New Issues in International Crisis Management

AbstractThe current scientific publication follows the invitation of scientists from the University of Defense in the Czech Republic, Brno for joint international study on economic diplomacy and peacekeeping. The paper presents the role of the Bulgarian army in the operations of international crisis management as part of the security and defense policy of the country, and characteristics of the activities of armed forces in international operations for crisis management. The article focuses on national contribution to international efforts in support of peace and stability, the legal basis for the participation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria in allied and coalition operations and support operations and military participation of the Republic of Bulgaria in international missions and operations.

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A Case Study in International Crisis ManagementA Chatham House Conference

International Affairs ◽

10.1093/ia/51.1.1 ◽

1975 ◽

Keyword(s):

Crisis Management ◽

International Crisis ◽

International Crisis Management

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NATO's Lessons in Crisis

10.1093/oso/9780190672171.001.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Heidi Hardt

Keyword(s):

Crisis Management ◽

Lessons Learned ◽

Formal Learning ◽

Survey Experiment ◽

International Crisis ◽

Learning Capacity ◽

Critical Knowledge ◽

Institutional Memory ◽

High Level ◽

International Crisis Management

In crisis management operations, strategic errors can cost lives. Some international organizations (IOs) learn from these failures, whereas, others tend to repeat them. Given high rates of turnover and shorter job contracts, how do IOs such as NATO retain any knowledge about past errors? Institutional memory enhances prospects for reforms that can prevent future failures. The book provides an explanation for how and why IOs develop institutional memory in international crisis management. Evidence indicates that the design of an IO’s learning infrastructure (e.g. lessons learned offices and databases) can inadvertently disincentivize IO elites from using it to share knowledge about strategic errors. Under such conditions, IO elites - high-level civilian and military officials - view reporting to be risky. In response, they prefer to contribute to institutional memory through the creation and use of informal processes such as transnational interpersonal networks, private documentation and conversations during crisis management exercises. The result is an institutional memory that remains vulnerable to turnover since critical knowledge is highly dependent on a handful of individuals. The book draws on the author’s interviews and a survey experiment with 120 NATO elites, including assistant secretary generals, military representatives and ambassadors. Cases of NATO crisis management in Afghanistan, Libya and Ukraine serve to further illustrate the development of institutional memory. Findings challenge existing organizational learning scholarship by indicating that formal learning processes alone are insufficient to ensure learning occurs. The book also offers policymakers a set of recommendations for strengthening the learning capacity of IOs.

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