scholarly journals A consciência como uma percepção do mental e o estatuto dos fenômenos mentais inconscientes na perspectiva de David Armstrong

Sofia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-220
Author(s):  
Tárik de Athayde Prata
Keyword(s):  
David Armstrong

O artigo examina a teoria de David Armstrong sobre a consciência e sua concepção do inconsciente. Após uma discussão do caráter anti-cartesiano dessa teoria (seção 1), são discutidas as noções de consciência mínima e consciência perceptiva (seção 2), bem como o conceito de consciência introspectiva, que é o mais importante para Armstrong (seção 3). A conclusão é que, apesar do valor explicativo dos seus conceitos de consciência, Armstrong defende uma perspectiva insatisfatória a respeito do inconsciente, pois essa perspectiva não dá conta da real influência do inconsciente em nossa vida mental (seção 4).

scholarly journals Consciência e fenômenos mentais inconscientes: as visões de David Armstrong e John Searle

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tárik De Athayde Prata
Keyword(s):  
John Searle ◽  
David Armstrong

O artigo examina as concepções de consciência, bem como as concepções de fenômenos mentais inconscientes, de David Armstrong e John Searle. Enquanto Armstrong entende a consciência como decorrente de uma percepção de segunda ordem, de modo que um fenômeno inconsciente é apenas um fenômeno mental que não é percebido, Searle entende a consciência como um estado global, o que torna sua visão do inconsciente mais complicada. Estados mentais inconscientes não passam de padrões de atividade neuronal, padrões que são capazes de causar estados mentais conscientes nas circunstâncias adequadas. Porém, enquanto a teoria de Armstrong é perfeitamente coerente, a visão de Searle se mostra inconsistente, pois a eficácia causal que ele atribui aos fenômenos inconscientes é incompatível com o papel fundamental que ele atribui à consciência no domínio dos fenômenos mentais.

Knowledge

2021 ◽  
pp. 23-50
Author(s):  
Jonathan Stoltz
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
David Armstrong

This chapter carries out a detailed analysis of Dharmakīrti’s definitions of the term pramāṇa. After elucidating his definitions and subsequent Indian interpretations of them, it is argued that we can characterize the standard post-Dharmakīrtian account of knowledge as a novel, truth-tracking cognition. The second half of the chapter explores how this Buddhist account of knowledge compares to analyses of knowledge in the contemporary analytic tradition of epistemology. It is argued, for example, that the Buddhist account cannot be assimilated to analyses of knowledge that appeal to justification, nor to standard versions of reliabilism. Instead, it more closely resembles the theory of knowledge defended by David Armstrong.

scholarly journals What Can Armstrongian Universals Do for Induction?

Philosophia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Peden
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Induction ◽  
Potential Explanation ◽  
David Armstrong

Abstract David Armstrong (1983) argues that necessitation relations among universals are the best explanation of some of our observations. If we consequently accept them into our ontologies, then we can justify induction, because these necessitation relations also have implications for the unobserved. By embracing Armstrongian universals, we can vindicate some of our strongest epistemological intuitions and answer the Problem of Induction. However, Armstrong’s reasoning has recently been challenged on a variety of grounds. Critics argue against both Armstrong’s usage of inference to the best explanation and even whether, by Armstrong’s own standards, necessitation relations offer a potential explanation of this explanandum, let alone the best explanation. I defend Armstrong against these particular criticisms. Firstly, even though there are reasons to think that Armstrong’s justification fails as a self-contained defence of induction, it can usefully complement several other answers to Hume. Secondly, I argue that Armstrong’s reasoning is consistent with his own standards for explanation.

‘Looks Red’ and Dangerous Talk

Philosophy ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 70 (274) ◽  
pp. 545-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. J. C. Smart
Keyword(s):  
Frank Jackson ◽  
David Armstrong ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Do So

This paper is partly to get rid of some irritation which I have felt at the quite common tendency of philosophers to elucidate (for example) ‘is red’ in terms of ‘looks red’. For a relatively recent example see, for example, Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, ‘An Objectivist′s Guide to Subjectivism about Colour’. However rather than try to make a long list of references, I would rather say ‘No names, no pack drill’. I have even been disturbed to find the use of the words ‘looks red’ that I am opposing ascribed to me by Keith Campbell in his useful article ‘David Armstrong and Realism about Colour’. I am not saying that such talk is necessarily wrong. Talk of ‘looks red’ may be a way of harmlessly referring to the behavioural discriminations with respect to colour of a human percipient. Where it is dangerous, at least to those of us who wish to argue for a broadly physicalist account of the mind, is that it may have concealed overtones of reference to epiphenomenal and irreducibly psychic properties of experiences. Moreover even if it does not do so it may be fence sitting on this issue and liable to misinterpretation.

David Armstrong and perception

1963 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Deutscher
Keyword(s):  
David Armstrong

Armstrong's Materialism

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-592
Author(s):  
George S. Pappas
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Central State ◽  
The Central Nervous System ◽  
David Armstrong

Central-state materialism ( = CSM) is a very strong, but also very exciting theory of mind according to which each mental state is identical with a state of the central nervous system. CSM thus goes considerably beyond early versions of the identity theory of mind, since those early accounts (e.g., those of Place and Smart) held only that sensations are to be identified with neural events. CSM, by contrast, is a thesis about all mental states; every mental state is held to be a state of the central nervous system. In fact, as we will see shortly, CSM is an even more sweeping thesis than this formulation of it suggests, since it is not concerned simply with mental states.One prominent defender of CSM, David Armstrong, has maintained that CSM can be established by means of a two-step argument.

scholarly journals Unrestricted Quantification and Natural Theology: Is "the World" on the Index?

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stig Børsen Hansen
Keyword(s):  
Natural Theology ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Philosophical Logic ◽  
The World ◽  
Integral Element ◽  
Unrestricted Quantification ◽  
David Armstrong

The first section of this paper introduces talk about absolutely everything – the world as a totality – as an integral element in the project of natural theology, as it has been presented by Fergus Kerr and Denys Turner respectively. The following section presents talk about the world as a totality of facts as a theme in philosophical logic and outlines a problem it has given rise to there. After confronting the solution originally suggested by Bertrand Russell and defended by David Armstrong, the paper points to key elements of the solution presented by Wittgenstein in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I show how Wittgenstein’s answer to the question of unrestricted quantification draws on his notion of showing and the inexpressible. Against this background, the concluding section draws attention to an important difference in ambition between Kerr’s and Turner’s description of the prospects for natural theology.

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