Micellar and Molecular Solutions of Rubber

1932 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-128
Author(s):  
Paul Bary

Abstract The chief interest in studying the degradation of rubber lies in the fact that it makes possible an investigation of the manner in which substances first swell in a liquid before they disperse. There are two opinions current about the state of rubber in its solutions; one, for several years the most popular, is that rubber consists of micelles in the liquid; the other is that rubber is a molecular dispersion with the molecules in the form of chains which may be very long. This latter hypothesis has been taken up comparatively recently by Staudinger, and is supported by a large number of experiments. In the investigation being carried out by the author and E. Fleurent on the degradation of rubber, of which the preliminary results have already been published, the object has been first of all to determine the law according to which the degradation progresses with time under different conditions of solvent, concentration and temperature. When one operates with dilute solutions (0.4 to 2%), the law of degradation is easily proved to be proportional to the time, but these solutions have no appreciable rigidity until they are homogeneous, and all the viscosity measurements of the solutions can be made with a single viscosimeter, without waiting for too long a period of flow.

2019 ◽  
pp. 22-151
Author(s):  
Sudhanshu Ranjan

Judges are not above the law. Like the other institutions of the State, the judiciary must be accountable. Chief Justice Edward Coke told King James I point blank that was not above the law and quoted jurist Bracton, Non-sub homine sed sub deo et lege. (The King is under no man, save under God and the law.) Ironically, judges themselves don’t appear to be following this dictum giving an impression that they are above the law. The judiciary should be accountable according to its own reasonings employed for holding all other institutions to account. But it abhors the idea of accountability for itself in the name of its independence. It is a misnomer as independence and accountability are complementary, not antagonistic.


Semiotica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (209) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Augusto Ponzio

AbstractIt is not with the State that personal responsibility arises towards the other. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the other is every single human being I am responsible for, and I am this responsibility for him. The other, my fellow, is the first comer. But I do not live in a world with just one single “first comer”; there is always another other, a third, who is also my other, my fellow. Otherness, beginning with this third, is a plurality. Proximity as responsibility is a plurality. There is a need for justice. There is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others. This is what is hidden, unsaid, implied in legal discourse. But recourse to comparison among that which cannot be compared, among that which is incomparable is justified by love of justice for the other. It is this justification that confers a sense to law, which is always dura lex, and to the statement that citizens are equal before the law. From this point of view, State justice is always imperfect with respect to human rights understood as the rights of the other, of every other in his absolute difference, in his incomparable otherness.


2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-436
Author(s):  
Roderick A. Macdonald

Given the inclination of legal scholars to progressively displace the meaning of a judicial decision from its context toward abstract propositions, it is no surprise that at its fiftieth anniversary, Roncarelli v. Duplessis has come to be interpreted in Manichean terms. The complex currents of postwar society and politics in Quebec are reduced to a simple story of good and evil in which evil is incarnated in Duplessis’s “persecution” of Roncarelli. In this paper the author argues for a more nuanced interpretation of the case. He suggests that the thirteen opinions delivered at trial and on appeal reflect several debates about society, the state and law that are as important now as half a century ago. The personal socio-demography of the judges authoring these opinions may have predisposed them to decide one way or the other; however, the majority and dissenting opinions also diverged (even if unconsciously) in their philosophical leanings in relation to social theory (internormative pluralism), political theory (communitarianism), and legal theory (pragmatic instrumentalism). Today, these dimensions can be seen to provide support for each of the positions argued by Duplessis’s counsel in Roncarelli given the state of the law in 1946.


1975 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Elman

Very soon after the establishment of the State (and as an important part of its constitutional structure) the office of State Comptroller, responsible to the Knesset alone and independent of the Government, was established under statute—the State Comptroller Law of 1949. After undergoing a number of amendments, the Law was eventually replaced in 1958 by a Consolidated Version but without any substantive change being made in the functions and powers of the Comptroller, a fact which goes far to demonstrate the proven worth of the office.Briefly, the functions of the Comptroller are to carry out “inspection of the finances and the management of the finances and the property and administration of the State and of the bodies subject to the inspection of the Comptroller, and to perform the other functions assigned to the Comptroller by this Law”.The bodies subject to inspection include, in addition to every government department, state enterprises and institutions and local authorities, persons or bodies holding, otherwise than under contract, or managing or controlling any state property or funds in the management of which the Government has a share or which are made subject to inspection by the Knesset or by agreement with the Government.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-246
Author(s):  
Ariel Porat

