scholarly journals Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy

Author(s):  
Eugene Matusov ◽  
Kiyotaka Miyazaki

In September 2011 in Rome at the International Society for Cultural and Activity Research conference, Eugene Matusov (USA), Kiyotaka Miyazaki (Japan), Jayne White (New Zealand), and Olga Dysthe (Norway) organized a symposium on Dialogic Pedagogy. Formally during the symposium and informally after the symposium several heated discussions started among the participants about the nature of dialogic pedagogy. The uniting theme of these discussions was a strong commitment by all four participants to apply the dialogic framework developed by Soviet-Russian philosopher and literary theoretician Bakhtin to education. In this special issue, Eugene Matusov (USA) and Kiyotaka Miyazaki (Japan) have developed only three of the heated issues discussed at the symposium in a form of dialogic exchanges (dialogue-disagreements). We invited our Dialogic Pedagogy colleagues Jayne White (New Zealand) and Olga Dysthe (Norway) to write commentaries on the dialogues. Fortunately, Jayne White kindly accepted the request and wrote her commentary. Unfortunately, Olga Dysthe could not participate due to her prior commitments to other projects. We also invited Ana Marjanovic-Shane (USA), Beth Ferholt (USA), Rupert Wegerif (UK), and Paul Sullivan (UK) to comment on Eugene-Kiyotaka dialogue-disagreement.                The first two heated issues were initiated by Eugene Matusov by providing a typology of different conceptual approaches to Dialogic Pedagogy that he had noticed in education. Specifically, the debate with Kiyotaka Miyazaki (and the other two participants) was around three types of Dialogic Pedagogy defined by Eugene Matusov: instrumental, epistemological, and ontological types of Dialogic Pedagogy. Specifically, Eugene Matusov subscribes to ontological dialogic pedagogy arguing that dialogic pedagogy should be built around students’ important existing or emergent life interests, concerns, questions, and needs. He challenged both instrumental dialogic pedagogy that is mostly interested in using dialogic interactional format of instruction to make students effectively arrive at preset curricular endpoints and epistemological dialogic pedagogy that is most interested in production of new knowledge for students. Kiyotaka Miyazaki (and other participants) found this typology not to be useful and challenged the values behind it. Kiyotaka Miyazaki introduced the third heated topic of treating students as “heroes” of the teacher’s polyphonic pedagogy similar to Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel based on Bakhtin’s analysis. Eugene Matusov took issue with treating students as “heroes” of teacher’s polyphonic pedagogy arguing that in Dialogic Pedagogy students author their own education and their own becoming.                Originally, we wanted to present our Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy in the following format. An initiator of a heated topic develops his argument, the opponent provides a counter-argument, and then the initiator has an opportunity to reply with his “final word” (of course, we know that there is no “final word” in a dialogue). However, after Eugene Matusov developed two of his heated topics, Kiyotaka Miyazaki wanted to reply to both of them in one unified response, rather than two separate replies. Jayne White, Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Beth Ferholt, and Paul Sullivan wrote commentaries about the entire exchange and these commentaries should be treated as part of our Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy. We hope that readers, interested in Dialogic Pedagogy, will join our heated Dialogue-Disagreement and will introduce more heated topics.

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sorin Baiasu

AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Kuehn

AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.


Zootaxa ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 878 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
KOUKI FUKUOKA ◽  
NIEL L. BRUCE

Tenagomysis longisquama sp. nov. is described from South Island, New Zealand. T. longisquama is readily distinguished from the other species of Tenagomysis by the elongate antennal scale with an acute apex and the 10to 16-subsegmented carpopropodus of the third to eighth thoracopodal endopods. T. macropsis Tattersall, 1923 and T. producta Tattersall, 1923, and an unidentifiable species, Tenagomysis sp., are also recorded from South Island. A key to the New Zealand species of Tenagomysis is provided.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. SF1-SF28
Author(s):  
Eugene Matusov

