scholarly journals Quantum Erasure as Quantum Predestination

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (10) ◽  
pp. 1031
Author(s):  
Terry Bollinger

As indicated by the name "quantum erasure," the most common interpretation of certain classes of delayed choice quantum experiments is that they, in some fashion, erase or undo past decisions. Unfortunately, this interpretation cannot be correct since the past decisions were already classically and irreversibly captured as recorded information or datums. A datum is information that, through temporal entanglement, constrains future events. The correct interpretation of such experiments is stranger than erasure: Recordings made early in such quantum experiments predestine choices made later through arbitrarily complex and often human-scale classical choices. Since this process of quantum predestination occurs only within the future light cone of datum creation, another (possibly) less radical way to interpret such experiments is that time is multiscale, granular, and impossible to define outside of the quantum state of the entities involved. The continuum time abstraction is not compatible with this view.

2021 ◽  
pp. 147612702110120
Author(s):  
Siavash Alimadadi ◽  
Andrew Davies ◽  
Fredrik Tell

Research on the strategic organization of time often assumes that collective efforts are motivated by and oriented toward achieving desirable, although not necessarily well-defined, future states. In situations surrounded by uncertainty where work has to proceed urgently to avoid an impending disaster, however, temporal work is guided by engaging with both desirable and undesirable future outcomes. Drawing on a real-time, in-depth study of the inception of the Restoration and Renewal program of the Palace of Westminster, we investigate how organizational actors develop a strategy for an uncertain and highly contested future while safeguarding ongoing operations in the present and preserving the heritage of the past. Anticipation of undesirable future events played a crucial role in mobilizing collective efforts to move forward. We develop a model of future desirability in temporal work to identify how actors construct, link, and navigate interpretations of desirable and undesirable futures in their attempts to create a viable path of action. By conceptualizing temporal work based on the phenomenological quality of the future, we advance understanding of the strategic organization of time in pluralistic contexts characterized by uncertainty and urgency.


2002 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 117-132
Author(s):  
Hilary M. Carey

Time, according to medieval theologians and philosophers, was experienced in radically different ways by God and by his creation. Indeed, the obligation to dwell in time, and therefore to have no sure knowledge of what was to come, was seen as one of the primary qualities which marked the post-lapsarian state. When Adam and Eve were cast out of the garden of delights, they entered a world afflicted with the changing of the seasons, in which they were obliged to work and consume themselves with the needs of the present day and the still unknown dangers of the next. Medieval concerns about the use and abuse of time were not merely confined to anxiety about the present, or awareness of seized or missed opportunities in the past. The future was equally worrying, in particular the extent to which this part of time was set aside for God alone, or whether it was permissible to seek to know the future, either through revelation and prophecy, or through science. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the scientific claims of astrology to provide a means to explain the outcome of past and future events, circumventing God’s distant authority, became more and more insistent. This paper begins by examining one skirmish in this larger battle over the control of the future.


Philosophy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Stoneham

AbstractThere are many questions we can ask about time, but perhaps the most fundamental is whether there are metaphysically interesting differences between past, present and future events. An eternalist believes in a block universe: past, present and future events are all on an equal footing. A gradualist believes in a growing block: he agrees with the eternalist about the past and the present but not about the future. A presentist believes that what is present has a special status. My first claim is that the familiar ways of articulating these views result in there being no substantive disagreement at all between the three parties. I then show that if we accept the controversial truthmaking principle, we can articulate a substantive disagreement. Finally, I apply this way of formulating the debate to related questions such as the open future and determinism, showing that these do not always line up in quite the way one would expect.


Author(s):  
Nadia Gamboz ◽  
Maria A. Brandimonte ◽  
Stefania De Vito

Human beings’ ability to envisage the future has been recently assumed to rely on the reconstructive nature of episodic memory ( Schacter & Addis, 2007 ). In the present research, young adults mentally reexperienced and preexperienced temporally close and distant autobiographical episodes, and rated their phenomenal characteristics as well as their novelty. Additionally, they performed a delayed recognition task including remember-know judgments on new, old-remember, and old-imagine words. Results showed that past and future temporally close episodes included more phenomenal details than distant episodes, in line with earlier studies. However, future events were occasionally rated as already occurred in the past. Furthermore, in the recognition task, participants falsely attributed old-imagine words to remembered episodes. While partially in line with previous results, these findings call for a more subtle analysis in order to discriminate representations of past episodes from true future events simulations.