Abstract In standard economic models, two basic assumptions are made: the first, that actors are rational, and the second, that actors’ preferences are a given and exogenously determined. Behavioral economics — followed by behavioral law and economics — has questioned the first assumption. This Article challenges the second one, arguing that in many instances, social welfare should be enhanced not by maximizing satisfaction of existing preferences but by changing the preferences themselves. The Article identifies seven categories of cases where the traditional objections to intentional preference change by the state and the law lose force and argues that in these cases, such a change warrants serious consideration. It then proposes four different modes of intervention in people’s preferences, varying in intensity, on the one hand, and in the identity of their addressees, on the other, and explains the relative advantages and disadvantages of each form of intervention.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 11-28
Author(s):  
Kamil Zaradkiewicz

The second part of the article concerns the interpretation and application in the central parts of Poland of the provisions of the Napoleonic Code on vacant inheritances. The Code does not provide a definition of the vacant inheritance. The key to the interpretation of the provisions on the acquisition of vacant inheritances by the state is the term “is presumed to be” (a vacant inheritance) used in the former Article 811 of the Napoleonic Code (French: est réputée vacante), see the current Article 809 of the French Civil Code which omits the term “is presumed to be”).This indicates that, in the absence of suitable heirs, the law introduced a specific rebuttable presumption of a vacant inheritance, belonging to the state. Only after an appropriate period of time did the presumption turn into certainty, i.e. it resulted in the inability to invoke the inheritance title. In practice, this meant that thirty years after the time necessary to draw up an inventory of the inheritance and to deliberate (ad deliberandum), the inheritance ultimately fell to the State. The mechanism adopted in the Napoleonic Code made it possible, on the one hand, for the heir to acquire the inheritance, which remained under the supervision of a curator for the period when it was presumed vacant, and on the other hand, it prevented the existence of inheritances without a claimant, i.e. inheritances devoid of the persons entitled to take them over. In the post-war period, when the communist authorities passed subsequent legal acts concerning the provisions of the inheritance law, the deadlines for heirs to apply for inheritance changed. Ultimately, the legislator did not adopt the model of vacant inheritances in the regulations harmonising the inheritance law on the Polish lands since 1947; instead, a solution analogous to the one provided for in the German Civil Code of 1986 (BGB) was adopted. The “shortening” of the statute of limitations also influenced the assessment of the admissibility of further application of the provisions of the Napoleonic Code in regard to vacant inheritances during the period of the People’s Republic of Poland regime (despite the existence of different inheritance law solutions).


Author(s):  
Lorenzo Zucca

Genuine conflicts of rights imply a choice between two valuable goods and an inevitable sacrifice as a consequence. In Evans v. The United Kingdom the choice was between imposing fatherhood on one of the parties or denying biological motherhood to the other. The case was presented as a dilemma, and this chapter suggests a cautious approach to the resolution of dilemmas. In medical ethics, technological advancements largely determine the range of options open to individuals. Medical progress is so fast that a dead end one day can become an opportunity the next. This reshapes the choices individuals have and ultimately dispels the necessary choice between options that seemed to lead to a sacrifice of value. This chapter argues that given the state of incessant medical progress, it is fundamental that the law refrains from coercing either party to do something without their consent.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haider Ala Hamoudi

