Epistemological–Normative Function of the Basic Norm in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-42
Author(s):  
Wojciech Włoch ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (40) ◽  
Author(s):  
Helder Gonçalves Lima ◽  
Adrualdo Lima Catão

RESUMOO presente tem como finalidade analisar a obra “Teoria Pura do Direito”, de Hans Kelsen, numa visão mais contemporânea, mediante uma análise do propósito encampado pelo autor de Viena e que, por vezes, é pouco compreendido no cenário jurídico brasileiro. Para tanto, o estudo compreenderá conceitos firmados pelo autor, numa busca por explicar os conceitos que ensinou sobre a moldura e a questão da norma fundamental. Assim, a intenção é disseminar os estudos de Kelsen na perspectiva atual, haja vista ter influência não somente no seio acadêmico, mas também na jurisprudência por meio de sua visão de aplicação do direito.PALAVRAS-CHAVETeoria do Direito. Hans Kelsen. Interpretação. Aplicação. Norma fundamental. ABSTRACTThe purpose of this paper is to analyze Hans Kelsen's book "Pure Theory of Law", in a more modern way, through an analysis of the purpose of the Vienna author and which is sometimes little understood in the Brazilian legal context. For this, the study will include concepts signed by the author, in a search to explain the concepts he taught about the framework and the question of the basic norm. Thus, the intention is to disseminate Kelsen's studies in the current perspective, since it has influenced not only in the academic sphere but also in court decisions through his vision of the application of law.KEYWORDSLegal theory. Hans Kelsen. Interpretation. Application. Basic norm.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
JÖRG KAMMERHOFER

AbstractHans Kelsen is known both as a legal theorist and as an international lawyer. This article shows that his theory of international law is an integral part of the Kelsenian Pure Theory of Law. Two areas of international law are analysed: first, Kelsen's coercive order paradigm and its relationship to the bellum iustum doctrine; second, the Kelsenian notion of the unity of all law vis-à-vis theories of the relationship of international and municipal law. In a second step, the results of Kelsenian general legal theory of the late period – as interpreted and developed by the present author – are reapplied to selected doctrines of international law. Thus is the coercive order paradigm resolved, the unity of law dissolved, and the UN Charter reinterpreted to show that the concretization of norms as positive international law cannot be unmade by a scholarship usurping the right to make law.


1968 ◽  
Vol 18 (73) ◽  
pp. 377
Author(s):  
A. D. Woozley ◽  
Hans Kelsen ◽  
Max Knight
Keyword(s):  

1971 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 617 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Ebenstein

KPGT_dlutz_1 ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-35
Author(s):  
Ricardo Borrmann

This paper offers an original analysis of the interconnections between law and psychoanalysis through the personal and academic exchanges between Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). After a brief analysis of the similar cultural background of both scholars as Jews who grew up in fin-de-siècle Vienna, the text focuses on the personal encounters between them and subsequently analyzes Kelsen's reception of Freud's work in “The State-Concept and Social-Psychology” (Der Begriff des Staates und die Sozialpsychologie). Kelsen’s text was originally published in 1922 in Freud’s review, Imago, resulting from a conference he held at the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society. This paper analyzes the relevance of Freud’s theory to the construction of the Pure Theory of Law, especially regarding his concept of the state. Furthermore, it presents a new hypothesis for the subjective reasons behind Kelsen’s attraction to psychoanalysis, and for his admiration of Freud, which it tries to understand through the personal context of Kelsen’s life. Finally, it deals with the possible influence of Kelsen on Freud's work, especially with regards to the term "Super-Ego."


Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

This chapter discusses Hans Kelsen's influential attempt to present a “pure” theory of law, and the reasons for its failure. It tries to show that Kelsen's pure theory of law is the most striking—and in many ways, still the most interesting—defense of a complete detachment view, both in method and substance. It argues that the main reason for the failure of this project is that it identified the detachment view with antireductionism. Kelsen thought that a theory about the nature of law should avoid any reduction of legal facts to facts of any other type, either social or moral.


2017 ◽  
pp. 101-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kelsen †
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 8-35
Author(s):  
Robert Schuett

Why is Kelsen such a consequential and controversial, perhaps even misunderstood, political thinker and actor? Who wants to make us believe that Kelsen was a naïve idealist dreaming up a Kantian peace and throwing white sand at battle cruisers? The chapter is a rebuttal of the many clichés propounded by Schmittians and the other pseudo-realists that are thrown at Kelsen and the project of a Pure theory of law, state, and international legal order. The fact that the FBI was after Kelsen as an alleged communist is as ridiculous as it is tragic, and even two of his own students, Hans J. Morgenthau and John H. Herz, did not seem to understand legal positivism’s cold analysis of political and international life. The same goes for the fact that Kelsen was, actually, a tough Freudian human nature realist who turned the tables on natural law ideologues. Who’s naïve now?


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