scholarly journals The rise and globalization of negotiated settlements: How an American procedure, the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA), became a transnational key tool to fight transnational corporate crimes

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel A Perez
2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 266-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Doucet ◽  
Stephen Littlechild

2002 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-311
Author(s):  
Barbara F. Walter

Although the literature on international negotiation is rich with studies attempting to explain why some wars end in negotiated settlements while others do not, the theoretical and empirical work focuses almost entirely on explaining a single dichotomous variable: whether parties reach agreement or not. This article argues that in order to truly understand how conflicts end, the resolution process must be viewed as taking place in three distinct stages which begins with the decision to initiate negotiations, continues with the decision to strike a mutually agreeable bargain, and ends with the decision to implement the terms of a treaty. Each of these stages is likely to be driven by very different causal factors, and only by drawing clear conceptual and theoretical distinctions between the stages (and then testing them this way) can we begin to understand the full range of factors that truly bring peace.


Author(s):  
Lloyd C. Anderson

 People negotiate agreements "in the shadow of the law," whether in the private ordering of affairs such as drafting contracts or in the public forum of settling lawsuits.[1] A reverse phenomenon, however, has gone largely unnoticed: judges occasionally declare law in the shadow of negotiated settlements. In interpreting the terms of a consent decree[2] when the parties themselves cannot agree on what obligations such terms impose, the judge may determine that both the words and the parties' own intentions are so ambiguous that the words must be interpreted in light of the substantive law that gave rise to the plaintiffs' claim. This writer has previously contended that the meaning of an ambiguous term should be determined, in part, "by reference to the constitutional or statutory rights sought to be vindicated in the litigation." Even if the law is somewhat uncertain, part of the judge's interpretive effort should be to determine which interpretation "will best serve the policies of the relevant law."[3] It appears that the federal courts, at least, have adopted this position.[4]


Author(s):  
Lidija Georgieva

This article will focus on theoretical and practical dilemmas related to the concept of peace governance, and within this context on the possible transformative role of peace education trough facilitation of contact between communities in conflict. The basic assumption is that violent conflicts in the Balkans have been resolved trough negotiated settlements and peace agreements. Yet, education strategy including peace education and its impact on post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation are underestimated. Peace governance is recognized as a dynamic but challenging process often based on institutional and policy arrangements aimed to at least settle conflict dynamics or in some cases even to provide more sustainable peace after signing of negotiated settlement in multicultural societies. We will argue that education in general is one of the critical issues of peace governance arrangements that could facilitate peacebuilding and create a contact platform between communities. The first question addressed in this article is to what extend peace agreements refer to education as an issue and the second one relate to the question if education is included in peace agreement to what extent it contributes for contact between different conflicting communities. Although it is widely accepted that contacts between former adversaries contributes for multicultural dialogue it is less known or explained if and in what way peace agreements provisions on education facilitate contact and transformation of conflicting relations.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002200272095041
Author(s):  
Heather Elko McKibben ◽  
Amy Skoll

How do different types of external intervention affect the likelihood of a negotiated settlement in civil conflicts? Drawing on the negotiation literature, which shows that the nature of the parties’ “best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)” influences the bargaining process between them, we argue different types of intervention affect governments’ and rebel groups’ BATNAs in different ways. This, in turn, affects the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. To test this argument, we address the fact that interventions are nonrandom, and that characteristics of civil conflicts that lead to different types of intervention also influence the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We therefore use a two-stage statistical model. The first stage predicts the likelihood of different types of intervention, and drawing on those results, the second stage analyzes the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. The results provide insights into how different types of intervention affect civil conflict outcomes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Ginsburg

AbstractInternational law, though formally neutral among regime types, has mainly been a product of liberal democracies since World War II. In light of recent challenges to the liberal international order, this Article asks, what would international law look like in an increasingly authoritarian world? As compared with democratic countries, authoritarians emphasize looser cooperation, negotiated settlements, and rules that reinforce regime survival. This raises the possibility of authoritarian international law, designed to extend authoritarian rule across time and space.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 845-856
Author(s):  
Omer Zarpli

Abstract How does regime type affect the likelihood of negotiated settlements that end civil conflicts? A limited number of previous studies have offered divergent theories and mixed findings about whether democracy is an asset or a liability. I draw these disparate findings together and present a novel theory on why leaders under fully democratic and autocratic regimes may have a particularly difficult time in peacemaking, and how leaders in anocratic (hybrid) regimes are more likely to be successful in reaching negotiated settlements. Thus, I hypothesize that the relationship between regime type and the likelihood of conflict-resolution is inverted U-shaped. I test this hypothesis using data on all internal conflicts between 1946 and 2014, and find empirical support. The findings suggest that even if anocracies are more prone to the outbreak of civil wars as has been proposed by previous studies, they are also better at settling these conflicts.


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