scholarly journals Function and Structure of European Economic Interest Group and Its Structural Difference with Multinational Companies

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Masoumeh Rad Goudarzi ◽  
Khashayar Esfandiari Far ◽  
Ardeshir Esfandiyari Far
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Structural Difference ◽  
Multinational Companies ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
European Economic

Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Deficit Countries

2020 ◽  
pp. 66-107
Author(s):  
Stefanie Walter ◽  
Ari Ray ◽  
Nils Redeker
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Opportunity Costs ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Structural Reforms ◽  
Political Upheaval ◽  
Group Preferences ◽  
Distributive Conflict ◽  
Original Survey

The politics of adjustment in deficit countries were characterized by strong domestic discontent, leading to significant political upheaval. Why did policymakers in these countries nonetheless implement unprecedented austerity and painful structural reforms? Zooming in on the domestic drivers of this adjustment choice, this chapter highlights mechanisms by which internal adjustment grew more politically feasible in deficit countries. The chapter draws on original survey data on the policy preferences of 359 economic interest groups in Ireland, Spain and Greece. It finds that while groups were consistently negative to a full range of scenarios by which external adjustment could be achieved in deficit countries, their preferences toward austerity measures and structural reforms varied much more widely. This variation, it is argued, facilitated the formation of pro-internal adjustment coalitions in deficit country contexts. Moreover, the chapter shows that opportunity costs mattered. While opposed to internal adjustment in absolute terms, a large majority of interest groups in deficit countries grew pliable to the prospect of it when faced with a choice between this and the alternative of abandoning the euro; even if internal adjustment programs were comprised of policies that groups themselves distinctly opposed.

ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUP OF THE FRENCH LAW

2012 ◽  
Vol 34 (34) ◽  
pp. 9-26
Author(s):  
Vitomir Popović ◽  
Ranko Vulic
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
French Law

Pride and Prejudice in Prague: Understanding Early Policy Error and Belated Reform in the Czech Economic Transition

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shale Horowitz ◽  
Martin Petráš
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Economic Transition ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Group Support ◽  
Pride And Prejudice ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Economic Ideology

Failed banking sector policies and weak regulatory policies are the keys to the collapse of the Czech economic “miracle.” Why were these policy errors made? Why has it taken so long to correct them? We examine the roles of economic interest groups, political institutions, technocratic economic ideology, and political leadership. Initially, economic interest group support provided broad liberal constraints on economic policy making. Within this context, neither political institutions nor technocratic economic ideology prevented political leaders from making the key early policy errors. A change in technocratic ideology made eventual error correction difficult to avoid. But stable economic interest group support and institutional divisions made it possible for responsible leaders to delay the corrections.

scholarly journals Regional development through European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-115
Author(s):  
Nataša Zrilić ◽  
◽  
Davor Širola ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Regional Development ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
European Economic
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