scholarly journals Process Reliabilism and Scientific Antirealism

2012 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-51
Author(s):  
Takashi Aso
Keyword(s):  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
Scientific Antirealism

Core Criteria II

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Content ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Explicit Criteria

This chapter completes the account of the explicit criteria for epistemically proper belief. Given a belief formed through a process or processes on which the subject enjoyed a default permission to rely, the belief is epistemically proper just in case it satisfies a version of Process Reliabilism which the author calls Coherence-Infused Reliabilism (CIR). CIR requires that (i) beliefs be formed and sustained through processes that were reliable (or conditionally reliable), and (ii) the propositional content of the belief, as well as the hypothesis asserting the reliability of the processes as used on this occasion, cohere with the subject’s background beliefs. After arguing that such a view is well motivated, the author suggests that condition (ii) amounts to the exemplification of a minimal kind of epistemic responsibility, and goes on to generalize the account to cover all beliefs (not just basic ones).

Reliabilism’s Memory Loss

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Frise
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Memory Loss ◽  
Extreme Form ◽  
Process Reliabilism

Abstract Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process reliabilism explains the justification of beliefs by way of the reliability of the processes they result from. Some advocates of reliabilism deny various forms of generativism. Other reliabilists reject or remain neutral about only the more extreme forms. I argue that an extreme form of generativism follows from reliabilism. This result weakens a long-standing argument for reliabilism.

scholarly journals Scientific Realism versus Antirealism in Science Education

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park
Keyword(s):  
Science Education ◽  
Science Teachers ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Science Classrooms ◽  
Moore's Paradox ◽  
Scientific Antirealism

Scientific realists believe both what a scientific theory says about observables and unobservables. In contrast, scientific antirealists believe what a scientific theory says about observables, but not about unobservables. I argue that scientific realism is a more useful doctrine than scientific antirealism in science classrooms. If science teachers are antirealists, they are caught in Moore’s paradox when they help their students grasp the content of a scientific theory, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Teachers ask questions to their students to check whether they have grasped the content of a scientific theory. If the students are antirealists, they are also caught in Moore’s paradox when they respond positively to their teachers’ questions, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Finally, neither teachers nor students can understand phenomena in terms of scientific theories, if they are antirealists.

Epistemic value

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Greco ◽  
Luis Pinto de Sa
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
Mere True Belief

Epistemic value is a kind of value possessed by knowledge, and perhaps other epistemic goods such as justification and understanding. The problem of explaining the value of knowledge is perennial in philosophy, going back at least as far as Plato’s Meno. One formulation of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is valuable. Another version of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief or opinion. This article looks at various formulations of the value problem and various accounts of the value of knowledge in ancient and modern philosophy. The article then considers some contemporary discussions of the value problem, including the charge that reliabilist accounts cannot account for the value of knowledge over mere true belief. Various virtue-theoretic accounts of epistemic value are discussed as possible improvements over process reliabilism, and the epistemic value of understanding (as compared to knowledge) is considered.

Process Reliabilism

Good Thinking ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Process Reliabilism

Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mylan Engel
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Truth Condition ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Externalist Theory ◽  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
Justification Condition ◽  
Internal States ◽  
New Evil Demon Problem ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The internalism/externalism distinction in epistemology applies to both theories of justification and theories of knowledge. The distinction is most clearly defined for theories of justification. An internalist theory of epistemic justification is any theory that maintains that epistemic justifiedness is exclusively a function of states internal to the cognizer. Externalism is the denial of internalism. Thus, an externalist theory is any theory that maintains that epistemic justifiedness is at least partly a function of states or factors external to the cognizer, i.e., states or factors outside the cognizer’s ken. There is no unified agreement among internalists as to which internal states are epistemically relevant, and different internalisms emerge based on the subset of internal states deemed relevant. (See Internalism and Justification for details.) Internalists typically maintain that justification is a normative notion in the belief-guiding/regulative sense. Internalists also typically maintain that one can tell whether one is justified in believing p simply by reflecting on one’s internal evidence for p. The central internalist intuition, as highlighted by the New Evil Demon Problem is this: There can be no difference in justification without a difference in epistemically relevant internal states. Externalism is motivated by the intuition that epistemic justification must be conceptually connected to truth such that the conditions that make a belief justified also make it objectively probable. Externalists are also typically motivated by the view that children and animals can form justified beliefs, while failing to satisfy the internalist’s intellectualist requirements for justification. The dominant externalist theory of justification is process reliabilism, a simplified version of which holds that a belief is justified iff it’s produced by a reliable process. There is less canonical agreement when it comes to applying the internalist/externalist distinction to theories of knowledge. In one sense, every plausible epistemology is an externalist theory because every plausible epistemology requires an externalist truth condition and an externalist Gettier-blocking fillip. However, in another widely used sense, “externalist” theories of knowledge are theories that replace the internalist justification condition with either an externalist justification condition or some other externalist constraint (such as a causal or modal constraint); while “internalist” theories of knowledge hold that internalist justification is necessary for knowledge and also typically hold that no other kind of justification is needed for knowledge, though they do incorporate some sort of externalist constraint to handle the Gettier problem.

RELIABILISM, VERITISM, AND EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvin I. Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
Epistemic Consequentialism ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

ABSTRACTAccording to Selim Berker the prevalence of consequentialism in contemporary epistemology rivals its prevalence in contemporary ethics. Similarly, and more to the point, Berker finds epistemic consequentialism, epitomized by process reliabilism, to be as misguided and problematic as ethical consequentialism. This paper shows how Berker misconstrues process reliabilism and fails to pinpoint any new or substantial defects in it.

Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism

1996 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Process Reliabilism
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