Effects of Flexitime on Employee Attendance and Performance: A Field Experiment

1981 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 729-741 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay S. Kim ◽  
Anthony F. Campagna
Author(s):  
Anang Siswahyudi

This research aims to describe the implementation of additional refinement income policy in Kediri Regency. The result shows that: 1. The process of compiling policy runs in a planned and system according to the stage of policy formulation. In identification issues of administration, the wording has been based on strategic topics such as a). The condition of the reality of the performance of employees tends to be lower, b). The level of welfare and income disparities rate for employees. In taking the model or the alternative selection of policy is an interracial process between bureaucracy elite actors in the district government of Kediri which influences the form of additional refinement income policy determination 2). The type of other refinement income policy of Kediri district government is acquired through three variables: position, presence, and employee performance; 3). In the implementation of additional refinement, income policy has been supported by the system, and the existing plan in the operation of finger online towards employee attendance and performance variables through the instrument of performance achievement is made at the end of the year. In the implementation of the other variables based on positions. In the application of the three variables seem less effective in terms of performance variables because it does not reflect the performance of employees every day, while in the acquisition of additional refinement income policy is still perceived disparities between staff employees with the structural employees consequently have not been able to improve performance significantly to the lower level employees. 


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ina Ganguli ◽  
Marieke Huysentruyt ◽  
Chloé Le Coq

We conducted a field experiment to identify the causal effect of extrinsic reward cues on the sorting and performance of nascent social entrepreneurs. The experiment, carried out with one of the United Kingdom’s largest support agencies for social entrepreneurs, encouraged 431 nascent social entrepreneurs to submit a full application for a grant competition that provides cash and in-kind mentoring through a one-time mailing sent by the agency. The applicants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: one group received a standard mailing that emphasized the intrinsic incentives of the program, or the opportunity to do good (Social treatment), and the other two groups received a mailing that instead emphasized the extrinsic incentives—either the financial reward (Cash treatment) or the in-kind reward (Support treatment). Our results show that an emphasis on extrinsic incentives has a causal impact on sorting into the applicant pool: the extrinsic reward cues led fewer candidates to apply and “crowded out” the more prosocial candidates while “crowding in” the more money-oriented ones. The extrinsic reward cues also increased application effort, which led these candidates to be more successful in receiving the grant. Yet the selection resulting from the extrinsic incentive cues led to worse performance at the end of the one-year grant period. Our results highlight the critical role of intrinsic motives in the selection and performance of social enterprises and suggest that using extrinsic incentives to promote the development of successful social enterprises may backfire in the longer run. This paper was accepted by Toby Stuart, entrepreneurship and innovation.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Carter ◽  
Sharon K. Parker ◽  
Richard J. Badham ◽  
Paul Nesbit

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