A New Argument for the Incompatibility of Hylomorphism and Metaphysical Naturalism

2015 ◽  
Vol 89 ◽  
pp. 119-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Travis Dumsday ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Metaphysical Naturalism

Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-193
Author(s):  
Zahra Zargar ◽  
Ebrahim Azadegan ◽  
Lotfollah Nabavi
Keyword(s):  
Metaphysical Naturalism

Alvin Plantinga’s Pox on Metaphysical Naturalism

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-142
Author(s):  
James K. Beilby ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Metaphysical Naturalism

Platonism about Abstracta

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-158
Author(s):  
Travis Dumsday ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Abstract Entities ◽  
Metaphysical Naturalism

I present a new argument to the effect that platonism about abstract entities (at least when combined with a specific understanding of the abstract / concrete distinction) undermines metaphysical naturalism and provides some support to theism. I further suggest that there are ways of extending this line of reasoning to point toward one or another more specific varieties of Christian theism.

No God, No Powers

2019 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-426
Author(s):  
James Orr ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Nancy Cartwright ◽  
Modal Force ◽  
Metaphysical Naturalism ◽  
Physical Objects ◽  
Dispositional Properties

One common feature of debates about the best metaphysical analysis of putatively lawful phenomena is the suspicion that nomic realists who locate the modal force of such phenomena in quasi-causal necessitation relations between universals are working with a model of law that cannot convincingly erase its theological pedigree. Nancy Cartwright distills this criticism into slogan form: no God, no laws. Some have argued that a more plausible alternative for nomic realists who reject theism is to ground laws of nature in the fundamental dispositional properties or “pure powers” of physical objects. This article argues that for all its advantages over deflationary and rival realist accounts, a pandispositionalist account of law cuts against the commitment to metaphysical naturalism that its supporters almost always presuppose. It then examines and rejects a Platonic version of this account before elaborating and advancing a theistic alternative that is more theoretically powerful and more metatheoretically parsimonious. In slogan form: no God, no powers.

Metaphysical Naturalism and Some Moral Realisms

Philo ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Carey Jordan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Metaphysical Naturalism

The Role of Metaphysical Naturalism in Science

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (10) ◽  
pp. 1437-1459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Mahner
Keyword(s):  
Metaphysical Naturalism

scholarly journals On Characterizing Metaphysical Naturalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 232-260
Author(s):  
Lok-Chi Chan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Popular Approach ◽  
Metaphysical Naturalism ◽  
Scientific Ideas

The disciplinary characterization (DC) is the most popular approach to defining metaphysical naturalism and physicalism. It defines metaphysical naturalism with reference to scientific theories and defines physicalism with reference to physical theories, and suggests that every entity that exists is a posited entity of these theories. DC has been criticized for its inability to solve Hempel’s dilemma and a list of problems alike. In this chapter, I propose a novel version of DC that can be called a historical paths approach. The idea is (roughly) that metaphysical naturalism can be defined with reference to the historical ideas that current scientific ideas descend from. I argue that it is not rendered implausible by the above problems, and hence that DC is more defensible and attractive than it may first appear. I then argue that the approach also provides a useful framework for the naturalization of the philosophy of mind and phenomenology.

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