scholarly journals The Impact of Demand Information Sharing on the Supply Chain Stability

10.5772/15835 ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Wang ◽  
Ling Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Simulation Research on Information-Sharing Value of Two-Level Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Xiaheng Zhang ◽  
Zekai Lin ◽  
Lin Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Simulation Research ◽  
Incentive Effect ◽  
Actual Evaluation ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Impact

In the two-stage supply chain model, the incentive effect to the supplier’s sharing of demand information and performance evaluation and the effect of various parameters on the incentive effect of the supply chain are studied through a multiagent simulation model constructed for the purpose. It is found that the incentive coefficient of demand information-sharing degree, the number of selected suppliers, the order allocation coefficient, and the order proportion are positively related to the incentive effect of demand information sharing. So, the greater the demand information sharing is, the greater the impact of these parameters on the incentive effect is. Based on the demand information sharing, the supplier performance evaluation rules are shared, and when the actual evaluation rules are inconsistent with the supplier’s expectations, the incentive effect is further enhanced. Other parameters do not affect the incentive effect of demand information sharing and performance evaluation rule sharing.

scholarly journals Demand Sharing Inaccuracies in Supply Chains: A Simulation Study

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvatore Cannella ◽  
Roberto Dominguez ◽  
Jose M. Framinan ◽  
Manfredi Bruccoleri
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Bullwhip Effect ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Short Delay ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Demand Variability ◽  
The Impact

We investigate two main sources of information inaccuracies (i.e., errors and delays) in demand information sharing along the supply chain (SC). Firstly, we perform a systematic literature review on inaccuracy in demand information sharing and its impact on supply chain dynamics. Secondly, we model several SC settings using system dynamics and assess the impact of such information inaccuracies on SC performance. More specifically, we study the impact of four factors (i.e., demand error, demand delay, demand variability, and average lead times) using three SC dynamic performance indicators (i.e., bullwhip effect, inventory variability, and average inventory). The results suggest that demand error has a negative impact on SC performance, which is exacerbated by the magnitude of the error and by low demand variability scenarios. In contrast, demand delay produces a nonlinear behavior in the supply chain response (i.e., a short delay may have a negative impact and a long delay may have a positive impact), being influenced by the supply chain configuration.

Information sharing in a green supply chain with promotional effort

Kybernetes ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (11) ◽  
pp. 2683-2712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junfei Ding ◽  
Wenbin Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Share Information

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the retailer’s strategy of information sharing in a green supply chain with promotional effort, and the impact of information sharing on the decisions and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Design/methodology/approach The developed models aim to maximize the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer and the green supply chain system. The game theory is used to obtain the equilibrium solutions of both the manufacturer and the retailer. A two-part compensation (TPC) contract is designed to motivate the retailer to share information with the retailer. Numerical examples are used to show the impact of parameters on decisions by Matlab 2014. Findings The results show that the green degree increases while the promotional effort level decreases when the manufacturer receives the larger demand information from the retailer; information sharing leads to a profit increase to the manufacturer and a profit loss to the retailer, but can increase the profit of supply chain under a certain condition; information sharing reduces the expected consumer surplus. The TPC contract designed in this paper can not only motivate the retailer to share information but also increases the consumer surplus. Research limitations/implications The study has been done in a monopoly environment where only a retailer can forecast demand information. It is an interesting direction of future research when considering there are more retailers who can forecast such information in a supply chain. Originality/value There exist two main aspects that are different from the existing literature. The stochastic demand function related to the retail price, the green degree and the promotional effort have never appeared in previous literature. This paper considers a green product supply chain with a manufacturer who produces green products and a retailer who has an information advantage because of her promotional effort; this paper investigates the impact of information sharing on the consumer surplus and designs a contract to coordinate the green supply chain.

scholarly journals Information Acquisition and Its Incentives in an E-Commerce Supply Chain under the Offline Showroom Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1791-1804
Author(s):  
Mengli Li ◽  
Xumei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Optimal Information ◽  
Acquisition Strategy ◽  
The One ◽  
The Impact

Recently, the showroom model has developed fast for allowing consumers to evaluate a product offline and then buy it online. This paper aims at exploring the optimal information acquisition strategy and its incentive contracts in an e-commerce supply chain with two competing e-tailers and an offline showroom. Based on signaling game theory, we build a mathematical model by considering the impact of experience service and competition intensity on consumers’ demand. We find that, on the one hand, information acquisition promotes supply chain members to obtain demand information directly or indirectly, which leads to forecast revenue. On the other hand, information acquisition promotes supply chain members to distort optimal decisions, which results in signal cost. The optimal information acquisition strategy depends on the joint impact of forecast revenue, signal cost and demand forecast cost. Notably, in some conditions, the offline showroom will not acquire demand information even when its cost is equal to zero. We also design two different information acquisition incentive contracts to obtain Pareto improvement for all supply chain members.

