Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management Compensation

1998 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin J. Conyon ◽  
Simon I. Peck
Keyword(s):  
Top Management ◽  
Management Compensation

Is top-management remuneration influenced by board characteristics?

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastien Deschenes ◽  
Hamadou Boubacar ◽  
Miguel Rojas ◽  
Tania Morris
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Top Management Teams ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Management Compensation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to examine if certain board characteristics have an impact on the total remuneration of top management and the ratio of stock-based remuneration to total top-management remuneration. Design/methodology/approach – The study draws on data from the largest public Canadian companies, the constituents of the TSX/60 index. The study controls for firm size and profitability. Findings – The authors concludes that total remuneration of top management is directly linked to board-member total remuneration and the board average number of director-tenure years. The study also shows that the ratio of stock-based to total top-management remuneration is positively affected by the percentage of independent directors, total remuneration of board directors, the ratio of stock-based remuneration of directors to their total remuneration and the average number of tenure years of the board of directors. Practical implications – If regulators are determined to curb the excesses in top-management remuneration by means of promoting boards with certain characteristics, they should implement measures facilitating the control of directors’ remuneration and tenure, to discourage cronyistic behavior. Good corporate governance requires that the board act as a counterbalance to top management, ensuring that a substantial percentage of top-executive total compensation is variable, and not fixed. According to our findings, the boards that are the most likely to hold managerial avoidance of variable pay in check are those favoring director independence, variable director remuneration and longer director tenures. Social implications – The present article examines specifically the latter aspect, namely, the role of board characteristics (independence, size, compensation, board director ownership and tenure, etc.) in the determination of top-management compensation. This relationship is important because it allows us to further the analysis of corporate governance. If the above-mentioned traits of boards have a meaningful relationship with the compensation of the top management, one might conclude that certain practices in the composition of boards could influence good corporate governance practices. This is relevant for regulatory agencies, for investors and for corporations. Originality/value – The article adds to the extant literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it considers the role of the traits of the board in the determination of the compensation of the top-management teams, and not only of the chief executive officer, as is the focus of previous literature. Secondly, the article focuses on the power interplay between boards and managers, and, more particularly, on the ability of boards to be an effective mechanism of corporate governance. Finally, the article examines the potential impact of board traits in the determination of top-management compensation in the context of Canadian firms, a subject that has received less attention from academic research, which has mostly concentrated on analyzing the issue in the US context.

Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence

2002 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Cyert ◽  
Sok-Hyon Kang ◽  
Praveen Kumar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Management Compensation ◽  
Compensation Theory

When much is not better? Top management compensation, board structure, and performance in Spanish firms

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (15) ◽  
pp. 2778-2797 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregorio Sánchez-Marín ◽  
J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler ◽  
M. Encarnación Lucas-Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Top Management ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Management Compensation ◽  
And Performance

TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE

1987 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 37-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Prakash Sethi ◽  
Nobuaki Namiki
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Management Compensation
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