Mind the gap: From recommendation to practice in crisis management. Exploring the gap between the “lessons identified” during exercise cygnus and the UK government response to COVID-19

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. 133-149
Author(s):  
Kevin Pollock, MBCI ◽  
Eve Coles, BSc (Hons), CertEd, FEPS

The failure to learn lessons from crises is a common observation. The UK Government has been criticized for its response to the COVID-19 crisis. Many critics have highlighted the Government’s apparent failure to learn the lessons from Exercise Cygnus, which made recommendations to improve the UK’s response to a pandemic. This article compares and contrasts the UK Government’s response with the exercise recommendations. It critiques the gaps using current crisis management literature and argues that to avoid future failings, more emphasis is needed on the effectiveness of recommendations from exercises. If this is not done, exercise lessons identified, and their recommendations will not be operationalized. This article argues that the successful transition from policy recommendation to practice requires recommendations to be contextualized, so they are feasible and practical, before they can be institutionalized. It introduces a practical framework and organizational actions on how future exercises can close the gap from lessons identified to be learned and shape practice.

Author(s):  
H Chalmers ◽  
N Jakeman ◽  
P Pearson ◽  
J Gibbins

In November 2007, the UK Government set the direction for initial commercial-scale demonstration of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the UK. It announced the rules for a competition to identify a demonstration of post-combustion capture project at a pulverized coal power plant, linked to a full chain of CCS, including carbon dioxide transport to an offshore storage site. Because there are several options for further demonstration and initial deployment projects to build on this initial effort, the UK Government will need to decide its priorities for CCS deployment. Regardless of the route, a successful transition to widespread use of CCS would have to overcome significant technical, commercial, regulatory, and political challenges. This article considers the significance of understanding and using lessons learned from previous major UK energy sector transitions to manage the development, demonstration, and deployment of CCS. The past transitions considered here are not perfect analogies, but they do suggest a range of potential futures for CCS deployment in the UK. They also provide insights into possible drivers and triggers for deployment and the general business environment required for a successful transition to widespread commercial use of CCS in the UK.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 640-649
Author(s):  
Deborah Knowles ◽  
Damian William Ruth ◽  
Clare Hindley

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to enrich the understanding of current models of organisational response to crises and offer additional perspectives on some of these models. It is also intended to confirm the value of fiction as a truth-seeking and hermeneutic device for enriching the imagination. Design/methodology/approach The study uses Daniel Defoe’s 1722 novel A Journal of the Plague Year to draw parallels between his portrayal of the London Great Plague of 1665 and the management of modern-day crises. Defoe uses London’s ordeal of the Great Plague to advise those subjected to future crises. Through his representation of plague-ridden streets, Defoe shows stakeholders acting in ways described in current crisis management literature. Findings The authors note how the management of the Plague crisis was unsuccessful and they challenge the very idea of managing a true crisis. The authors are able to illustrate and offer refinements to the Pearson and Clair (1998) and Janes (2010) models of crisis management as well as confirming the value of their constructs across a lapse of centuries. Research limitations/implications Although it is an examination of a single novel, the findings suggest value in conceptualising organisational crises in innovative and more imaginative ways. Originality/value It confirms the heuristic value of using fiction to understand organisational change and adds value to current models.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Anna McNamara

The impact of Covid-19 placed Higher Education leadership in a state of crisis management, where decision making had to be swift and impactful. This research draws on ethea of mindfulness, actor training techniques, referencing high-reliability organisations (HRO). Interviews conducted by the author with three leaders of actor training conservatoires in Higher Education institutions in Australia, the UK and the USA reflect on crisis management actions taken in response to the impact of Covid-19 on their sector, from which high-frequency words are identified and grouped thematically. Reflecting on these high-frequency words and the thematic grouping, a model of mindful leadership is proposed as a positive tool that may enable those in leadership to recognise and respond efficiently to wider structural frailties within Higher Education, with reference to the capacity of leaders to operate with increased mindfulness, enabling a more resilient organisation that unlocks the locus of control.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232098340
Author(s):  
Paul Joyce