The impact of information sharing on ordering policies to improve supply chain performances

2015 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 127-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Costantino ◽  
Giulio Di Gravio ◽  
Ahmed Shaban ◽  
Massimo Tronci
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Ordering Policies ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Improve Supply Chain

scholarly journals Information Sharing and Channel Construction of Supply Chain under Asymmetric Demand Information

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangdong Wu ◽  
Qingshan Kong ◽  
Jian-gang Shi ◽  
Hamid Reza Karimi ◽  
Wei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Marketing Channel ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Management Theory ◽  
Force Model ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Structure Characteristics ◽  
Demand Information

Information sharing and marketing channel building have become an important problem of supply chain management theory and practice. The research of information sharing focused on traditional channel of supply chain between upstream and downstream enterprises; however, the research ignores the behavior of information sharing with potential entrants and composite structure characteristics about traditional marketing channel with the direct channel. This paper uses the model to research the effects brought about sharing demand information with potential entrants and building marketing channel, which reveals information sharing and channel building mechanism in the supply chain. The study found that the five-force model of Porter regards potential entrants only as a threat that is one-sided. When the channel competitiveness meets certain conditions, manufacturer and retailer will share demand information with potential entrants. Building composite marketing channel is the manufacturer's absolute dominant strategy. Channel construction will increase the entry barriers for potential entrants and weaken the effect of double marginalization; meanwhile, the performance of supply chain will be augmented.

MODELING THE IMPACT OF PARTIAL INFORMATION SHARING IN A THREE-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (05) ◽  
pp. 1350020 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZHUPING LIU ◽  
QIUHONG ZHAO ◽  
SHOUYANG WANG ◽  
JIANMING SHI
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Autoregressive Coefficient ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the impact of partial information sharing in a three-echelon supply chain. Partial information sharing means that information sharing occurs only between the distributor and the retailer, but not between the distributor and the manufacturer. This paper contributes to the literature by summarizing the circumstances in which information sharing between the retailer and the distributor benefits the manufacturer. In addition, our study points out that such information sharing does not always bring benefits to the manufacturer and that in some cases the information sharing may harm the manufacturer. We explain the reasons why this can happen and give managerial intuition for our results. Using numerical analysis, we illustrate the impact of partial information sharing on the agents in the supply chain with the change of the autoregressive coefficient in the demand process.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies of Multichannel Apparel Supply Chain Based on Showrooming and Information Sharing

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Shanshan Wang ◽  
Tian Luo ◽  
Daofang Chang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Forecast Error ◽  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Clothing Industry ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Information Barriers ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Share Information

This paper examines the influence of information forecast accuracy on the profits of the supply chain under the circumstance of a multichannel apparel supply chain. Due to the emergence of multichannel, customer showrooming behavior is becoming increasingly prevalent. For example, consumers usually buy garments online after experiencing the service in the traditional bricks and mortar in the clothing industry. Meanwhile, there are often information barriers between the manufacturer and the retailer, which will affect enterprise decision-making. To solve these problems, this paper mainly investigates the information sharing and customer showrooming phenomenon, which includes four models: no information sharing without showrooming model (NN), information sharing without showrooming model (SN), no information sharing with showrooming model (NS), and information sharing with showrooming model (SS). The numerical analysis shows that under the impact of the forecast error, information sharing between channel members is more favorable than no information sharing when parameters satisfy certain conditions. From the perspectives of the retailer, the manufacturer, and the whole supply chain, customer showrooming behavior will bring them less profit. These conclusions mean that the retailer should share information with the manufacturer and adjust their service level and sales price to alleviate the effect of showrooming.

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