Aristotle’s Ethics and Moral Responsibility, by Javier Echenique

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-446
Author(s):  
Steven Skultety ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 124 (4) ◽  
pp. 575-578
Author(s):  
Susan Sauvé Meyer

Author(s):  
Mihaela Constantinescu ◽  
Cristina Voinea ◽  
Radu Uszkai ◽  
Constantin Vică

AbstractDuring the last decade there has been burgeoning research concerning the ways in which we should think of and apply the concept of responsibility for Artificial Intelligence. Despite this conceptual richness, there is still a lack of consensus regarding what Responsible AI entails on both conceptual and practical levels. The aim of this paper is to connect the ethical dimension of responsibility in Responsible AI with Aristotelian virtue ethics, where notions of context and dianoetic virtues play a grounding role for the concept of moral responsibility. The paper starts by highlighting the important difficulties in assigning responsibility to either technologies themselves or to their developers. Top-down and bottom-up approaches to moral responsibility are then contrasted, as we explore how they could inform debates about Responsible AI. We highlight the limits of the former ethical approaches and build the case for classical Aristotelian virtue ethics. We show that two building blocks of Aristotle’s ethics, dianoetic virtues and the context of actions, although largely ignored in the literature, can shed light on how we could think of moral responsibility for both AI and humans. We end by exploring the practical implications of this particular understanding of moral responsibility along the triadic dimensions of ethics by design, ethics in design and ethics for designers.


Classics ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thornton Lockwood

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (EN) is the first part of what Aristotle calls “a philosophy of human things” (EN X.9.1181b15), one which finds its completion in Aristotle’s Politics (see the separate Oxford Bibliographies article Aristotle’s Politics). (Throughout this article, references to Ethics or EN are to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics; for the relationship of the Nicomachean Ethics to Aristotle’s other ethical writings, including the Eudemian Ethics (EE), see Relationship between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics.) The work inaugurates the study of “ethics” as an independent discipline, albeit a discpline which is broader than modern notions of morality, which is primarily practical rather than theoretical, and which is the companion study to politics. The Ethics sets as its goal the understanding of the human good, or eudaimonia, which Aristotle describes as “an activity of the soul in accord with virtue” (I.7.1098a16–17). Its analyses range over the nature of the human soul, the notion of moral responsibility, the ethical and intellectual qualities—called virtues—that are perfections of the nonrational and rational parts of the soul, ways in which reason and desire are unified and in conflict, the nature of pleasure, and the various kinds of friendship that contribute to the human good. Although the work includes a treasure trove of passages that paint a picture of 4th-century Greek social and linguistic practices, the work’s most lasting significance has been its articulation of a philosophical vocabulary and framework to address many of the central questions concerning human well-being.


Moreana ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (Number 207) (1) ◽  
pp. 19-35
Author(s):  
Louis W. Karlin ◽  
Jordan D. Teti

“Equity,” a fertile concept for understanding justice in More's time, has its origins in Greek and Roman philosophy. As the putative emissary of Greek (and Ciceronian) philosophy in More's Utopia, it is thus fitting that Raphael Hythloday expressly acknowledges classical sources in his references to equity, such as in his allusion to the “leaden rule” of Aristotle and his paraphrase of Cicero's famous epigram, “summum ius, summa iniuria.” In substance, however, Raphael's understanding of equity differs from that of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. For example, while classical thinkers sought flexibility in the application of written law so as to accord with a higher justice (as in the “leaden rule”), Raphael rejects such impure flexibility. Also, Utopia, itself, a land with few laws and fewer lawyers, lacks equity as it was traditionally understood—that is, as a justice-facilitating corrective to the imprecision of written law. Nevertheless, Raphael emotionally concludes Book Two by apparently praising the “fairness” (aequitas) of Utopia. Despite his appeals to equity, Raphael actually appears to be an inequitable man in the action of the dialogue, with his brash monologues, tendentious citations of the Gospel, and dubious references to equity, itself. By contrast, Cardinal Morton and Morus embody the traits of the “equitable man,” a figure with a key role in promoting justice in Aristotle's Ethics and Rhetoric and in bringing about the best regime in Plato's Laws and Republic. This irony in Utopia helps readers appreciate the fruits and risks of incorporating philosophy into politics, especially as it relates to clamoring for reform. We see the important distinction between impassioned partisans of philosophy (such as Raphael) and the enlightened gentleness of men like Morton and Morus.


DeKaVe ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arief Agung Suwasono

Television is a medium that delivers meaning through various type of text television conveys information that promotes moral responsibility and social solidarity. In spite of the fact that television is one of capitalism product, its programs can generate social commitment and solidarity reflecting human moral values.Keyword : Television, Fetisme


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