scholarly journals Assessing Risks in Critical Systems Using Petri Nets

10.5772/7500 ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucio Flavio ◽  
Joao Batista Camargo Junior
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guanjun Liu ◽  
Changjun Jiang ◽  
Mengchu Zhou

2018 ◽  
Vol 226 ◽  
pp. 04001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina A. Ganzhur ◽  
Aleksei P. Ganzhur ◽  
Olga V. Smirnova

This work is devoted to solving the problem of modeling critical systems based on the use of modified Petri nets. The dual (binary) Petri net one of the modifications, which allows us to view inversing events at the same time, solving the problem with the possibility of deadlocks. Construction of schemes using fuzzy logic makes it possible to calculate the values of linguistic variables obtained knowledge. Petri dual network allows you to organize the exclusion of negative events by introducing additional links. In accordance with the rules, it is possible to construct a dual fuzzy Petri net, which involves the use of maximum and minimum transitions or appropriate logical calculations of conjunctions and disjunctions. Transition from classical Petri nets to dual fuzzy nets, realizes fuzzy knowledge of logical deriving that gives the chance in construction of expert systems with fuzzy logic solving a problem of data analysis.


2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (21) ◽  
pp. 332-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zakaryae Boudi ◽  
El Miloudi ◽  
El Koursi ◽  
Simon Collart-Dutilleul

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 50-65
Author(s):  
Yujian Fu ◽  
Jeffery Kulick ◽  
Lok K. Yan ◽  
Steven Drager

Multi-million gate system-on-chip (SoC) designs easily fit into today’s Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). As FPGAs become more common in safety-critical and mission-critical systems, researchers and designers require information flow guarantees for the FPGAs. Tools for designing a secure system of chips (SOCs) using FPGAs and new techniques to manage and analyze the security properties precisely are desirable. In this work we propose a formal approach to model, analyze and verify a typical set of security properties – noninterference – of Handel C programs using Petri Nets and model checking. This paper presents a method to model Handel C programs using Predicate Transition Nets, a type of Petri Net, and define security properties on the model, plus a verification approach where security properties are checked. Three steps are used. First, a formal specification on the Handel C description using Petri Nets is extracted. Second, the dynamic noninterference properties with respect to the Handel C program statements are defined on the model. To assist in verification, a translation rule from the Petri Nets specification to the Maude programming language is also defined. Thus, the formal specification can be verified against the system properties using model checking. A case study of the pipeline multiplier is discussed to illustrate the concept and validate the approach.


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