scholarly journals Marya Schechtman e Christine Korsgaard: Uma reflexão sobre Unidade Forense e Self Moral

Sofia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-173
Author(s):  
Adelino Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
Christine Korsgaard

O artigo discute o tema da identidade pessoal a partir do debate entre as filósofas Marya Schechtman e Christine Korsgaard. Para isso, será inicialmente explicitada a temática da identidade pessoal em suas origens modernas, nas reflexões lockeanas. O tema da continuidade psicológica na obra de John Locke será brevemente abordado, assim como sua recepção pela obra de Derick Parfit. Sobre o debate específico entre Schechtman e Korsgaard, será apresentada a crítica de Schechtman à noção de independência metafísica do conceito de pessoa e discutido em que ponto isso afeta ou não a posição central de Korsgaard a respeito do tema.

Kantian indifference about moral reason

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam J. Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reason ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Philosophical Assumption

Abstract The pessimistic arguments May challenges depend on an anti-Kantian philosophical assumption. That assumption is that what I call philosophical optimists about moral reason are also committed to empirical optimism, or what May calls “optimistic rationalism.” I place May's book in the literature by explaining how that assumption is resisted by Christine Korsgaard, one of May's examples of a contemporary Kantian.

A Fatal Error of Locke’s?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galen Strawson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
John Locke ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Radical Theory ◽  
Single Person

This chapter argues that the unqualified attribution of the radical theory to John Locke is mistaken if we are to take into account the fact that the theory allows for freaks like [Sₓ]. It first considers [I]-transfer without [P]-transfer—that is, [I]-transfer preserving personal identity—before discussing Locke's response to the idea that personal identity might survive [I]-transfer from an a priori point of view. It suggests that [I]-transfer is possible in such a way that the existence of a single Person [P₁] from t₁ to t₂ can successively (and non-overlappingly) involve the existence of two immaterial substances. It also explains how Locke's claim that [I]-transfer is possible opens up the possibility that it could go wrong, in such a way as to lead to injustice. Finally, it examines Locke's notion of “sensible creature,” which refers to a subject of experience who is a person.

John Locke and the Authority of Church and State

Anglophonia ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 289-296
Author(s):  
Graham Alan John Rogers
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
Church And State

John Locke, Pensamientos sobre educación

2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (71) ◽  
pp. 184
Author(s):  
[Carmen Silva]
Keyword(s):  
John Locke

Williams on Practical Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Deigh
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Christine Korsgaard ◽  
Internalist Account

Bernard Williams’s controversial view about reasons for action is the topic of this essay. The essay explains Williams’s internalist account of reasons for action as an improvement on Donald Davidson’s account. It then corrects Williams’s criticism of externalist accounts of reasons for action by conceding that such accounts are viable as long as they do not imply that the reasons a person has for doing an action can explain his or her doing it. The concession follows from acknowledging the very different program of studying reasons in ethics exemplified in the work of Kurt Baier. Once the correction is made to Williams’s criticism, the essay offers a defense of his view against the criticisms of T. M. Scanlon and Christine Korsgaard.

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