scholarly journals In Pursuit of Equity in Property Tax Allocation: Discussing the Flawed Implementation of Proposition 13**(**This article first appeared in the Virginia Tax Review in Spring 2011.)

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael K. Gervais ◽  
Dontae Rayford
Keyword(s):  
Property Tax ◽  
Proposition 13

scholarly journals Howard Jarvis, Populist Entrepreneur: Reevaluating the Causes of Proposition 13

1999 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Property Tax ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Letters To The Editor ◽  
Proposition 13 ◽  
Primary Election ◽  
Local Newspapers ◽  
Tax Limitation ◽  
Radio Programs ◽  
Ballot Measure ◽  
Opinion Polls

During the months immediately preceding California’s June 1978 primary election, Proposition 13, the fractious property tax ballot measure, received a dizzying amount of media attention. Newspaper columnists from California and around the country swapped partisan barbs, debating ad infinitum the initiative’s merits and faults. In public forums, political scientists and economists calculated and recalculated the measure’s possible effects and unintended consequences. Heated letters to the editor and sharp-edged political cartoons saturated the editorial pages of local newspapers. Opinion polls registered the public’s sentiment toward the measure on a weekly basis. Shrill advertisements touting either the necessity or the destructiveness of the proposition interrupted regularly scheduled television and radio programs. Indefatigable Howard Jarvis, the monomaniacal, septuagenarian leader of the tax limitation movement, was seemingly everywhere. By election day, the proponents and opponents of Prop 13 had spent over $2 million each on the measure (CFPPC 1988).

Perspectives of the Property Tax Forty Years after Proposition 13

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert William Wassmer ◽  
Ronald C. Fisher ◽  
Zachary Kuloszewski
Keyword(s):  
Property Tax ◽  
Proposition 13

Proposition 13: An Equilibrium Analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 24-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayşe İmrohoroğlu ◽  
Kyle Matoba ◽  
Şelale Tüzel
Keyword(s):  
House Prices ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
The United States ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Welfare Gains ◽  
Proposition 13 ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Tax Changes

There are many federal, state, and local laws that distort housing decisions and prices. However, it is often difficult to tease out the quantitative impact of such policies. In this paper, we examine the implications of one of the most significant tax changes initiated by voters in the United States on house prices, housing turnover, and household welfare. In 1978 California passed Proposition 13, which lowered property tax rates and restricted future property tax increases. We find that the introduction of Proposition 13 leads to a 15 percent increase in house prices and a 3.3 percent decrease in the moving rates. The elimination of Proposition 13, however, leads to modest changes in house prices and mobility but sizable welfare gains. (JEL E13, G21, H71, R21, R31)

The Property Tax Revolt: The Case of Proposition 13.

1982 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 1109
Author(s):  
Dick Netzer ◽  
George G. Kaufman ◽  
Kenneth T. Rosen
Keyword(s):  
Property Tax ◽  
Proposition 13

International Real Estate Review

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-47
Author(s):  
Mark Hoven Stohs ◽  
◽  
Yun W. Park ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Property Tax ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Proposition 13 ◽  
Holding Period ◽  
Short Period ◽  
Risk Arbitrage ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Residential Market

California’s Proposition 13, which limits the growth of property tax to 2 percent per year, provides homeowners an incentive to remain in their housing units and thus contributes to residential stability. Yet, with fast home price appreciation, new home buyers may purchase a home and then sell it again within a short period of time. Even though they incur transaction costs, they can gain by the appreciation. Under Proposition 13, faced with a disproportionately large property tax relative to those homeowners who purchased their homes a long time ago at a much lower price, the new homebuyers have an additional incentive to trade homes fast in an up market to avoid paying a high property tax. We call this short term residential trading ‘Proposition 13 risk arbitrage’ and predict that Proposition 13 induces additional short-term residential trading, which adds to the underlying residential market speculation. Cross-sectional variations of the residential holding periods over the 1993 to 2001 period in the five counties of Southern California are generally consistent with the predictions based on Proposition 13 induced trading: Households which face a higher property tax per square foot and those that experience larger capital gains show a shorter holding period. We also explain the time variation of the aggregate residential holding period using the Proposition 13 risk arbitrage argument.

Political Shirking – Proposition 13 vs. Proposition 8

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-237
Author(s):  
SEIJI FUJII
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Property Tax ◽  
State Legislature ◽  
Property Taxes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Proposition 13 ◽  
Proposition 8 ◽  
Political Market ◽  
Tax Limitation ◽  
Voter Initiative

AbstractThis paper considers the efficiency of the political market in the California State legislature. I analyzed the property tax limitation voter initiative, Proposition 13. I found that districts which supported Proposition 13 more strongly were more likely to oppose the incumbents regardless of whether the incumbents had the different preferences for property taxes from their districts. I also studied how legislators voted on the bills adopted after the passage of Proposition 13 to finance local governments. I found that legislators tended to follow the constituents’ will after they received the voters’ tax-cutting message expressed by the passage of Proposition 13.

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