Artikel 35a Rating-VO und das Internationale Privatrecht

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Mehrmann

The major role of the Rome II Regulation within Art. 35a of the CRA Regulation challenges investors, issuers and Credit Rating Agencies but also the courts. This book deals with the difficulties of applying the Rome II Regulation on financial market torts using the example of the liability of Credit Rating Agencies. The problem of where exactly economic loss occurs is discussed as well as the need for a new Conflict of Laws rule for financial torts. In this context, the proposal by the Special Committee on Financial Market Law of the German Council for Private International Law is analyzed, also taking into account the materialization of European Private International Law.

2019 ◽  
pp. 172-194
Author(s):  
Adrian Briggs

This chapter examines of the role of the lex fori in English private international law before proceeding to examine the rules of the conflict of laws applicable in an English court. Issues for which the rules of the conflict of laws select the lex fori as the law to be applied include grounds for the dissolution (as distinct from nullity) of marriage, even if the marriage has little or nothing to do with the United Kingdom; or settlement of the distribution of assets in an insolvency even though there may be significant overseas elements. Where the rules of the conflict of laws select a foreign law, its application, even though it is proved to the satisfaction of the court, may be disrupted or derailed by a provision of the lex fori instead. The remainder of the chapter covers procedural issues; penal, revenue, and public laws; and public policy.


Author(s):  
Mccormick Roger ◽  
Stears Chris

This chapter first discusses the origins of the financial crisis, highlighting practice of ‘packaging and selling’ credit risk by financial market participants that led up to the crisis. It argues that although, in retrospect, many aspects of that practice look very bad indeed, the idea that banks might originate a credit exposure and then transfer the credit risk attached to it to a third party was, before the financial crisis, considered to be part and parcel of sound risk management. The discussion then turns to credit-rating agencies. Analysis of the financial crisis and ‘what went wrong’ has shown that rating agencies were too generous with their rating of many of the structured products that contributed to the collapse.


This chapter and the next two examine certain key issues which one may describe as the ‘general doctrines’ of transnational commercial law. In particular, the inter-relationship with rules of conflict of laws (private international law), the different function of the ‘connecting factor’ as well as the impact of the choice of a broader or narrower sphere of application are discussed in the light of past experience and current legislative preferences. Moreover, the ever increasing number of transnational commercial law instruments leads inevitably to issues of the proper design of their co-existence and the solution of conflicts: which are the rules determining which instrument shall prevail over others touching upon the same or neighbouring issues?


Author(s):  
Boudewijn de Bruin

This chapter argues for deregulation of the credit-rating market. Credit-rating agencies are supposed to contribute to the informational needs of investors trading bonds. They provide ratings of debt issued by corporations and governments, as well as of structured debt instruments (e.g. mortgage-backed securities). As many academics, regulators, and commentators have pointed out, the ratings of structured instruments turned out to be highly inaccurate, and, as a result, they have argued for tighter regulation of the industry. This chapter shows, however, that the role of credit-rating agencies in achieving justice in finance is not as great as these commentators believe. It therefore argues instead for deregulation. Since the 1930s, lawgivers have unjustifiably elevated the rating agencies into official, legally binding sources of information concerning credit risk, thereby unjustifiably causing many institutional investors to outsource their epistemic responsibilities, that is, their responsibility to investigate credit risk themselves.


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