Bridging Finance and Behavioral Scholarship on Agent Risk Sharing and Risk Taking

Author(s):  
G. Martin ◽  
L. Gomez-Mejia ◽  
R. Wiseman
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (03) ◽  
pp. 1950019
Author(s):  
JUNMIN WANG

The scholarship of entrepreneurship has identified the significance of institutional and social factors in accounting for entrepreneurial activity and firm innovation, especially in emerging economies and transitional societies. However, the lion’s share of the existent literature focuses on entrepreneurs’ characteristics and psychological traits and firms’ structures and strategies. In this study, I develop a relatively comprehensive analytic framework to study the interactive relationships between economic actors’ institutional trust, risk-taking activities and their risk-sharing with social and political actors in shaping firm innovativeness. By analyzing a nationally representative sample of Chinese private companies, I find that entrepreneurs’ legal confidence, risk-taking and risk-sharing activities are positively associated with firm innovativeness, respectively. Entrepreneurs’ risk-taking and risk-sharing activities can substitute for the role of entrepreneurs’ trust in China’s legal system in shaping firm innovativeness. Entrepreneurs’ social ties serve as the most salient factor that modulates the association between entrepreneurs’ institutional trust and innovative activities.


2016 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 1669-1698 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRUNO BIAIS ◽  
FLORIAN HEIDER ◽  
MARIE HOEROVA

2000 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia ◽  
Theresa M. Welbourne ◽  
Robert M. Wiseman
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 349-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey P. Martin ◽  
Robert M. Wiseman ◽  
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Belhaj ◽  
Renaud Bourlès ◽  
Frédéric Deroïan

This paper explores the effect of moral hazard on both risk-taking and informal risk-sharing incentives. Two agents invest in their own project, each choosing a level of risk and effort, and share risk through transfers. This can correspond to farmers in developing countries, who share risk and decide individually upon the adoption of a risky technology. The paper mainly shows that the impact of moral hazard on risk crucially depends on the observability of investment risk, whereas the impact on transfers is much more utility dependent. (JEL D81, D82, D86, G22)


2000 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 492-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia ◽  
Thereas M. Welbourne ◽  
Robert M. Wiseman
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 229-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Cettolin ◽  
Franziska Tausch
Keyword(s):  

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