The Imperfect Nature of Corporate Responsibilities to Stakeholders

2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lea

Abstract:In this paper, I specifically consider the issue of corporate governance and normative stakeholder theory. In doing so, I argue that stakeholder theory and responsibilities to non-shareholder constituencies can be made more intelligible by reference to Kant’s conception of perfect and imperfect duties. I draw upon Onora O’Neill’s (1996) work, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning. In her text O’Neill underlines a number of relevant issues including: the integration of particularist and universalist accounts of morality; the priority of obligations over rights; the importance of the distinction between imperfect and perfect duties; and the relation between the virtues and imperfect duties. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the paper argues that business ethicists should avoid recommending the institutionalising of stakeholder responsibilities in terms of legally defined sets of stakeholder rights. Instead, we should regard stakeholder responsibilities as uniformalised imperfect duties. Conceiving responsibilities to all stakeholder groups in this manner, allows the firm the freedom to perfect these duties in ways appropriate to cultural and societal setting, and in accordance with the capacity to do so.

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-49
Author(s):  
K. M. Anwarul Islam ◽  
Abul Bashar Bhuiyan

As part the Corporate Governance, the Shariah Supervisory Board has a significant role in the Islamic Financial Institutes for ensuring its conformity with the Shariah standards. In general, the Corporate governance should be played essential roles to design and promote principles of fairness, accountability, and transparency to meet of all the stakeholder’s rights such as shareholders, the workers, the depositors, and the customers, etc. however, there are still struggling for convincing arguments to justify stakeholders’ participation in governance in the traditional conventional systems rather, the Stakeholder theory has become one of the most important developments in the field of business ethics, which is widely regarded as being a key element in Islamic banking, making it of extreme relevance in Islam’s principles of property rights, commitment. Therefore, this study aims to justify the theoretical linkages or relationship between the role of the Shariah Supervisory Board of Islamic banking and stakeholders’ model from the existing empirical literature review. The summary of empirical review findings revealed that the stakeholder concept in a way that overcomes many of the existing limitations and provides a different understanding of the identity and meaning of Islamic banking, specifically in terms of its relationship to stakeholder groups, such as Islamic banks are a connected body, they should have control over the external environment and should implement hierarchies. Moreover, the developed a conceptual framework to do empirical research by applying real data to test the significance of the above relationships for further policy explorations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 439-446
Author(s):  
Hamid Ait lemqeddem ◽  
◽  
Mounya Tomas ◽  

There is renewed interest in the need to focus on corporate governance in an environment where it is a performance imperative for all small and large organizations, private and public, beginner or established.The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the place of corporate governance practices in organizations to ensure that the board, officers, and directors take action to protect shareholder interests and all stakeholders. It is important to focus on the effect of these practices on improving performance and competitiveness. To do so, we opted for the hypothetico-deductive method with a quantitative approach. Our theoretical foundation is theory is agency theory.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Ahson Azmat

AbstractLeading accounts of tort law split cleanly into two seams. Some trace its foundations to a deontic form of morality; others to an instrumental, policy-oriented system of efficient loss allocation. An increasingly prominent alternative to both seams, Civil Recourse Theory (CRT) resists this binary by arguing that tort comprises a basic legal category, and that its directives constitute reasons for action with robust normative force. Using the familiar question whether tort’s directives are guidance rules or liability rules as a lens, or prism, this essay shows how considerations of practical reasoning undermine one of CRT’s core commitments. If tort directives exert robust normative force, we must account for its grounds—for where it comes from, and why it obtains. CRT tries to do so by co-opting H.L.A. Hart’s notion of the internal point of view, but this leveraging strategy cannot succeed: while the internal point of view sees legal directives as guides to action, tort law merely demands conformity. To be guided by a directive is to comply with it, not conform to it, so tort’s structure blocks the shortcut to normativity CRT attempts to navigate. Given the fine-grained distinctions the theory makes, and with the connection between its claims and tort’s requirements thus severed, CRT faces a dilemma: it’s either unresponsive to tort’s normative grounds, or it’s inattentive to tort’s extensional structure.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill Atkins ◽  
Mohamed Zakari ◽  
Ismail Elshahoubi

