New challenges to arms export control

The article addresses the U.K. government's arms export licensing process to try to account for the discrepancy between its rhetoric of responsibility and practice of ongoing controversial exports. It describes the government's licensing process and demonstrate how this process fails to prevent exports to states engaged in internal repression, human rights violations, or regional stability. It then sets out six reasons for this failure: The vague wording of arms export guidelines; the framing of arms export policy; the limited use (from a control perspective) of a case-by-case approach; the weak role of pro-control departments within government; pre-licensing mechanisms that facilitate exports and a lack of prior parliamentary scrutiny, which means the government's policy can only be examined retrospectively; and the wider context of the relationship between arms companies and the U.K. state. It is concluded that the government's export control guidelines do not restrict the arms trade in any meaningful way but, rather, serve predominantly a legitimating function.

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Introduction

10.1007/978-94-6265-471-6_1 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-11

Author(s):

Robert Beeres ◽

Jeroen Klomp ◽

Job Timmermans ◽

Robert Bertrand ◽

Joop Voetelink

Keyword(s):

Critical Thinking ◽

The Netherlands ◽

Information Management ◽

Export Control ◽

Annual Review ◽

Military Studies ◽

Private And Public ◽

The Subject ◽

Arms Export ◽

Research Domain

AbstractThis year’s volume of the Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies (NL ARMS) offers an interdisciplinary view on the domain of Compliance and Integrity in International Military Trade (CIIMT), integrating defence economics, international law, arms export control frameworks and policies, information management, organizational sciences and ethics. Although in academia, and from an interdisciplinary perspective, CIIMT constitutes a novel research domain, across private and public defence-related sectors, the subject evokes high levels of attention and interest, instigating a need for critical thinking, reflection and creativity to address ensuing multi-faceted issues and problems. From 2017, the Faculty of Military Sciences (FMS) at the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) has offered an in-house MSc programme on CIIMT, which, by integrating practice-based and scientific-based knowledge, aims to contribute to this need. The NL ARMS 2021 comprises, amongst others, contributions from students and lecturers partaking in this programme.

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Arms Export Controls under Siege of Globalisation

10.5771/9783828876187 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

John N. T. Helferich

Keyword(s):

Security Policy ◽

International Security ◽

National Level ◽

Export Control ◽

Ir Theory ◽

Export Controls ◽

Arms Exports ◽

Arms Export ◽

German Security Policy ◽

Control Regime

While defence industrial production is increasingly transnationalised, the control of arms exports still takes place almost exclusively on a national level. With the example of the German export control regime, this work analyses if the current situation yields arms export control risks that could undermine German security policy principles. Furhermore, inferences about IR theory are drawn based on the current regulation and its implementation. Looking at three particular case studies, this work finds that transnational production and trade indeed creates a number of arms diversion risks, however, these risks are predominantly a result of political choice rather than a phenomenon of hyper-globalisation. This work contributes to key discourses in International Security.

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Case: Sharing Parts and Services Among NATO Members

10.1007/978-94-6265-471-6_10 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 175-186

Author(s):

Semra Türkalp ◽

Bastiaan Dekkers

Keyword(s):

Export Control ◽

Export Controls ◽

Deviant Behaviour ◽

Member States ◽

Control Laws ◽

Transfer Of Technology ◽

Operational Readiness ◽

Close Cooperation ◽

Arms Export ◽

Internal Pressures

AbstractNATO’s goals require close cooperation of Member States on operational readiness, interoperability of their systems, material supplies, transfer of technology and joint R&D projects. A common approach on the application and implementation of arms export controls, however, is largely lacking. This chapter questions the absence of application and implementation of arms export controls in the context of the material logistical support and services provided by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). Three root causes of deviant behaviour of the Member States with the arms export controls are identified and analysed: (1) fragmentation of the arms export control laws and regulations; (2) a lack of leadership commitment and organisational culture of compliance; and (3) a combination of external and internal pressures leads to a forced prioritization of operational readiness above compliance. Next, a response is formulated to effectively counter deviant behaviour such as non-compliance with arms export controls by implementing a mixture of soft and hard controls. We advise the NSPA to create a culture of compliance within the NATO Partnership Program’s community based on ethical values and virtues. This requires social consensus, leadership commitment and a common agreement on and formalization of the basic rules of export control.

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British Control over the Export of war Materials

The American Journal of International Law ◽

10.2307/2190335 ◽

1939 ◽

Vol 33 (2) ◽

pp. 292-317 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Elton Atwater

Keyword(s):

Great Britain ◽

Present Article ◽

The Other ◽

Export Control ◽

Government Control ◽

Other Hand ◽

The World ◽

The Subject ◽

Arms Export

At a time when the subject of arms embargoes and arms export control is arousing considerable interest both at home and abroad, it is not untimely to examine the system of control which has developed in one of the chief arms producing and exporting countries of the world—Great Britain. Much attention has been devoted to the alleged evils of the international traffic in arms, and to the desirability of an effective government control over all armaments exports. Little consideration, on the other hand, has been given by writers to the question of how such control should be administered by a government, and what measures are actually involved. Taking the experience of Great Britain as a case study, the writer proposes in the following pages to trace the development of arms export control in that country, to examine the ways in which it has been administered, and to point out some of the difficulties which have been encountered. The present article may be looked upon, therefore, as a case study in the broader subject of national controls over the export of war materials.

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The Foreign Arms Sales Policy of the Carter Administration

Alternatives Global Local Political ◽

10.1177/030437547900400406 ◽

1979 ◽

Vol 4 (4) ◽

pp. 527-556

Author(s):

Nicole Ball ◽

Milton Leitenberg

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Third World ◽

Carter Administration ◽

Export Control ◽

Arms Sales ◽

Arms Trade ◽

The Us ◽

The World ◽

Arms Export ◽

The Third World

This paper makes the point that the Carter Administration is continuing the US policy of spreading militarization round the world, particularly in the Third World. During the Nixon and Ford Administrations, arms sales and transfers came to be used routinely as the quid pro quo in diplomacy. As a Presidential candidate, Carter pledged to reduce US involvement in the conventional arms trade. Nonetheless, within a year of his enunciating his ‘arms sales restraint’ policy in May 1977, the Administration proposed an end to the arms ban on Turkey, approved the sale of AWACs to Iran and 200 warplanes to the Mid-East, as well as a myriad of less controversial weapons deals. The dollar ceiling on arms sales, has been frequently circumvented. Despite the legislation requiring the cessation of military sales, loans and grants to countries in which there is a ‘consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights’, the Carter Administration continues to supply arms to many of the worst human rights offenders. And despite the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, the Administration has failed to act. It is extremely unlikely that any significant change will occur in the world arms trade despite President Carter's pronouncements against the ‘spiralling arms traffic’.

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