scholarly journals Tax Competition and Strategic Delegation with Interregional Asymmetries in Capital Endowment and Income Inequality

2019 ◽  
Vol 09 (05) ◽  
pp. 1434-1446
Author(s):  
Takahiro Watanabe
2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hikaru Ogawa ◽  
Taiki Susa

Author(s):  
Jiancai Pi ◽  
Xuyang Chen

Abstract This paper extends Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010, “Endogenizing Leadership in Tax Competition.” Journal of Public Economics 94 (9):768–776) and Hindriks and Nishimura (2015, “A Note on Equilibrium Leadership in Tax Competition Models.” Journal of Public Economics 121:66–68) by jointly considering the effects of market power and strategic interaction in tax competition. We depict the regional asymmetry as different slopes and different vertical intercepts of the inverse demand for capital. In our setup, the risk-dominant equilibrium in which the large region leads is regained. Moreover, dissimilar to Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010, “Endogenizing Leadership in Tax Competition.” Journal of Public Economics 94 (9):768–776) and Hindriks and Nishimura (2015, “A Note on Equilibrium Leadership in Tax Competition Models.” Journal of Public Economics 121:66–68), we show that with a large market demand and a low capital endowment, the leadership by the large region can still be Pareto-dominant even if the asymmetry is very small.


2020 ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
S. M. Drobyshevsky ◽  
N. S. Kostrykina ◽  
A. V. Korytin

The problem of efficiency of regional tax expenditures is an actual issue of the fiscal policy and fiscal federalism in Russia. A large fiscal autonomy allows federal subjects to realize a more active tax policy to attract new investments. One cannot claim current fiscal powers of the Russian regions to be wide. However, not all the regions use even existing tax policy instruments. Moreover, out of the regions that use them only few provide incentives to stimulate investment decisions. Others use regional tax measures to support businesses that already have strong positions in the region. And it is an open question whether such tax incentives are efficient. On the other hand, an aggressive tax competition for investors can also be wasteful for regional budgets. In this paper, we calculate indicators that characterize the depth and scope of tax exemptions provided at the regional level. The calculations are based on the open tax statistics. Through the analysis of the tax legislation as well as the economic structure of selected regions, we reveal the inducements of their higher activity: federal regional tax policy, tax competition or benefits for budget-forming companies of the region.


Author(s):  
Hoi Le Quoc ◽  
Hoi Chu Minh

Financial development could exert various effects on income distribution of a country. By employing Generalized Method of Moment, this paper aims at examining the impacts of credit market depth, one of most used financial development barometers, on income inequality in Vietnam. The empirical findings show that expanding credit market in the country could lead to higher income inequality. We have not found evidence that supports the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relation ever introduced by Greenwood and Jovanovich, although this hypothesis may still hold in a sense that Vietnam has not reached to the inflection point to generate such a curve alike.


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