scholarly journals Una ruta de Kant a Hegel. Destino: ¿McDowell?

2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-371
Author(s):  
Rafael Aragües Aliaga

El presente artículo trata sobre la relación entre el pensamiento de John McDowell y la obra de Hegel. La idea fundamental es exponer la línea argumental que va, en el marco de la filosofía analítica, desde una posición kantiana a una hegeliana. El punto clave se sitúa en la lectura de la deducción de las categorías vista a la luz de la crítica de Wilfrid Sellars al mito de lo dado. A partir de ahí, el objetivo es discutir si esta ruta de Kant a Hegel tiene como destino la filosofía de McDowell contrastando la filosofía de estos dos últimos: repensar el concepto de idealismo y la relación entre experiencia y filosofía desde ambos autores, Hegel y McDowell, tanto en sus similitudes como en sus discrepancias.

2019 ◽  
pp. 191
Author(s):  
Michał Piotr Bochen

<p>Artykuł jest próbą refleksji nad epistemiczną wartością doświadczenia zmysłowego. Biorąc za przykład pojęciową treść percepcji Johna McDowella, staram się wykazać, że krytyka empiryzmu dokonana przez Wilfrida Sellarsa nie neguje całkowicie sensowności idei fundacjonalistycznej epistemologii. Uważam tym samym, że możliwe jest zrehabilitowanie wartości percepcji w uzasadnieniu wiedzy po przeformułowaniu koncepcji doświadczenia zmysłowego. Jeżeli bowiem przyjmiemy ideę pojęciowej treści percepcji oraz jej konsekwencję w postaci potencjalnej propozycjonalności treści doświadczenia, uda się nam wykazać, że percepcja może wchodzić w racjonalny (a nie wyłącznie przyczynowy) stosunek z przekonaniami żywionymi przez podmiot. To zaś uzasadnia idee fundacjonalistycznej epistemologii zgodnie z którymi, wiedza posiada zewnętrzne oraz epistemicznie wartościowe ugruntowanie.</p>


Author(s):  
Willem A. deVries

Analytic philosophy is rediscovering Hegel. This chapter examines a particularly strong thread of new analytic Hegelianism, sometimes called ‘Pittsburgh Hegelianism’, which began with the work of Wilfrid Sellars. In trying to bring Anglo-American philosophy from its empiricist phase into a more sophisticated, corrected Kantianism, Sellars moved in substantially Hegelian directions. Sellars’s work has been extended and revised by his Pittsburgh colleagues John McDowell and Robert B. Brandom. The sociality and historicity of reason, the proper treatment of space and time, conceptual holism, inferentialism, the reality of conceptual structure, the structure of experience, and the nature of normativity are the central concerns of Pittsburgh Hegelianism.


Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel

A long tradition in the philosophy of education identifies education’s most fundamental aim and ideal as that of the fostering or cultivating of rationality. This chapter relates this tradition in philosophy of education to recent work, inspired by Wilfrid Sellars, on “the space of reasons.” I briefly lay out Sellars’ notion and discuss its place in the work of some of those he influenced, especially John McDowell. I next address recent work in philosophy of education that suggests that there is a tension between Sellars’ notion and the traditional educational ideal, or that the Sellarsian view as developed by McDowell resolves outstanding difficulties with my version of the traditional view. I argue that there is less tension than some of my critics suggest, and that the Sellarsian notion is compatible with the traditional view, but that it leaves out an important aspect of that view that should not be lost.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Keiling

AbstractSpatial metaphors have peculiar prominence in accounts of rationality, such as in the phrase “space of reason” made prominent by Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell. This article attempts to understand the potential of such comparisons of reason to space, taking Wittgenstein’s metaphor of “logical space” as exemplary. As Hans Blumenberg observes in his reading of Wittgenstein and in contrast to its stated aim, the account of “logical space” in the


Author(s):  
Willem A. de Vries
Keyword(s):  

Starting in about 2004 John McDowell and I have engaged in a debate. There have been a number of public exchanges, and quite a few more private ones. In my view, some progress has been made (though the debate continues). Others may disagree (the ‘law of diminishing fleas’). I, at any rate, think I have learned from him. Guy Longworth does us both the honour of comparing our debate to one a half century earlier between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. Honours apart, I think he has pointed to an illuminating connection between what I have long thought the main issue and another. If I had been asked what question McDowell and I had been (most centrally) debating, I would have said: it is the question how enjoying an experience of perceiving (e.g., of seeing) can make judging one thing or another intelligibly rational (that last term lifted from McDowell). I have a story to tell which is, in one key respect, sparser than his. To telegraph, he thinks such experience must have (representational) content. I think, not just that it needn’t, but that if it did, we would be cut off from ...


Keyword(s):  

Hansen is certainly right that the aim of my ‘Travis examples’ is, not to explain anything, but rather to point to a phenomenon. Or perhaps I would not now say so much as that. Over the course of my career I have been very deeply influenced by John McDowell. The main lesson I have taken from him is that the most important ‘result’ in philosophy—one of its most important tasks—is showing (to borrow a bit of McDowellian terminology) how it is ...


Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This chapter challenges the notion that the colours we believe to belong to the objects we see are ‘secondary’ qualities of those objects. Such a notion is endorsed by John McDowell, who has explained why he thinks the author is wrong to resist it. McDowell recognizes that the author’s focus on the conditions of successfully unmasking the metaphysical status of the colours of things is a way of trying to make sense of whatever notion of reality is involved in it. However, the author argues that the notion of reality he is concerned with is ‘independent reality’, not simply the general notion of reality. He also contends that an exclusively dispositional conception of an object’s being a certain colour cannot account for the perceptions we have of the colours of things.


Hypatia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Paul Giladi

Abstract This article has two aims: (i) to bring Judith Butler and Wilfrid Sellars into conversation; and (ii) to argue that Butler's poststructuralist critique of feminist identity politics has metaphilosophical potential, given her pragmatic parallel with Sellars's critique of conceptual analyses of knowledge. With regard to (i), I argue that Butler's objections to the definitional practice constitutive of certain ways of construing feminism is comparable to Sellars's critique of the analytical project geared toward providing definitions of knowledge. Specifically, I propose that moving away from a definition of woman to what one may call poststructuralist sites of woman parallels moving away from a definition of knowledge to a pragmatic account of knowledge as a recognizable standing in the normative space of reasons. With regard to (ii), I argue that the important parallels between Butler's poststructuralist feminism and Sellars's antirepresentationalist normative pragmatism about knowledge enable one to think of her poststructuralist feminism as mapping out pragmatic cognitive strategies and visions for doing philosophy. This article starts a conversation between two philosophers whom the literature has yet to fully introduce to each other.


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