scholarly journals Failed Educational Reform in the New York City School System

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 38-45
Author(s):  
Andrea Dupre

Like the horrifying photographs journalists take of the innocent victims of senseless-seeming wars, the article's lens zeroes in on the destruction of a once highly regarded Manhattan high school whose story needs to be told. The article sheds light on what the NYC Department of Education would like to keep buried, the revelation of a shameful mismanagment of a school community by among other things, a misguided pair of principals assigned during the administration of Mayor Michael Bloomberg. The school - unlike those with more economically priveleged student bodies - was rendered powerless by virtue of its demographics and lack of cultural capital.

2017 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 776-790 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julio César Zambrano-Gutiérrez ◽  
Amanda Rutherford ◽  
Sean Nicholson-Crotty

2017 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Hammerness ◽  
Anna MacPherson ◽  
Maritza Macdonald ◽  
Hudson Roditi ◽  
Linda Curtis-Bey

What does it take to sustain a productive partnership between a public school system and local cultural institutions? This article describes the genesis, evolution, and continued success of a long-term partnership between the New York City Department of Education, the American Museum of Natural History, and seven other leading cultural institutions, promoting inquiry-based science instruction in local middle schools.


1986 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 493-498
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Franse ◽  
Adrienne Siegel

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (12) ◽  
pp. 3635-3689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu ◽  
Nikhil Agarwal ◽  
Parag A. Pathak

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement. (JEL C78, D82, I21, I28)


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document