The Alexandrite: A Natural Fact in a Mystical Light

Author(s):  
Nikolai Leskov ◽  
Richard Pierre
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
O Syrotin ◽  

Introduction. The article is devoted to the presentation of the results of the study of metaphorization and the study of metaphorical terms, widely represented in the English terminology of veterinary medicine. The purpose of the article is to represent the features of the anthropomorphic metaphorical name in the English terminology of veterinary medicine. Materials and methods of research. The study of metaphorization as a way of forming English veterinary terms was conducted by us on the basis of lexicographic data recorded in English terminological dictionaries of veterinary medicine. Results of the research. The analysis of lexicographic material allowed to identify four donor domains that served as a source of metaphorical names in the terminology of veterinary medicine: HUMAN, LIVING ORGANISM, NATURAL FACT, ARTIFACT. Conceptual analysis of metaphorical terms of veterinary medicine revealed that one of the most productive metaphors used in the creation of terminological units is anthropomorphic. In anthropomorphic metaphorization, the names are transferred from the donor domain HUMAN to the recipient domain VETERINARY. The article attempts to consider the cognitive basis of anthropomorphic metaphor as one of the mechanisms of creation of veterinary terms in English. Based on the theory of conceptual metaphor, it was found that the sources of anthropomorphic metaphor are the biological characteristics of people, the names of body parts and properties of a living organism. Semantic groups of metaphorical terms formed on the basis of cognitive transfer of tokens related to the structure of the human body, its behavior, inherent qualities, life and way of life in the field of veterinary medicine based on external or functional similarity between donor and recipient domains are considered. Сonclusions. Thus, the study allows us to conclude that the terms-metaphors occupy a certain niche in the terminology of veterinary medicine in English and ensure their effective functioning in the language of veterinarians. Conceptual analysis of metaphorical terms of veterinary medicine revealed that one of the most productive is anthropomorphic metaphor. As a result of anthropomorphic metaphorization, new terms of veterinary medicine are formed on the basis of cognitive transfer of tokens that relate to the social characteristics of a person that determine his appearance, behavior or condition, in the field of veterinary medicine on the basis of external or functional similarity between donor and recipient domains.


1992 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.C. Tohá ◽  
M.A. Soto
Keyword(s):  

2022 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Damiano Ranzenigo

Abstract Aim of this paper is to support the view that all human practical identities are contingent by arguing against the view that there is at least one necessary practical identity shared by all human beings, namely Humanity. The view that Humanity is a necessary practical identity is explicitly defended by Christine M. Korsgaard (Korsgaard, C. M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity, edited by O. O’Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Korsgaard, C. M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. New York: Oxford University Press) and indirectly by Marya Schechtman (Schechtman, M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. New York: Oxford University Press). Korsgaard understands Humanity both in terms of pure self-legislation, and as deep sociality. In the first case, Humanity as self-legislation faces what I call ‘Existential dilemma’: either Humanity has specific content, typical of contingent practical identities, but stops being necessary for all human beings; or Humanity is emptied of its content and is conceived of as necessary self-legislation, but stops being a practical identity. In the second case, i.e., Humanity as deep sociality, Korsgaard confuses the necessary natural fact that human beings are social creatures, with contingent contexts of human socialization, which are the true sources of specifically human practical identities. I articulate this confusion in the guise of what I call ‘Nature/Nurture dilemma’, which also applies to the morally neutral account of human personhood advocated by Schechtman (Schechtman, M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. Oxford University Press). In conclusion, I address the worry that without the necessary practical identity of Humanity we might not be able to extend our practical and moral concerns to distant fellow human beings by sketching an alternative path to extend such concerns.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad. But behind this bald statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full-blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following three claims. First, moral facts are somehow special and different from other sorts of fact. Realists differ, however, about whether the sort of specialness required is compatible with taking some natural facts to be moral facts. Take, for instance, the natural fact that if we do this action, we will have given someone the help they need. Could this be a moral fact – the same fact as the fact that we ought to do the action? Or must we think of such a natural fact as the natural ‘ground’ for the (quite different) moral fact that we should do it, that is, as the fact in the world that makes it true that we should act this way? Second, realists hold that moral facts are independent of any beliefs or thoughts we might have about them. What is right is not determined by what I or anybody else thinks is right. It is not even determined by what we all think is right, even if we could be got to agree. We cannot make actions right by agreeing that they are, any more than we can make bombs safe by agreeing that they are. Third, it is possible for us to make mistakes about what is right and what is wrong. No matter how carefully and honestly we think about what to do, there is still no guarantee that we will come up with the right answer. So what people conscientiously decide they should do may not be the same as what they should do.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (168) ◽  
pp. 20200174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danyang Jia ◽  
Xinyu Wang ◽  
Zhao Song ◽  
Ivan Romić ◽  
Xuelong Li ◽  
...  

The progression of game theory from classical to evolutionary and spatial games provided a powerful means to study cooperation, and enabled a better understanding of general cooperation-promoting mechanisms. However, current standard models assume that at any given point players must choose either cooperation or defection, meaning that regardless of the spatial structure in which they exist, they cannot differentiate between their neighbours and adjust their behaviour accordingly. This is at odds with interactions among organisms in nature who are well capable of behaving differently towards different members of their communities. We account for this natural fact by introducing a new type of player—dubbed link players—who can adjust their behaviour to each individual neighbour. This is in contrast to more common node players whose behaviour affects all neighbours in the same way. We proceed to study cooperation in pure and mixed populations, showing that cooperation peaks at moderately low densities of link players. In such conditions, players naturally specialize in different roles. Node players tend to be either cooperators or defectors, while link players form social insulation between cooperative and defecting clusters by acting both as cooperators and defectors. Such fairly complex processes emerging from a simple model reflect some of the complexities observed in experimental studies on social behaviour in microbes and pave a way for the development of richer game models.


