scholarly journals Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Companions In Guilt

Companions in Guilt

2020 ◽  
pp. 91-104
Author(s):  
Joel Marks
Keyword(s):  
Companions In Guilt

scholarly journals Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox

Symposion ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Michael Campbell ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Moore's Paradox ◽  
Companions In Guilt

Prudential Normativity, Moral Scepticisms, and Metaethics

Dear Prudence ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 145-166
Author(s):  
Guy Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Moral Debate ◽  
Companions In Guilt ◽  
Moral Scepticism

In earlier chapters it was argued that prudential value gives agents normative, prudential reasons and that prudential judgements are normative judgements on a par with moral judgements. This chapter spells out some ramifications of these theses by examining four different areas of inquiry about morality and moral discourse, showing how the theses hitherto defended in this book affect them. It begins with the form of moral scepticism found within the ‘why be moral?’ debate. It then examines hermeneutic moral error theory and proposes a companions-in-guilt argument based on the normativity of prudential discourse. Third, it examines arguments given within the literature on revisionary metaethical views, pointing out and questioning their commitment to prudential justifications. Finally, it is shown how the normativity of prudential properties applies to a central debate about thick concepts, that between reductionists and non-reductionists about such concepts.

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