Author(s):  
Vlad Strukov

Balabanov’s Morphine is concerned with cultural memory conceived as a continuum; not as identity but rather subjectivity in construction. The concepts relates to Badiou’s study of subjectivity. It determines existence in a world where the horizon of knowledge is always disappearing and is never available to us in its integrity whereby the subject is barred from the infinite. Different directions and speeds of movement generate the transcendental subject in that the subject is in relation to the variations of the lived. One of such states implies a continuum, or becoming without determination, whilst the other, refers to the imperative to construct knowledge out of the elements of the continuum. Such assemblages, rituals and rites allow the subject to access the ‘beyond’, a different realm, where the elements of the past are positioned towards the future. The transcendence of the subject is coded as an unstoppable flow of imagery—a hallucination—divided into sequences by reiterations and references to the cultural discourse: an introspective vision produces not self-organisation but self-destruction as the subject becomes aware of its own infiniteness. I showcase how Balabanov’s Morphine captures the brutality of such openings and the self-annihilating impact of nothingness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (11) ◽  
pp. 1109
Author(s):  
Terry Bollinger

Quantum erasure experiments push the boundary between the quantum and classical worlds by letting delayed events influence the state of previously recorded and potentially widely distributed classical information. The only significant restriction to such unsettling violations of forward-only causality is that the distribution of forward-dependent information cannot cross out of the light cone boundaries of the event in the past, a feature that ensures no violations of causality — no rewriting of anyone else's recorded histories — can occur. The erasure interpretation of this conundrum requires rewriting of information recorded and distributed in the past, which would itself be a violation of causality. The quantum predestination interpretation removes the causal rewriting issue. However, quantum predestination requires detailed coordination of inputs from outside of the forward-dependent event's light cone, thus massively violating the same limit that prevents causality violations in such events. Yet another approach is to invoke the Schrödinger's cat variant of quantum erasure in which arbitrarily complex classical events within the light cone become quantum dependent upon the future event. As with all Schrödinger's cat interpretations of quantum mechanics, this variant of quantum erasure violates causality by discarding local classical histories such as the information-rich state of the cat's body. The most straightforward interpretation of erasure experiments is to follow the lead of the equations themselves, which transform on paper as if their components are independent of ordinary space and time limits, up to the limits imposed on them by the speed of light. Interpreting the light cone of each quantum system as an atemporal, aspatial unit in which classical time and space have no meaning results in a multi-scale, matter-dependent definition of spacetime in which every light cone is a singular quantum entity. In such a universe, both time and space are defined not as pre-existing, mass-independent continuums but as the consensus of vast numbers of constantly interacting and mutually limiting quantum-entity light cones.


1969 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 169-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Clark

