scholarly journals Editorial: Injusticia epistémica

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
pp. 1-2
Author(s):  
Cristina Bernabéu ◽  
Alba Moreno Zurita ◽  
Llanos Navarro Laespada
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
Sobre Todo

Nos complace presentar este número especial de la Revista Las Torres de Lucca, dedicado íntegramente a la investigación sobre injusticia epistémica. El proyecto de esta publicación se gestó entre 2017 y 2018, en conversaciones entre Cristina Bernabéu e Isabel Gamero; a las que luego se sumaron Alba Moreno y Llanos Navarro. Los directores de Las Torres de Lucca, Diego Fernández Peychaux y Juan Antonio Fernández Manzano, aceptaron la propuesta con interés. Estamos muy agradecidas a ambos por ello, así como por el acompañamiento que nos han hecho durante todo el proceso, desde la publicación de la convocatoria hasta la conclusión del número que ahora presentamos. La motivación que subyace a este trabajo es el interés en la noción de injusticia epistémica, en la que encontramos una poderosa herramienta para visibilizar qué voces tienen más (o menos) presencia en los distintos contextos sociales situados en los que participamos y qué prácticas habría que aplicar para lograr una distribución más justa de capacidades, tan básicas y cruciales, como las de dar testimonio y comunicar las propias experiencias. El debate sobre injusticia epistémica ha crecido significativamente a raíz de la publicación del libro de Miranda Fricker Epistemic Injustice (2007). Desde entonces, la discusión se ha desarrollado sobre todo en el contexto de la epistemología social feminista y antirracista, aunque ha tenido otras ramificaciones. Este número en particular reúne una serie de trabajos que aplican la noción de injusticia epistémica, tal y como fue propuesta por Fricker, a ámbitos diversos de discusión, que incluyen el análisis jurídico, el análisis del discurso y la estrategia políticos o el desarrollo de formas de resistencia epistémica, y que abordan problemas como la atribución errónea de género ─conocida como misgendering por su voz inglesa─ y el fenómeno del silenciamiento. Nos satisface comprobar que el debate es tan rico en sus ramificaciones y aplicaciones, así como haber podido reunir una muestra de esta riqueza.

Epistemic Injustice and Indigenous Women: Toward Centering Indigeneity in Social Work

Affilia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 088610992098526
Author(s):  
Marjorie Johnstone ◽  
Eunjung Lee
Keyword(s):  
Social Workers ◽  
Indigenous Women ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Feminist Activism ◽  
Indigenous Resistance ◽  
Systemic Analysis ◽  
Life Journey ◽  
Women And Girls ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
Individual Perspective

Using the theoretical framework of epistemic injustice articulated by philosopher Miranda Fricker as an analytic tool, we analyze recent victories of Indigenous feminist activism in gathering the stories of Indigenous women, challenging dominant meta-narratives and rewriting the herstory of Canada. We use the epistemic concept of the hermeneutic gap to consider the implications of this resistance in conjunction with the increased visibility of the intersectional positionality of Indigenous women. To illustrate our analysis, we focus on two case studies. Firstly, an individual perspective through the life journey of a feminist Anishinaabe Activist, Bridgett Perrier. Secondly, we conduct a systemic analysis of the recent Report on the National Inquiry into the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG). We close with a discussion on how critical it is for social workers—especially non-Indigenous social workers—to relearn and document the meaning of the MMIWG issues. This includes recognizing Indigenous resistance, activism, and the newly formulated hermeneutic understandings that are emerging. Then, the final task is to apply these concepts to their practice and heed the calls to action which the report calls for.

scholarly journals Hagar and Epistemic Injustice: An Intercultural and Post-colonial Analysis of Genesis 16

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Beth E. Elness-Hanson
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Shared Understanding ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Biblical Hermeneutics ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Seminal Work ◽  
The Core ◽  
Epistemic Justice ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
Woman's Voice

Having one's voice heard and being known by one's name are foundational aspects of respect and human dignity. Likewise, being able to contribute to shared understanding is at the core of epistemic justice. This intercultural and post-colonial inquiry of Gen 16 considers the Egyptian Hagar-known by her foreign Semitic name meaning "Fleeing One"-as an example of epistemic injustice. Integrating Miranda Fricker 's work on epistemic injustice, this study espouses the justice of hearing and seeing the marginalised and oppressed, as exemplified by Yhwh. As the Egyptian woman's voice- once ignored-gives testimony within the text to a fuller understanding of God, so also listening to/seeing other contemporary African scholars' voices/writings opens one's ears/eyes to fuller understandings of God today. These voices include the seminal work of David Tuesday Adamo, a vanguard in African biblical hermeneutics, in whose honour this examination is written.

