scholarly journals Quantum Walk Algorithm to Compute Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Finite Two-player Sequential Games

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 32-40
Author(s):  
Arish Pitchai ◽  
◽  
A V Reddy ◽  
Nickolas Savarimuthu
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Quantum Walk ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Sequential Games ◽  
Walk Algorithm

scholarly journals BACKWARD INDUCTION: MERITS AND FLAWS

2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Marek M. Kamiński
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Number ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Complex Structure ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Sequential Games ◽  
Theoretical Predictions

Abstract Backward induction (BI) was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats. BI can be also extended to solve complex games that include an infinite number of actions or an infinite number of periods. However, some more complex empirical or experimental predictions remain dramatically at odds with theoretical predictions obtained by BI. The primary example of such a troublesome game is Centipede. The problems appear in other long games with sufficiently complex structure. BI also shares the problems of subgame perfect equilibrium and fails to eliminate certain unreasonable Nash equilibria.

Step-by-Step: The Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium

2020 ◽  
pp. 125-140
Author(s):  
Manfred J. Holler ◽  
Barbara Klose-Ullmann
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium

Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (02) ◽  
pp. 1940011
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Weber
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Canonical Extension ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
The Given

To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.

Field Centipedes

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (4) ◽  
pp. 1619-1635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta ◽  
Oscar Volij
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Previous Evidence ◽  
Chess Players

In the centipede game, all standard equilibrium concepts dictate that the player who decides first must stop the game immediately. There is vast experimental evidence, however, that this rarely occurs. We first conduct a field experiment in which highly ranked chess players play this game. Contrary to previous evidence, our results show that 69 percent of chess players stop immediately. When we restrict attention to Grandmasters, this percentage escalates to 100 percent. We then conduct a laboratory experiment in which chess players and students are matched in different treatments. When students play against chess players, the outcome approaches the subgame-perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C93)

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