While philosophers feel relatively comfortable about talking of the present and the past, some of them feel uncomfortable about talking in just the same way of future events. They feel that, in general, discourse about the future differs significantly from discourse about the past and present, and that these differences reflect a logical asymmetry between the past and future beyond the merely defining fact that the future succeeds, and the past precedes, the present time. The problem is: how can we talk about events which have not yet happened, or at any rate are not yet bound to happen, or whose participants do not yet exist? The effect of these worries has led them to claim to recognise restrictions on our talk about the future which do not govern talk about the past and present. The most famous of these views is Aristotle's. According to one familiar interpretation, he holds that a statement about a future event which is not yet settled, a contingent event in the future, is neither true nor false, even though the statement that the event either will or will not happen is necessarily true. Proponents of this view felt that if a future-tensed statement were already true then the fact that it stated would already be settled. I do not propose to discuss this well-known and muchdiscussed doctrine of Aristotle's, but I do want to consider some allied views which have been aired recently, and to look at their philosophical significance. Before I look at these, however, it will be convenient to recall three of the main reasons why the Aristotelian doctrine is unpopular. In the first place it is paradoxical to accept that a statement of the form p v ∼ p is (necessarily) true while claiming that neither of its disjuncts is true. Then there are misgivings about the notion of truth involved: many feel that truth is essentially an attribute of timeless propositions and that it is nonsense to talk of a statement's becoming true as you would of Aristotle's views if the event described became inevitable. There is also the difficulty of accounting for the meaning of a future-tensed sentence which may express a statement that is neither true nor false simply because what it states is not yet settled. It could not be said of the sentence expressing such a statement that you know what it means if you know what it is for the sentence to express a true statement. I know the meaning of the present-tensed sentence ‘A sea-battle is now being waged’ if I know that it can normally be used to make a true statement precisely in the event of there being a sea-battle being waged at present. But I do not know the meaning of the future-tensed sentence ‘A sea-battle will be waged tomorrow’ simply by knowing that the sentence expresses a true statement if it is already settled that there is going to be a battle: the statement doesn't mean that the battle is already settled, otherwise it would not lack a truth-value when the matter was still open – it would be false.


Author(s):  
Anthony Hussenot ◽  
Tor Hernes ◽  
Isabelle Bouty

This chapter suggests an events-based approach that can be used to understand organization as a temporal phenomenon. To date, the ontology of time sees the present, the past, and the future as different and discrete temporal epochs and thus prevents us from understanding activities as a creative process in which the past, the present, and the future are constantly redefined to give meaning and sense to actors. Conversely, an ontology of temporality enables us to grasp the situated nature of organizational phenomena. We argue that an events-based approach provides a better understanding of how past, present, and future events are constantly co-defined and configured, thereby enabling actors to gain a sense of continuity, i.e. a sense about their history, the present moment, and an expected future. Following a discussion of the nature of an events-based approach, we discuss the contributions and implications of such an approach by showing how it redefines the very subject of organization and brings insights to the study of contemporary organizational phenomena.


Author(s):  
Alexandre Harvey-Tremblay

Consistent with special relativity and statistical physics, here we construct a partition function of space-time events. The union of these two theories resolves longstanding problems in regards to time. It augments the standard description of time given by the (non-relativistic) arrow of time to one able to show the emergence of three macroscopic regimes of time: the past, the present, and the future, represented by space-like entropy, light-like entropy, and time-like entropy, respectively, and in a manner consistent with our experience of said regimes. First, using Fermi-Dirac statistics, we find that the system essentially describes a "waterfall" of space-time events. This "waterfall" recedes in space-time at the speed of light towards the direction of the future as it "floods" local space with events that it depletes from the past. In this union, an observer O will perceive two horizons that can be interpreted as hiding events behind it. The first is an event horizon, and its entropy hides events in the regions that O cannot see. The second is a time horizon, and its entropy "shields" events from O's causal influence. As only past events are "shielded", and not future events, an asymmetry in time is thus created. Finally, future events are hidden by an entropy prohibiting O from knowing the future before the present catches on.


1992 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-309
Author(s):  
John Myhill

ABSTRACTIn clauses with future meaning in Biblical Hebrew, a basically VSO language, there are consistent functional differences between clauses with verb-initial word order and clauses with non-verb-initial word order. Quantitative study shows that verb-initial clauses are associated with future events that come about through cooperation between (some combination of) the speaker, the listener, and God, whereas non-verb-initial clauses are associated with future events that are the result of unilateral action. This is related to the finding of Givón (1977) that, in clauses with past time reference in Biblical Hebrew, verb-initial order is associated with the unmarked function of temporal sequencing and continuity of the narrative, whereas non-verb-initial order is associated with a break in sequencing and discontinuity. If we take verb-initial order as generally associated with unmarked discourse functions, these data suggest that cooperation represents the unmarked expectation in dialogues about the future in the same way that sequencing represents the unmarked expectation in narratives about the past.


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