scholarly journals Power Control for Cognitive Radios: A Mixed-Strategy Game-Theoretic Framework

10.5772/29919 ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chungang Yang ◽  
Jiandong Li
Keyword(s):  
Power Control ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Cognitive Radios ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategy Game

scholarly journals Power Control for Cognitive Radio Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Waqas Gulzar ◽  
Abdullah Waqas ◽  
Hammad Dilpazir ◽  
Anwar Khan ◽  
Ashfaq Alam ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Power Control ◽  
Cognitive Radios ◽  
Primary User ◽  
Radio Spectrum ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Secondary Users ◽  
Communication Industry ◽  
Efficient Access ◽  
Solution Models ◽  
Game Theoretic

AbstractIn communication industry one of the most rapidly growing area is wireless technology and its applications. The efficient access to radio spectrum is a requirement to make this communication feasible for the users that are running multimedia applications and establishing real-time connections on an already overcrowded spectrum. In recent times cognitive radios (CR) are becoming the prime candidates for improved utilization of available spectrum. The unlicensed secondary users share the spectrum with primary licensed user in such manners that the interference at the primary user does not increase from a predefined threshold. In this paper, we propose an algorithm to address the power control problem for CR networks. The proposed solution models the wireless system with a non-cooperative game, in which each player maximize its utility in a competitive environment. The simulation results shows that the proposed algorithm improves the performance of the network in terms of high SINR and low power consumption.

The Economics of Crime Reconsidered

2012 ◽  
pp. 352-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph P. McGarrity
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Major League Baseball ◽  
Total Effect ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Economics Of Crime ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategy Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This article uses data on hit batsmen from Major League Baseball to illustrate a mixed-strategy, game theoretic approach to the decisions of the pitcher and the batter. The pitcher would like to throw to a batter who stands in the middle of the batter's box. The game theoretic model predicts that the pitcher will throw at fewer batters as velocity increases, while the standard crime model would assume that the pitcher's throw-ats would remain unchanged and the batter would respond by leaning in less often. The Total Effect curves suggest that there will be more throw-ats in the American League for any level of velocity. The number of purposeful inside pitches will decrease at an increasing rate as velocity increases. The game theoretic model predicts that a pitcher who can throw with greater velocity will have to waste fewer inside pitches to keep a batter from leaning into a pitch.

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