scholarly journals Vícios intelectuais, virtudes e investigação

Sofia ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-162
Author(s):  
Felipe Rocha L. Santos
Keyword(s):  
Duncan Pritchard

Este artigo tem como objetivo propor uma definição de virtudes e vícios intelectuais relativos a uma investigação. Por investigação aqui entende-se qualquer busca que proporcione um produto epistêmico como por exemplo Conhecimento ou Entendimento. Para isso, faço uma análise da definição de virtudes e vícios oferecida por Quassim Cassam e discuto alguns problemas desta definição. Proponho que, ao contrário de Cassam e de Duncan Pritchard, a meta de uma investigação não é apenas Conhecimento ou apenas Entendimento. Em seguida, na parte final do artigo, proponho duas aplicações práticas a definição de virtudes e vícios intelectuais. A primeira eu descrevo como o uso da Internet pode proporcionar em nós mais vícios que virtudes intelectuais, e a segunda descrevo que na prática e pesquisa médica, ao que parece, também há mais vícios que virtudes intelectuais.

scholarly journals Sorte, Virtude, e Anulabilidade Epistêmica

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
João Rizzio Vicente Fett
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Satisfactory Theory ◽  
Better Than ◽  
The Gettier Problem

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p179 Duncan Pritchard has suggested that anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology are the best options to solve the Gettier problem. Nonetheless, there are challenging problems for both of them in the literature. Pritchard holds that his anti-luck virtue epistemology puts together the correct intuitions from both anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology and avoids their problems. Contra Pritchard, we believe that there is already a satisfactory theory on offer, namely, the defeasibility theory of knowledge. In this essay we intend (i) to examine Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, and (ii) to defend the defeasibility theory of knowledge as an alternative to Pritchard’s theory. We will provide the reader with reasons for believing that the defeasibility theory is better than Pritchard’s theory because the former is more economic and more ecumenical than the latter, since it goes without non-epistemic notions and remains neutral as for the internalism vs. externalism debate.

scholarly journals Um problema para a epistemologia anti-sorte de Pritchard

2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 683
Author(s):  
Lucas Roisenberg Rodrigues
Keyword(s):  
Duncan Pritchard

Este artigo propõe uma crítica à epistemologia anti-sorte, tal como defendida por Duncan Pritchard. A teoria de Pritchard é uma das mais bem desenvolvidas explorações do conceito de sorte, e da sua significação epistêmica. Ele julga possível derivar uma condição que exclua a sorte epistêmica a partir de uma análise modal do conceito de sorte. A cláusula epistêmica resultante é uma condição denominada princípio de segurança. Após apresentar a teoria e algumas de suas motivações, argumento que ela não consegue responder a uma objeção apresentada por Mark McEvoy, e que consiste em uma variação do exemplo da loteria. Por fim, alego que o princípio de segurança, tal como defendido por Pritchard, não captura corretamente nossas intuições sobre quando sorte está ausente ou presente.

Intellectually Virtuous Inquirer and the Practical Value of Truth

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 54-59
Author(s):  
Sergei M. Levin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Circular Reasoning ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Face

Veritism is the thesis that the truth is the fundamental epistemic good. According to Duncan Pritchard, the most pressing objections to veritism are the trivial truths objection and the trivial inquiry problem. The former states that veritism entails that trivial truths are as important as deep and important truths. The latter is a problem that a veritist must prefer trivial inquiry that generates many trivial truths to the serious inquiry with the hope but no guarantee to discover some deep and important truth. Both objections arise from the inability of veritism prima facie to properly rate the different types of truths. Pritchard's solution is to approach the truth from the perspective of the intellectually virtuous inquirer who would prefer weighty truth over trivial truth. In my commentary, I criticise the proposed solution as circular reasoning. The necessary virtue for an intellectually virtuous inquirer is that they would prefer the weighty truth over the trivial one and at the same time, the weighty truth is superior because it is the goal for intellectually virtuous inquirer. I suggest another path to substantiate veritism in the face of the two sibling objections. I argue that truth is the fundamental epistemic good as it makes the epistemic realm practically valuable more than any other epistemic good. The weighty truths are preferable to the trivial ones because the practical value of the deep and important truths is usually higher. The suggested path goes away from the attempts to prove the epistemic value of truth only within the epistemic realm, yet I argue it does not compel the intellectually virtuous inquirer to seek the truth only for the sake of practical reasons.

Epistemic Luck - By Duncan Pritchard

2006 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 372-374
Author(s):  
brian ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Duncan Pritchard

Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 96-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Ranalli
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Belief Theory ◽  
Radical Scepticism

In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard’s version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments (NBT). One of the main reasons in favour ofNBTover rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue thatNBTfares at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue thatNBTis inconsistent with certain cases of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge commitments.

Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Greco
Keyword(s):  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Princeton University

Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of our Believing. By Duncan Pritchard. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016. Pp. xv + 239. isbn 978-0-691-16723-7.

scholarly journals Against Quasi-Fideism

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-243
Author(s):  
Jeroen de Ridder ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Hinge Epistemology

Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly conflicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: (a) that it is, at least at some level, a matter of ungrounded faith, but also (b) that it can be epistemically rationally grounded. In this paper, I argue that quasi-fideism fails. Its central tenets either have unattractive consequences or are implausible.

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