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which board of directors’ mechanism is implemented in Libyan listed companies. This includes a consideration of composition, duties and responsibilities of the board directors. This study employed a questionnaire survey to collect required data from four key stakeholder groups: Boards of Directors (BD), Executive Managers (EM), Regulators and External Auditors (RE) and Other Stakeholders (OS). The results of this study provided evidence that Libyan listed companies generally comply with the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) requirements regarding the board composition: the findings assert that most boards have between three and eleven members, the majority of whom are non-executives and at least two or one-third of whom (whichever is greater) are independent. Moreover, the results indicate that general assemblies in Libyan listed companies are practically committed to the LCGC’s requirements regarding the appointment of board members and their length of tenure. The findings provide evidence that boards in Libyan listed companies are carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with internal regulations and laws, as well as the stipulations of the LCGC (2007). Furthermore, the stakeholder groups were broadly satisfied that board members are devoting sufficient time and effort to discharge these duties and responsibilities properly. This study helps to enrich our understanding and knowledge of the current practice of corporate boards as a significant mechanism of corporate governance (CG) by being the first to address the board of directors’ mechanism in Libyan listed companies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
pp. 679-692
Author(s):  
Simon Hollnaicher

Abstract According to a well-known problem in climate ethics, individual actions cannot be wrong due to their impact on climate change since the individual act does not make a difference. By referring to the practical interpretation of the categorical imperative, the author argues that certain actions lead to a contradiction in conception in light of the climate crisis. Universalizing these actions would cause foreseeable climate impacts, making it impossible to pursue the original maxim effectively. According to the practical interpretation, such actions are morally wrong. The wrongness of these actions does not depend on making a difference, rather these actions are wrong because they make it impossible for others to act accordingly. Thus, apart from imperfect duties, for which has been argued convincingly elsewhere (Henning 2016; Alberzart 2019), we also have perfect duties to refrain from certain actions in the face of the climate crisis.


2020 ◽  
pp. 017084062094455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Poulis ◽  
Efthimios Poulis ◽  
Paul Jackson

Alignment of organizations with external imperatives is seen as a sine qua non of proper organizing and strategizing by many fit and complexity scholars. Any deviation from this management mantra engenders organizational decline and, ultimately, mortality. We put this axiomatic principle under empirical scrutiny and use the law of requisite variety as our organizing principle to do so. The law is an iconic cornerstone of this matching contingency logic and it has served to legitimize a wide range of fit decisions in, e.g., leadership, organizational learning and corporate governance. Inspired by organizational vignettes inhabiting antithetical complexity regimes, we introduce a novel concept, which we label ‘agentic misfit’. In this way, we deconstruct deterministic assumptions related to environmental fittingness, we challenge teleological orientations in the fit literature, and we flesh out the viability of non-matching human agency amid complexity.


Author(s):  
Derek French

This chapter surveys corporate governance. It identifies the key problem of the separation of ownership and control in companies that are not owner-managed. Shareholders are seen as the owners of the company but directors manage the company and can do so for their own benefit rather than the shareholders’. There is a list of the numerous legal controls on directors, which are studied in other chapters. There is discussion of two ways of looking at directors, either as stewards who must account for their actions to the owners or as entrepreneurs whose wealth-creating work deserves reward. The UK Corporate Governance Code, which applies to premium listed companies, is discussed, as is shareholder activism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
pp. 19765
Author(s):  
Pushpika Vishwanathan ◽  
Jan-Willem Stoelhorst

Author(s):  
Cassandra R. Cole ◽  
Enya He ◽  
Kathleen A. McCullough ◽  
Anastasia Semykina ◽  
David W. Sommer

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