"38 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 293 (2010)That lawmaking in many modern Muslim nation states appears to give rather short shrift to shari'a, seemingly ignoring it in all areas save the law of the family and replacing it elsewhere with European transplanted law, has been discussed. That the Muslim world is replete with political institutions and leaders that seek a greater role than this for the shari'a in the affairs of the state is obvious to anyone even faintly familiar with the region. However, left undiscussed is the fact that the Islamist, who derives his authority precisely on the basis of returning sovereignty to God in all matters of state and law, is no more enthused than anyone else in permitting God's Law to retain any real level of supremacy over the law of the state. Yet this is amply demonstrated by the Islamist obsession with seizing state control and enacting, selectively, shari'a as state law, rather than attempting the type of complete law overhaul that would be necessary to ensure the permanent primacy of the shari'a. The selectivity, while puzzling to one in search of logic in the law, provides in fact much guidance to precisely why the Islamist has chosen this road of incoherence, demanding that the law of man lie subservient to the Will of God on the one hand, and then gleefully ignoring the necessary consequences of taking such a notion seriously on the other. The fact is that while the Islamist may say that he wishes God's Law to be supreme over that of man, there is nothing in his actions to suggest that this rhetoric, however sincerely held, is an accurate reflection of his actual aims. The Islamist does not want God's Law to reign supreme in areas such as corporate law and the law of business entities, where the economic consequences might be dire. On the other end lies the law of the family, where God's Law is deemed a vital necessity, and any development, any evolution, any alteration of the rules established centuries ago when caliphs walked the earth will meet with red-faced Islamist indignation at the suggestion of such outrageous sacrilege. With the power of lawmaking safely in the hands of the state, the Islamist need only bring sharia where he wishes it, and leave all other, largely transplanted, law, where it lies, which is to say in as authoritative a position as any shari'a derived enactment by the state. The wide scale adoption of secular, transplanted law and secular legal systems and their continuation in force even in the most thoroughly Islamized societies is not a matter very thoroughly discussed by our academy, except to the extent that it is asserted as largely irrelevant to the reestablishment of a true "Islamic state" where some form of shari'a does indeed reign supreme. Thus, much scholarly attention has been focused on the "repugnancy clauses" in various Muslim state constitutions, which prohibit the enactment of laws that are repugnant to the shari'a. The focus on such clauses is striking, and portentous phrases on their importance are rife in our scholarship, among them "the Rise of the Islamic State," "theocratic constitutionalism," and "Islamic constitutionalism." On repugnancy, I offer only two points. First, to the extent that an “Islamic state†can be formed under such a conception, it only seems to confirm how fundamentally limited the role of shari'a has become in the "Islamic state." Secondly, no theory of repugnancy has been coherently laid out, let alone applied, in any Muslim state. Muslim states, and Islamist movements, are far too invested in their development to call for anything less than a selective application of shari'a, with the only real difference between the Islamist, the moderate and the secularist being precisely how much to select. Logic and coherence, in the end, has been forced to give way to the hard realities of our times, which cannot afford to Divinity the primary role in the making of law."


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-27
Author(s):  
Carmen Adriana DOMOCOȘ

In a case, the court of appeal have interpreted the provisions of the law regarding the enforceable judgments delivered at first instance, with the right of appeal, or those in respect of which the parties agreed to directly exercise the appeal, when those interested or harmed by the enforcement can require the cancellation of the enforcement documents drawn up by violation of the legal provisions. The jurisprudence is not unanimous to consider the enforceability of the final civil decision is, however, a temporary one, until it is confirmed by the court of appeal, and it is removed when the court of appeal gives a contrary approach. One of the roles of the limitation is to provide the security of legal relationships, because after the expiry of the limitation period the debtor is satisfied that it can no longer be enforced, and the creditor knows that he no longer benefits from the coercive force of the state in order to recover his debt. On the other hand, to oblige the creditor to enforce a temporarily enforceable decision, about which he has no certainty that it will be upheld on appeal, means violating the very principle of the security of legal relationships, which the legislator intended to protect.


2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadav Solomonovich ◽  
Ruth Kark

This article examines land privatization in late nineteenth-century Ottoman Palestine through the extension of possession in miri lands, on the one hand, and its transformation into fee-simple property through change in land category classification (i.e., miri to mülk), on the other. Using primary sources, particularly Ottoman documents and correspondence of the German Consulate in Jerusalem, we analyze this process, as reflected in several cases involving foreign subjects and Ottoman authorities. We argue that privatization began as informal violations of the law, proceeded with the struggle of landholders against authorities who tried to reverse the process, and ended in victory for the landholders after the state ceded to their demands, inter alia, as a result of pressure from foreign nations and their consuls. Thus did de facto land privatization become de jure privatization.



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