scholarly journals Generalized Cav(u) Theorem for Repeated Games with One-sided Incomplete Information

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weicheng Xu ◽  
Zhendong Zhang ◽  
Xiaoyi Feng
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Repeated Games

A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-Folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (12) ◽  
pp. 3817-3835
Author(s):  
Takuo Sugaya ◽  
Alexander Wolitzky
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
Smoothness Condition ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Random Matching ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information ◽  
Linear Demand ◽  
Number Of Firms

We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types” who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a “pairwise dominant” action, this action is almost always taken. This implies that cooperation is impossible in the repeated prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. We also bound equilibrium payoffs for general games. Our bound implies that industry profits converge to zero in linear-demand Cournot oligopoly as the number of firms increases. (JEL C72, C73, D83)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document