The Kalām Cosmological Argument : Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Lane Craig

A survey of recent philosophical literature on the kalam cosmological argument reveals that arguments for the finitude of the past and, hence, the beginning of the universe remain robust. Plantinga’s brief criticisms of Kant’s argument in his First Antinomy concerning time are shown not to be problematic for the kalam argument. This chapter addresses, one by one, the two premises of the kalam, focusing on their philosophical aspects. The notion of infinity, both actual and potential, is discussed in relation to the coming into being of the universe. In addition, the scientific aspects of the two premises are also, briefly, addressed. Among these are the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem, which proves that classical space-time cannot be extended to past infinity but must reach a boundary at some time in the finite past. This, among other factors, lends credence to the kalam argument’s second premise.


2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 565-584 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Lane Craig

IntroductionJ. Howard Sobel devotes seventy pages of his wide-ranging analysis of theistic arguments to a critique of the cosmological argument. The focus of that critique falls on the argument a contingentia mundi; but he also offers in passing some criticisms of the argument ab initio mundi, or the kalam cosmological argument.Sobel provides the following Statement of the argument:Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.The universe began to exist.Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence [that did not begin to exist].Sobel will accept the causal premiss (1) only if ‘begins to exist’ means ‘has a first instant of its existence,’ and he disputes the arguments and evidence for (2).Traditional proponents of the kalam argument sought to justify (2) by means of philosophical arguments against the infinity of the past, while contemporary interest in the argument arises from the empirical evidence of physical cosmology for the truth of (2).


2014 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 521-534
Author(s):  
CALUM MILLER

AbstractThere has been a trend within natural theology to present arguments for theism deductively, such that at least one of the premises is likely to be extremely controversial. For those arguments with less controversial premises, the conclusion is usually something short of theism. On these grounds, some have employed probabilistic reasoning to revive classical arguments – to use less controversial premises in achieving a conclusion directly relevant to whether theism is true or not. Here, I formulate the kalam cosmological argument in Bayesian terms, and argue that doing so renders many objections levelled against it obsolete.


Philo ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold T. Guminski ◽  

Noûs ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 328
Author(s):  
William J. Wainwright ◽  
William Lane Craig

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