective experience ofsurviving quantum suicide regardless of the odds. The paper is a survey of the experiment of quantum suicide.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Sebastián Ardenghi ◽  
Olimpia Lombardi

Modal interpretations are non-collapse interpretations, where the quantum state of a system describes its possible properties rather than the properties that it actually possesses. Among them, the atomic modal interpretation (AMI) assumes the existence of a special set of disjoint systems that fixes the preferred factorization of the Hilbert space. The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the AMI and our recently presented modal-hamiltonian interpretation (MHI), by showing that the MHI can be viewed as a kind of “atomic” interpretation in two different senses. On the one hand, the MHI provides a precise criterion for the preferred factorization of the Hilbert space into factors representing elemental systems. On the other hand, the MHI identifies the atomic systems that represent elemental particles on the basis of the Galilei group. Finally, we will show that the MHI also introduces a decomposition of the Hilbert space of any elemental system, which determines with precision what observables acquire definite actual values.


2004 ◽  
Vol 02 (03) ◽  
pp. 407-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
TABISH QURESHI

A thought experiment, proposed by Karl Popper, which has been experimentally realized recently, is critically examined. A basic flaw in Popper's argument which has also been prevailing in subsequent debates, is pointed out. It is shown that Popper's experiment can be understood easily within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. An alternate experiment, based on discrete variables, is proposed, which constitutes Popper's test in a clearer way. It refutes the argument of absence of nonlocality in quantum mechanics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-156
Author(s):  
Jeanne Peijnenburg ◽  
David Atkinson

Abstract How certain is Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle?Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is at the heart of the orthodox or Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. We first sketch the history that led up to the formulation of the principle. Then we recall that there are in fact two uncertainty principles, both dating from 1927, one by Werner Heisenberg and one by Earle Kennard. Finally, we explain that recent work in physics gives reason to believe that the principle of Heisenberg is invalid, while that of Kennard still stands.


Quanta ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Oldofredi ◽  
Michael Esfeld

Paul Dirac has been undoubtedly one of the central figures of the last century physics, contributing in several and remarkable ways to the development of quantum mechanics; he was also at the centre of an active community of physicists, with whom he had extensive interactions and correspondence. In particular, Dirac was in close contact with Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli. For this reason, among others, Dirac is generally considered a supporter of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Similarly, he was considered a physicist sympathetic with the positivistic attitude which shaped the development of quantum theory in the 1920s. Against this background, the aim of the present essay is twofold: on the one hand, we will argue that, analyzing specific examples taken from Dirac's published works, he can neither be considered a positivist nor a physicist methodologically guided by the observability doctrine. On the other hand, we will try to disentangle Dirac's figure from the mentioned Copenhagen interpretation, since in his long career he employed remarkably different—and often contradicting—methodological principles and philosophical perspectives with respect to those followed by the supporters of that interpretation.Quanta 2019; 8: 68–87.


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