scholarly journals Demonstrating that monitoring and punishing increase non-cooperative behavior in a social dilemma game

2014 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoko Kitakaji ◽  
Susumu Ohnuma
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma

scholarly journals Stochasticity, Selection, and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Two-Level Moran Model of the Snowdrift Game

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian McLoone ◽  
Wai-Tong Louis Fan ◽  
Adam Pham ◽  
Rory Smead ◽  
Laurence Loewe
Keyword(s):  
Stochastic Dynamics ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Threshold Effect ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Multilevel Selection ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Interior Equilibrium ◽  
Moran Model ◽  
Snowdrift Game

The Snowdrift Game, also known as the Hawk-Dove Game, is a social dilemma in which an individual can participate (cooperate) or not (defect) in producing a public good. It is relevant to a number of collective action problems in biology. In a population of individuals playing this game, traditional evolutionary models, in which the dynamics are continuous and deterministic, predict a stable, interior equilibrium frequency of cooperators. Here, we examine how finite population size and multilevel selection affect the evolution of cooperation in this game using a two-level Moran process, which involves discrete, stochastic dynamics. Our analysis has two main results. First, we find that multilevel selection in this model can yield significantly higher levels of cooperation than one finds in traditional models. Second, we identify a threshold effect for the payoff matrix in the Snowdrift Game, such that below (above) a determinate cost-to-benefit ratio, cooperation will almost surely fix (go extinct) in the population. This second result calls into question the explanatory reach of traditional continuous models and suggests a possible alternative explanation for high levels of cooperative behavior in nature.

scholarly journals Social Value Orientation On Corruption Prisoners

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 245-252
Author(s):  
Agus Mulyana ◽  
Aulia Iskandarsyah ◽  
Ahmad Gimmy Prathama Siswadi ◽  
Wilis Srisayekti
Keyword(s):  
Social Values ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Value Orientation ◽  
Social Value ◽  
Social Value Orientation ◽  
Personal Interest ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
Values Orientation ◽  
Personal Interests

Social value orientation is a psychological factor that can influence cooperative behavior. In social values orientation, the prosocial type promotes cooperation while proself type is not. A social dilemma is a situation where to be cooperative or not. Corruption behavior is one of the contexts of social dilemmas. Someone who commits corruption means he/she shows non-cooperative behavior. It is hypothesized that someone who commits corruption is a self-type social values orientation because he/she prioritizes personal interests and is not cooperative. This study aims to explore how social value orientation types on corruption prisoners. Data collection in this study used a questionnaire distributed to participants and interview. The study found that not all corruptors are proself types and focused on personal interest. Individuals of prosocial types who focus on common interests can also commit corruption. Corruption perpetrators believe that anyone who is in their position will commit corruption. There is another psychological aspect that can encourage someone to commit corruption.

scholarly journals Fostering cooperative community behavior with IT tools: the influence of a designed deliberative space on efforts to address collective challenges

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Qian Hu ◽  
Erik Johnston ◽  
Libby Hemphill
Keyword(s):  
Local Community ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Active Engagement ◽  
Local Policy ◽  
Cooperative Community ◽  
Community Behavior ◽  
Inclusive Approach ◽  
Inclusive Processes ◽  
Collective Goals

How to encourage cooperative behavior and facilitate collaboration amongst diverse stakeholders to achieve collective goals remains a longstanding question in realizing a community’s capacity for local problem solving. Governments have increasingly adopted inclusive processes to engage non-state actors, and especially active engagement of citizens and communities in solving local policy challenges. Yet, the success of this inclusive approach depends on whether and to what extent all involved individuals, interest groups, communities, and government agencies can collectively deliberate and work together.  We conducted experiments to explore the potential of IT-facilitated communication environment designed for deliberation activities to address collective challenges. Our unique experimental site for this research is a designed deliberation space that can seat up to 30 participants surrounded by the 260-degree seven-screen communal display. Our study shows that when people deliberate on a local community challenge under the environment with a communal display, they show more cooperative behavior in a social dilemma scenario than those who deliberate on the same challenge presented on individual displays. This study highlights the potential of technology’s influence on public deliberation in such a way as to promoting collective behavior.