This conceptual essay, which opens the special issue, examines why a student’s right to freedom of education – the right for a student to define their own education – is so crucial for the education itself. Four diverse educational approaches are considered: training, closed socialization, open socialization, and critical examination, along with the Bakhtinian dialogic pedagogy to reveal the need for freedom of education within each of the approaches and the pedagogy. The eight aspects of the right to freedom are explicated. Three major objections against the right are considered and rebuked: 1) the Kantian paradox of autonomy and paternalism in education, 2) the paradox of learning and ignorance, and 3) fear of non-participation in education without coercion. The legitimate limitations of the right are discussed. Finally, the two major pathways to the right – radical and gradual – are analyzed. I sent the earlier draft of the paper to the Dialogic Pedagogy journal community, asking for critical commentaries. Many people submitted their critical commentaries involving their agreements, disagreements, associative readings, extensions, evaluations, and so on. My paper, their commentaries constitute this special, and my reply constitutes this special issue. Three people – David Kirshner, Belkacem TAIEB, and Jim Rietmulder – chose to provide commentaries on the margins. I included most of their comments on the margins as a new genre to promote a critical dialogue in our readers. Also, Belkacem TAIEB and Matthew Shumski submitted short commentaries that I included, below, at the end of this article as Appendix I and II. Jim Cresswell shared the manuscript with his undergraduate psychology students, and one student volunteered to add her commentary. Shelly Price-Jones shared it with her international undergraduate students studying English at a South Korean university. Twenty-one of them chose to provide a video reply. I selected a few of them that attracted my attention. Finally, I chose to address some of the issues brought in the presented critical commentaries either as my reply on the margins or at the end of this special issue. This should not be taken as “the final word” in the debate, but rather a dialogic response inviting other responses in the authors and in the audience.


ZooKeys ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 1044 ◽  
pp. 339-373
Author(s):  
James K. Liebherr ◽  
Nick Porch ◽  
Matthew Shaw ◽  
Bronte E. Sinclair ◽  
David R. Maddison

The Australian genus Theprisa Moore, 1963, is taxonomically revised to comprise five species, two newly described: Theprisa darlingtoni Liebherr & Porch, sp. nov. of Tasmania, and Theprisa otway Liebherr, Porch & Maddison, sp. nov. from the Otway Ranges, Victoria. Two previously described species, T. australis (Castelnau) and T. montana (Castelnau), are distributed in the mountains of Victoria. The third previously described species, T. convexa (Sloane) is found in Tasmania. A lectotype is designated for T. convexa because the various syntypes are ambiguously labelled. Cladistic analysis based on morphological characters establishes monophyly of Theprisa relative to the Australian genera Sitaphe Moore and Spherita Liebherr. This and a second clade of Australian genera (Pterogmus Sloane, Thayerella Baehr, and Neonomius Moore) do not form a natural group, but are cladistically interdigitated among two monophyletic New Zealand lineages (Tarastethus Sharp, and Trichopsida Larochelle and Larivière) suggesting substantial trans-Tasman diversification among these groups. Hypothesized relationships within Theprisa are consistent with two bouts of speciation involving the Bass Strait; an initial event establishing T. convexa as adelphotaxon to the other four species, and a more recent event establishing the sister species T. darlingtoni and T. montana. Geographic restriction of T. otway to the Otway Ranges is paralleled by Otway endemics in several other carabid beetle genera, as well as by endemics in numerous other terrestrial arthropod taxa. Whereas these numerous Otway endemics support the distinctive nature of the Otway Range fauna, their biogeographic relationships are extremely varied, illustrating that the Otways have accrued their distinctive biodiversity via various means.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-255
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Westphal

AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-210
Author(s):  
Gary Banham

AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-173
Author(s):  
Sorin Baiasu ◽  
Michelle Grier

AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Bird

AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.


2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 27-47
Author(s):  
Stevan Rakonjac

Both experiments and models are crucial in science. In this paper we will focus on the following questions about them: What are experiments and what are models? What is the relationship between them and how are they different? Are experiments and models equally good means for all scientific purposes, or do one of them have advantage over the other in some respects. Here we will offer a conceptual framework for dealing with these questions. First section will deal with Uskali Maki?s understanding of experiments and models, which highlits the concept of representation (Maki 2005). In the second section we will try to show that it is instead better to analyse experiments and models using the concepts of general phenomena and concrete phenomena, which will be introduced, as well as the concept of instantantiation. Using this conceptual framework, in the third section we will analyze experiments and models and make different claims about them than Maki does - Maki concludes that experiments and models are the same kind of thing, while we will point out to a nontrivial distinction between them. The distinction made here between experiments and models is very similar to the one made between them on the basis of the ?materials? of which they are made (Morgan 2005), but stating it in different terms and, we belive, more precisely . We will use our conceptual framework to try to show the adequacy of the distinction based on ?materials? and to show that Wendy Parker does not succeed in proving the opposite by the examples she give (sections 3.2 and 3.3). Using our conceptual framework, in sections 3.4 and 3.5, we will try to show that this difference in ?materials? makes experiments better means for acquiring new knowledge about (unexplored) phenomena and for testing theories than models.


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