scholarly journals Passively-Strictly Strong Nash Equilibrium in a Preference Revelation Game under the Student-Optimal Deferred Acceptance Algorithm

2017 ◽  
Vol 07 (05) ◽  
pp. 1244-1254
Author(s):  
Chengyue Li ◽  
Takehiro Inohara ◽  
Masahito Kitamura
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Strong Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm ◽  
Deferred Acceptance

Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zvika Neeman ◽  
Nir Vulkan
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Exchange Mechanism ◽  
Future Period ◽  
Strong Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Heterogenous Group ◽  
Informed Traders ◽  
Decentralized Bargaining

The paper considers the consequences of competition between two widely used exchange mechanisms, a “decentralized bargaining'' market, and a “centralized'' market. In every period, members of a large heterogenous group of privately-informed traders who each wish to buy or sell one unit of some homogenous good may opt for trading through one exchange mechanism. Traders may also postpone their trade to a future period. It is shown that trade outside the centralized market completely unravels. In every strong Nash equilibrium, all trade takes place in the centralized market. No trade ever occurs through direct negotiations.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document