Responding to Epistemic Injustice against Child Soldiers

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 662-700
Author(s):  
Jean Chrysostome K. Kiyala
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Democratic Republic ◽  
Democratic Republic Of Congo ◽  
Child Soldiers ◽  
Social Experiences ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Research Outcomes ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Miranda Fricker

Abstract This empirical study examines the impact of epistemic injustice on child soldiers while exploring the potential of the Baraza structure – a local jurisprudence in the Democratic Republic of Congo – to pursue the “the best interests of the child” principle, particularly in the process of holding young soldiers accountable. Epistemic injustice, conceptually developed by Miranda Fricker, consists of “testimonial injustice”, when the hearer gives a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word due to prejudice; “hermeneutical injustice”, which takes place when a structural breach in collective interpretive imagination resources unfairly disadvantages a person or social group when trying to render intelligible their social experiences; and “distributive epistemic injustice”, which happens when “epistemic goods” (education and information) are inequitably distributed. The research outcomes suggest that Baraza jurisprudence has the potential to avert epistemic injustice, and to promote a non-discriminatory treatment of accused former child and adolescent soldiers.

scholarly journals EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE IN THE SPACE OF REASONS

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Congdon
Keyword(s):  
Critical Race Theory ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Race Theory ◽  
Space Of Reasons ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
Epistemological Framework

AbstractIn this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent work in social epistemology exemplified by Miranda Fricker and Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, demonstrating the relevance of the metaphor of the “space of reasons” for theorizing and criticizing instances of epistemic injustice. I then point out how McDowell’s own view requires expansion and revision in light of Mills' concept of “epistemologies of ignorance.” I conclude that, when their strengths are used to make up for each others' weaknesses, Mills and McDowell’s positions mutually reinforce one another, producing a powerful model for theorizing instances of systematic ignorance and false belief.

Epistemic injustice, face-to-face encounters and caring institutions

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Bourgault
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Care Delivery ◽  
Care Ethics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Miranda Fricker

Recent care ethics scholarship has reflected on how to render socio-political institutions more inclusive/democratic. This project resonates with that of Miranda Fricker, who proposes means to diminish exclusions and epistemic injustices in institutions. This article considers two of these remedies, which sit in tension: one entails the unveiling of particulars, whereas the other involves the veiling of particulars (for example, the concealing of names and bodily features). The article insists on the significance of time and contact in care delivery, and on the need to consider epistemic wrongs within an economy of attention and credibility.

Book Review: Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, by Miranda Fricker

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
Oxford University Press

Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, by Miranda Fricker. New York: Oxford University Press. August 2007. ISBN: 9780198237907. 192 pages.

Feminism and Epistemic Injustice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Medina
Keyword(s):  
Gloria Anzaldua ◽  
Standpoint Theory ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Audre Lorde ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Sojourner Truth ◽  
Maria Stewart ◽  
Miranda Fricker

This chapter offers an account of central issues and themes in feminist philosophical work on injustice that is distinctly epistemic. The first part of the chapter focuses on the contributions that classic feminist theorists have made to the conceptualization of issues of epistemic injustice long before such name was available, focusing especially on the writings of feminists of color from the seventeenth century onward (Sojourner Truth, Maria Stewart, Gloria Anzaldúa, Audre Lorde, etc.). The second half of the chapter focuses on the contributions to recent discussions of epistemic injustice by contemporary feminist scholars, especially Lorraine Code, Kristie Dotson, and Miranda Fricker. The chapter highlights the ways in which the feminist paradigms of intersectionality and standpoint theory have shaped analyses of epistemic injustice and epistemic resistance against injustice, elaborating the key notions of epistemic agency, epistemic responsibility and epistemic advocacy.

Resisting Epistemic Injustices: Beyond Anderson’s “Imperative of Integration”

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Leon Schlüter
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Epistemic Practices ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
The Gaze ◽  
Social Segregation ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
Elizabeth Anderson

In this paper, I take up the question of how epistemic injustices can be resisted. Miranda Fricker (2007), who introduced the term to describe situations in which subjects are wronged as knowers, has initially advocated an individualist, virtue-based account to counteract epistemic injustices. Epistemic injustices, however, do not merely operate at an individual level but are rooted in social practices and structures. Arguably therefore, individually virtuous epistemic conduct is not enough to uproot patterns of epistemic injustice. Institutional change and collective actions are needed. Recently, Elizabeth Anderson (2012) has proposed such a structural remedy. Diagnosing patterns of social segregation that track existing inequalities to be the principal structural cause of epistemic injustices, Anderson suggests that integration is required to achieve epistemic justice. Pace Anderson, I argue that certain segregated spaces —namely spaces provided by subaltern counter-publics— can function and, in fact, have historically functioned as important sites of epistemic resistance. In particular, I argue that even if integration is sharply distinguished from assimilation, Anderson’s proposal insufficiently acknowledges the subversive potential of those spaces, in which shielded from the gaze of the oppressors, marginally situated subjects can assemble and question hegemonic epistemic practices

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document