scholarly journals The Detrimental Effects of Punishment and Reward on Cooperation in the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (5) ◽  
pp. 509-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoko Kitakaji ◽  
Susumu Ohnuma
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Waste ◽  
Social Dynamics ◽  
Waste Treatment ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Reward Condition ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Illegal Dumping ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Industrial Waste Treatment

Background. Many studies have shown that sanctions promote cooperation in social dilemma situations. However, it has also been suggested that sanctions have a negative effect. The interactions among people and systems need to be considered to examine the consequences of sanctions. Aim. We examined whether rewards and mutual punishment increased non-cooperation. We regarded illegal industrial waste dumping as a social dilemma in which everyone bears the burden of the cost of illegal dumping, legal treatment is cooperative behavior, and illegal dumping is non-cooperative behavior. Method. We used the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game. This game simulates the structure of industrial waste treatment (incomplete surveillance, various industries with different roles and payoffs, cost of cooperation, etc.) in addition to the social dilemma structure. Players take on roles in industrial waste treatment, negotiating and dealing with other players, and treating industrial waste. We set three conditions. In the reward condition, players can earn rewards by rapidly treating industrial waste. In the mutual punishment condition, players can mutually monitor and punish each other. In the control condition, neither reward nor punishment exists. Results. Non-cooperation occurred more frequently in the reward condition than in the control condition. Conversely, there was no difference in non-cooperation between the mutual punishment and control conditions. Players under the reward condition did not gather information proactively, and information on benefits was not shared. Conclusion. This study showed that sanctions caused non-cooperation. Social dynamics should be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions. Gaming allows us to examine social consequences, including social dynamics, which leads to discoveries not possible through traditional methods.

A “Cognitive Miser” Theory of Cooperators Advantage

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 515-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Orbell ◽  
Robyn M. Dawes
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Conditions ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Expected Payoff ◽  
New Model ◽  
Behavioral Decision ◽  
Cognitive Miser

We propose a new model of cooperators' advantage depending neither on supplementary incentives nor on cooperators' capacity to recognize, and play selectively with, other cooperators. It depends, rather, on players' making the play-no play decision by the heuristic of projecting their own “cooperate-defect” choices onto potential partners. Cooperators offer to play more often, and fellow cooperators will more often accept their offer. When certain boundary conditions are met, this results in a higher expected payoff for cooperators than for defectors. Empirical support for this heuristic is suggested by expectations data from related social dilemma experiments. Moreover, its use can be justified in Bayesean terms. Our model brings behavioral decision theory's “cognitive miser” paradigm to bear on interdisciplinary concern with the evolution of cooperative behavior and shows how, if other mechanisms provide a suitable “initial kick,” cooperation can evolve in the absence of iteration and in large, mobile societies.

scholarly journals Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments

2017 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuelong Li ◽  
Marko Jusup ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Huijia Li ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Psychological Effects ◽  
Theoretical Studies ◽  
Social Contacts ◽  
Total Cost ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Strict Condition ◽  
Theory And Experiments

Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks.

scholarly journals Do Economists Punish Less?

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Jonas Kaiser ◽  
Kasper Pedersen ◽  
Alexander Koch
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Public ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economics Students

A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and for sustaining the provision of public goods. We study the decision whether to engage in costly punishment of a free rider in a survey-based experiment with 1423 students from seven study areas in the social sciences, as well as medicine at Aarhus University, Denmark. Using a dictator game and a social dilemma game, that captures essential features of the public goods game, we replicate previous findings that economics students give significantly less than students from other disciplines. However, when subjects decide whether or not to punish a free rider, we find that economics students are just as likely to punish as students from other disciplines.

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