Individuele verschillen in graaigedrag

2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maaike Jongenelen ◽  
Roos Vonk

Individual differences in money-grabbing: The role of entitlement, social value orientation, and misuse of power Individual differences in money-grabbing: The role of entitlement, social value orientation, and misuse of power M. Jongenelen & R. Vonk, Gedrag & Organisatie, volume 20, November 2007, nr. 4, pp. 369-381 This research investigates the role of individual differences in money-grabbing. Feelings of entitlement, high scores on the Misuse of Power scale and a pro-self focus were expected to lead to grabbing behaviour in high-power individuals. While playing a manager in a role-playing game, participants had the opportunity to grab more valuable points then their equal share. Results showed that pro-self participants grabbed more than pro-socials. Among the pro-self participants, feelings of entitlement led to higher Misuse of Power scores which, in turn, led to more grabbing. Entitlement en Misuse of Power had no effect on grabbing in pro-socials. It is concluded that power does not corrupt absolutely: Individual differences predict how a powerful person will behave. Implications for business settings are dealt with in the discussion.

Author(s):  
Tyler F. Thomas ◽  
Todd A. Thornock

In this study, we investigate how team members' social value orientation (SVO) affects their contributions to a team project when different types of information about other team members' effort is known. Specifically, we examine the team contributions made by proselfs and prosocials after they learn either the input provided or output achieved by other team members. Proselfs subsequently contributed less following input information compared to output information because they can use input information opportunistically to justify their own lower contributions. Conversely, prosocials contributed more after receiving input information compared to output information because they perceive input information as being more psychologically meaningful. Finally, proself teams with output information perform similarly to prosocial teams with either type of information. These findings provide insight into how information about team member contributions and SVO affect individuals' subsequent team contributions, and how output information can help mitigate proselfs' free-riding tendencies and improve team performance.


2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 293-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Upton

ABSTRACT: In this paper I examine the effects of social value orientation (SVO) and group incentive contracts on performance and performance variance. SVO includes three main personality types: prosocials (who value cooperation and equality in outcomes); individualists (who focus upon their own rewards); and, competitors (who seek relative advantage over others, even at their own expense). In an experiment I form groups of participants based on their SVO and assign them to one of three incentive contracts: a piece-rate contract that pays all employees an equal share of any group output, and two budget-linear contracts (with a medium and a high budget target) that pay zero compensation below the budget target, an equal share of a bonus if the budget target is met and a piece-rate for output above the budget target. Group performance is highest for groups of prosocials and lowest for groups with competitors and SVO has a greater effect under a medium rather than a high budget over latter periods of the experiment. Further, SVO appears to play a role in influencing performance variance. These results illustrate the potential of considering individual difference measures such as SVO in conjunction with formal control systems such as budgets to enhance motivation and coordination within organizations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 137-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emile Jeuken ◽  
Bianca Beersma ◽  
Femke S. ten Velden ◽  
Maria T. M. Dijkstra

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda Modesta Rotella ◽  
Pat Barclay

Moral licensing occurs when someone who initially behaved morally or cooperatively, later behaves less morally, as if they had a “license” to act badly. On the flipside, moral cleansing occurs when someone first behaves immorally, which prompts them to later behaves more morally. To-date, few studies have investigated individual differences in the moral licensing and cleansing effects. This paper bridges this gap by investigating how cooperative preferences, as measured by social value orientation (SVO), influence engagement in these effects. We hypothesized that prosocial participants would be less likely to license, but more likely to cleanse. Contrary to predictions, we did not replicate the moral licensing or moral cleansing effects, and cooperative preferences did not influence engagement in the effect. However, checks suggest that our manipulations were successful. We postulate that licensing and cleansing effects are unlikely to be elicited online.


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