1995 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 463-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Passell ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Berenstein

How did vanilla, once a rare luxury, become a global sensation? Rather than taking the vanilla flavor of vanilla beans as a pre-existing natural fact, this essay argues that the sensory experience that came to be recognized as vanilla was a hybrid artifact produced by an expanding global trade in a diverse set of pleasurable substances, including cured beans from artificially pollinated vanilla orchids, synthetic vanillin, sugar, and a far-flung miscellany of other botanical and chemical materials. Global trade and large-scale production resulted not in the production of a homogenous, stable commodity, but in a range of local vanillas, heterogeneous mixtures with a range of qualities and virtues. As local commercial and regulatory interests competed to define the origins, and thus the market value, of authentic vanilla flavor, scientific experts were called upon to adjudicate these rival claims. In the United States, these debates played out in the context of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, where efforts to define and chemically enforce a ‘standard’ vanilla extract, in contradistinction from adulterated, ‘imitation’ extracts, clashed with the interests of makers and users of both synthetic and ‘genuine’ vanilla flavorings. As regulatory chemists grappled with the growing variety of vanillas, they were required to determine the appropriate chemical components of genuine vanilla, and consequently to delimit the subjective sensory effects proper to the flavor. Nonetheless, the materials, experiences, and meanings popularly associated with vanilla flavor continued to exceed the limits prescribed by officials.


2001 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-69
Author(s):  
Flemming Lundgreen-Nielsen

»When the Shadow comes nearest..« By Flemming Lundgreen-NielsenThis small contribution deals with two intricate lines from stanza 5 of Grundtvig’s 1824 poem .The Land of the Living.. They are usually taken to mean that when likeness in the shape of shadows comes nearest the real thing, the little ones observing them weep, because in human poetry and arts which strive to reflect eternity similarity is not and can never be identity. Chr. Thodberg has repeatedly since 1971 suggested a different understanding of the lines to the effect that »ligest« (i.e. .most similar to.) may be interpreted as »most vertical«, referring to the shrinkage or entire disappearance of shadows at noon, when the sun reaches zenith. Thodberg departs from an off-hand commentary by Grundtvig about this natural fact in a sermon delivered on 27 March 1823. The author tries to demonstrate that Grundtvig's varying usage of theword shadow (»Skygge«) both before and after 1824 makes it impossible to arrive at an unambiguous determination regarding the word in the said lines. Furthermore, the superlative degree »ligest« meaning »most vertical« neither seems to have been recorded in the language of Grundtvig and his contemporaries nor in older periods.Contrarily, »ligest« meaning »most similar to« can be found in ancient Danish proverbs which Grundtvig studied extensively from 1816 and until he edited and published a collection of them in 1845, and it can also be located in contemporary literature. Returning from there to the meaning of shadow, the author by means of quotes from Grundtvig’s brief but precise historical evaluations of Plato and his philosophy (in 1812 and 1833) is inclined to support the traditional interpretation that the shadows making little ones weep originate in the famous cave metaphor in the fifth book of Plato’s dialogue The Republic. Finally, two other details deriving from Grundtvig’s studies of Danish proverbs in the Peder Syv edition (1688) are mentioned to throw light on a couple of nebulous expressions in two other lyrical poems by him.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
SILVIA DEVI ◽  
ROIS LEONARD ARIOS

Tulisan ini bertujuan menggambarkan bagaimana strategi petani Keramba Jaring Apung (selanjutnya disebut KJA) di Kawasan Danau Maninjau Provinsi Sumatera Barat dalam menghadapi tubo yaitu peristiwa kematian ikan secara massal di Danau Maninjau akibat keracunan. Pendekatan ekologi budaya  digunakan untuk menganalisis dan menjawab permasalahan penelitian. Penelitian menggunakan  metode kualitatitf dengan pengumpulan data melalui studi pustaka,  wawancara, dan observasi. Hasil penelitian menggambarkan bahwa  petani KJA menghadapi peristiwa tubo sebagai proses alam yang harus diterima sehingga mereka harus beradaptasi agar kehidupan ekonomi mereka dapat bertahan. Adaptasi petani KJA didasarkan pada pemahaman mereka terhadap lingkungan, tubo, teknologi yang ada, dan nilai-nilai religi yang mereka miliki. Dengan pendekatan ekologi budaya petani KJA mampu menghadapi perubahan alam dan teknologi sehingga mereka dapat tetap bertahan.This work was intended to draw the strategy of the floating net cage farmers (Keramba Jaring Apung, KJA) in the Lake Maninjau in West Sumatera to deal with the ‘tubo’, a mass death of fish as a result of poison-laced bait. To analyze and answer the research question, therefore the research employed the cultural ecology approach. The research also used the qualitative method with the data collection by literature study, interviews, and observations. The study revealed that the farmers accepted the ‘tubo’ inevitably as a natural fact. As the consequence of it, they couldn’t help but adapted in order to survive economically. The adaptation process is based on their understanding of the environment, the ‘tubo’, the existing technology, and their religious values. They were able to adapt to natural and technological changes because of the ecological and cultural approaches they applied. As a result, they were able to survive


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