The UK government’s leaders initially believed that it was among the best-prepared governments for a pandemic. By June 2020, the outcome of the collision between the government’s initial confidence, on the one hand, and the aggressiveness and virulence of COVID-19, on the other, was evident. The UK had one of the worst COVID-19 mortality rates in the world. This article explores the UK government’s response to COVID-19 from a public administration and governance perspective. Using factual information and statistical data, it considers the government’s preparedness and strategic decisions, the delivery of the government response, and public confidence in the government. Points for practitioners Possible lessons for testing through application include: Use the precautionary principle to set planning assumptions in government strategies to create the possibility of government agility during a pandemic. Use central government’s leadership role to facilitate and enable local initiative and operational responses, as well as to take advantage of local resources and assets. Choose smart government responses that address tensions between the goal of saving lives and other government goals, and beware choices that are unsatisfactory compromises.


2020 ◽  
pp. bmjmilitary-2020-001455 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Blair Thomas Herron ◽  
K M Heil ◽  
D Reid

In 2015, the UK government published the National Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2015, which laid out their vision for the future roles and structure of the UK Armed Forces. SDSR 2015 envisaged making broader use of the Armed Forces to support missions other than warfighting. One element of this would be to increase the scale and scope of defence engagement (DE) activities that the UK conducts overseas. DE activities traditionally involve the use of personnel and assets to help prevent conflict, build stability and gain influence with partner nations as part of a short-term training teams. This paper aimed to give an overview of the Specialist Infantry Group and its role in UK DE. It will explore the reasons why the SDSR 2015 recommended their formation as well as an insight into future tasks.


2021 ◽  
pp. 095792652110131
Author(s):  
Michael Billig

This paper examines how the British government has used statistics about COVID-19 for political ends. A distinction is made between precise and round numbers. Historically, using round numbers to estimate the spread of disease gave way in the 19th century to the sort precise, but not necessarily accurate, statistics that are now being used to record COVID-19. However, round numbers have continued to exert rhetorical, ‘semi-magical’ power by simultaneously conveying both quantity and quality. This is demonstrated in examples from the British government’s claims about COVID-19. The paper illustrates how senior members of the UK government use ‘good’ round numbers to frame their COVID-19 goals and to announce apparent achievements. These round numbers can provide political incentives to manipulate the production of precise number; again examples from the UK government are given.


2009 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hermione C. Price ◽  
Philip M. Clarke ◽  
Alastair M. Gray ◽  
Rury R. Holman

Background. Insurance companies often offer people with diabetes ‘‘enhanced impaired life annuity’’ at preferential rates, in view of their reduced life expectancy. Objective. To assess the appropriateness of ‘‘enhanced impaired life annuity’’ rates for individuals with type 2 diabetes. Patients. There were 4026 subjects with established type 2 diabetes (but not known cardiovascular or other life-threatening diseases) enrolled into the UK Lipids in Diabetes Study. Measurements. Estimated individual life expectancy using the United Kingdom Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) Outcomes Model. Results. Subjects were a mean (SD) age of 60.7 (8.6) years, had a blood pressure of 141/83 (17/10) mm Hg, total cholesterol level of 4.5 (0.75) mmol/L, HDL cholesterol level of 1.2 (0.29) mmol/L, with median (interquartile range [IQR]) known diabetes duration of 6 (3—11) years, and HbA1c of 8.0% (7.2—9.0). Sixty-five percent were male, 91% white, 4% Afro-Caribbean, 5% Indian-Asian, and 15% current smokers. The UKPDS Outcomes Model median (IQR) estimated age at death was 76.6 (73.8—79.5) years compared with 81.6 (79.4—83.2) years, estimated using the UK Government Actuary’s Department data for a general population of the same age and gender structure. The median (IQR) difference was 4.3 (2.8—6.1) years, a remaining life expectancy reduction of almost one quarter. The highest value annuity identified, which commences payments immediately for a 60-year-old man with insulin-treated type 2 diabetes investing 100,000, did not reflect this difference, offering 7.4K per year compared with 7.0K per year if not diabetic. Conclusions. The UK Government Actuary’s Department data overestimate likely age at death in individuals with type 2 diabetes, and at present, ‘‘enhanced impaired life annuity’’ rates do not provide equity for people with type 2 diabetes. Using a diabetes-specific model to estimate life expectancy could provide valuable information to the annuity industry and permit more equitable annuity rates for those with type 2 diabetes.


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