scholarly journals Translucent Players: Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas

2016 ◽  
Vol 215 ◽  
pp. 114-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Joseph Y. Halpern
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemmas

scholarly journals Social Dilemmas in Environmental Economics and Policy Considerations: A Review

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-173
Author(s):  
Nicola Cerutti
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Environmental Issues ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Attitudes And Practices ◽  
Explorative Study ◽  
Environmental Economics And Policy ◽  
Decision Environments

Many crucial environmental issues lead to social dilemmas, in which the personally optimal solution, and the socially optimal solution diverge. Finding a solution to this dilemma is extremely important to allow a good and sustainable management of many exhaustible natural resources. This is especially true when the resource users need to develop collectively a set of rules or practices, and the institutions are unable to provide, or enforce, effective regulations. A few examples are forests, and fisheries, but also carbon emissions. This review presents a selected number of results coming from field observations, laboratory experiments, and theoretical work, which pinpoint some of the more crucial aspects of these decision environments. Knowing which incentives and situational aspects may motivate resource users to adopt a more or less cooperative behavior can potentially be of pivotal importance to develop effective policies and regulations. At the same time, the research we present is also of great interestfor any diagnostic or explorative study that aims to study direct resource users, and their development of cooperative attitudes and practices.

scholarly journals Social dilemmas with manifest and unknown networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-39
Author(s):  
Armando Razo
Keyword(s):  
Social Ties ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Aggregate Network ◽  
Network Estimation ◽  
Distributional Impact

Scholarly consensus that social ties resolve social dilemmas is largely predicated on common knowledge of networks. But what happens when people do not know all relevant social ties? Does network uncertainty translate into worse outcomes? I address these concerns by advancing the notion of a Network Estimation Bayesian Equilibrium to examine cooperative behavior under different epistemic conditions. When networks are common knowledge, I find that all possible outcomes of an original cooperation game can be realized in equilibrium, albeit with a higher likelihood of defection for more connected players. Variable knowledge of the network also has a distributional impact. With incomplete network knowledge, it’s possible to observe reversed equilibrium behavior when more connected players actually cooperate more often than less connected ones. In fact, aggregate network uncertainty in some social contexts incentivizes more mutual cooperation than would be the case with common knowledge of all social ties.

scholarly journals Coping with noise in social dilemmas: Group representatives fare worse than individuals because they lack trust in others’ benign intentions

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-214
Author(s):  
Christopher P. Reinders Folmer ◽  
Tim Wildschut ◽  
David De Cremer ◽  
Paul A. M. van Lange
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Real Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intergroup Interactions ◽  
And Behavior

Research on interindividual–intergroup discontinuity has illuminated distinct patterns of cognition, motivation, and behavior in interindividual versus intergroup contexts. However, it has examined these processes in laboratory environments with perfect transparency, whereas real-life interactions are often characterized by noise (i.e., misperceptions and unintended errors). This research compared interindividual and intergroup interactions in the presence or absence of noise. In a laboratory experiment, participants played 35 rounds of a dyadic give-some dilemma, in which they acted as individuals or group representatives. Noise was manipulated, such that players’ intentions either were perfectly translated into behavior or could deviate from their intentions in certain rounds (resulting in less cooperative behavior). Noise was more detrimental to cooperation in intergroup contexts than in interindividual contexts, because (a) participants who formed benign impressions of the other player coped better with noise, and (b) participants were less likely to form such benign impressions in intergroup than interindividual interactions.

scholarly journals Defectors’ intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vlastimil Křivan ◽  
Ross Cressman
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Opting Out ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
The Common

Abstract The theoretical and experimental research on opting out (also called conditional dissociation) in social dilemmas has concentrated on the effect this behavior has on the level of cooperation when used against defectors. The intuition behind this emphasis is based on the common property of social dilemmas that individuals are worse off the more their opponents defect. However, this article shows clearly that other opting out mechanisms are better at increasing cooperative behavior. In fact, by analyzing the stable Nash equilibria for the repeated multi-player public goods game with opting out, our results provide a strong argument that the best opting out rule is one whereby the only groups that voluntarily stay together between rounds are those that are homogeneous (i.e., those groups that are either all cooperators or all defectors), when these groups stay together for enough rounds. This outcome emerges when defectors are completely intolerant of individuals who cooperate (e.g., defectors exhibit xenophobic behavior toward cooperators) and so opt out whenever their group has a cooperator in it. The strong preference by defectors to be with like-minded individuals causes all heterogeneous groups to disband after one round.

scholarly journals Partner Selection for the Emergence of Cooperation in Multi-Agent Systems Using Reinforcement Learning

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (05) ◽  
pp. 7047-7054 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Anastassacos ◽  
Stephen Hailes ◽  
Mirco Musolesi
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Partner Selection ◽  
Artificial Agents ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Considerable Effort ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Selection For

Social dilemmas have been widely studied to explain how humans are able to cooperate in society. Considerable effort has been invested in designing artificial agents for social dilemmas that incorporate explicit agent motivations that are chosen to favor coordinated or cooperative responses. The prevalence of this general approach points towards the importance of achieving an understanding of both an agent's internal design and external environment dynamics that facilitate cooperative behavior. In this paper, we investigate how partner selection can promote cooperative behavior between agents who are trained to maximize a purely selfish objective function. Our experiments reveal that agents trained with this dynamic learn a strategy that retaliates against defectors while promoting cooperation with other agents resulting in a prosocial society.

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