Political Philosophy, Empathy and Political Justice

Contemporary feminist scholars have devoted much attention to analyzing the relationship between justice and care theories but little to the ideas of early feminist authors. I bring the political philosophy of the Mary Wollstonecraft to bear on contemporary justice/care debates in order to highlight her unique contribution. Although usually interpreted as a classical liberal or republican thinker, Wollstonecraft is better understood as a feminist care theorist. She aimed at a revolutionary transformation of liberal society by emphasizing the importance of care-giving duties. Unlike some recent feminist scholars, however, she still recognized an important role for justice. She argued that before personal care-giving activities could transform the political, political justice had first to be extended to personal caring relationships. Wollstonecraft's political philosophy thus provides a feminist model for synthesizing justice and care theories and represents an innovative reformulation of classical liberal and republican ideas that incorporates the care perspective.

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Equality without Documents: Political Justice and the Right to Amnesty

Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume ◽

10.1080/00455091.2010.10717656 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 36 ◽

pp. 99-122 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Michael Blake

Keyword(s):

Political Philosophy ◽

Political Justice ◽

Know How ◽

Political Theories ◽

Democratic Societies ◽

Social Arrangements ◽

The Right ◽

The Ideal

All modern democratic societies claim to be egalitarian. They do not agree, of course, about what egalitarianism demands; the ideal of equality is hardly transparent and can be plausibly understood to encompass any number of social arrangements and values. That some form of equality is to be prized, though, is uncontroversial. Indeed, it may be true that all political theories that have stood the test of time can be understood as specifying and interpreting the ideal of equality (Dworkin 1973, 500; 513). Whether or not this is true, I think it is hard to deny that democratic political philosophy can generally be understood as egalitarian in character; to know how to treat people as moral equals, on this account, is to know what justice demands of us. We are all, if this is correct, egalitarians now, however much we argue about what such a label truly demands.

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Law in other contexts: stand bravely brothers! A report from the law wars

International Journal of Law in Context ◽

10.1017/s1744552308002024 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 4 (2) ◽

pp. 111-134

Author(s):

Oscar Guardiola-Rivera

Keyword(s):

Political Philosophy ◽

Legal Theory ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Surface Appearance ◽

Political Justice ◽

General Terms ◽

The Subject ◽

Theory Of Law ◽

Object Of Study ◽

Critique Of Violence

AbstractThis essay argues against the two pillars of current research on law and globalisation, from the perspective of legal theory and political philosophy: first, the distinction between ‘well-ordered’ and ‘not so well-ordered’ societies; second, the sociological model of the subject as pacified, fearful and isolated (to sum up, in harmony). It is argued that mainstream legal theory and political philosophy merely reflects the actual rules of the game of competition, dispute and conflict. In contrast, this essay takes sides with the anthropological and philosophical tradition that conceives the subject as antagonistic and in state of lack, profoundly concerned with the other, whom she imitates and whose standpoint she must be able to share if she is to make sense of the world. Furthermore, it is argued that transitivity or imitation lies at the very origin of conflict and dispute; lack and antagonism remain thus at the core of society, in spite of the surface appearance of harmony that characterises post-modern societies. Because of this, any general theory of law and society that wishes to be relevant at the time of globalisation must make the experience of antagonism and violence, motivated by imitation and envy, and its containment, its object of study. To do this, it must abandon the dualist conception of subjects and societies expressed in the distinction between ‘well-ordered’ (more violent) and ‘not-so-well-ordered’ (less violent) societies that has informed its investigation to this day, in order to declare in the most general terms a critique of violence from the standpoint of the victim, as of a piece with its demand for global social and political justice.

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Adaptive Preferences Are a Red Herring

Journal of the American Philosophical Association ◽

10.1017/apa.2017.36 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 3 (4) ◽

pp. 465-484 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

DALE DORSEY

Keyword(s):

Political Philosophy ◽

Current Literature ◽

General Rule ◽

Political Justice ◽

Adaptive Preferences

ABSTRACT:Current literature in moral and political philosophy is rife with discussion of adaptive preferences. This is no accident: while preferences are generally thought to play an important role in a number of normative domains (including morality, the personal good, and political justice), adaptive preferences seem exceptions to this general rule—they seem problematic in a way that preference-respecting theories of these domains cannot adequately capture. Thus, adaptive preferences are often taken to be theoretically explanatory: a reason for adjusting our theories of the relevant normative domains. However, as I shall argue here, the relentless focus on the phenomenon of preference adaptation is a mistake. While I do not take a stand on whether typical examples of adaptive preferences are or are not problematic, I argue here that if they are problematic, it cannot be because they are adaptive.

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