Symmetric Block Ciphers Based on Cellular Automata

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Hernández Encinas ◽  
L. Hernández Encinas ◽  
A. Martín del Rey ◽  
G. Rodríguez Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Cellular Automata ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Symmetric Block

scholarly journals On the semantic security of cellular automata based pseudo-random permutation using results from the Luby-Rackoff construction

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Kamel Mohammed Faraoun
Keyword(s):  
Cellular Automata ◽  
Block Cipher ◽  
Random Permutation ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Random Permutations ◽  
Semantic Security ◽  
Transition Rules ◽  
Reversible Cellular Automata ◽  
Symmetric Block ◽  
Number Of Iterations

This paper proposes a semantically secure construction of pseudo-random permutations using second-order reversible cellular automata. We show that the proposed construction is equivalent to the Luby-Rackoff model if it is built using non-uniform transition rules, and we prove that the construction is strongly secure if an adequate number of iterations is performed. Moreover, a corresponding symmetric block cipher is constructed and analysed experimentally in comparison with popular ciphers. Obtained results approve robustness and efficacy of the construction, while achieved performances overcome those of some existing block ciphers.

Evaluation of Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Symmetric Block Ciphers

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Junaid ◽  
Mukhtar Hussain ◽  
Ashraf Masood ◽  
Firdous Kausar ◽  
Ayesha Noreen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Symmetric Block

scholarly journals Fully Automated Differential Fault Analysis on Software Implementations of Block Ciphers

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaolu Hou ◽  
Jakub Breier ◽  
Fuyuan Zhang ◽  
Yang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Fault Analysis ◽  
Smt Solver ◽  
Multiplication Operation ◽  
Analysis Methodology ◽  
Differential Fault Analysis ◽  
Software Implementations ◽  
Symmetric Block ◽  
Assembly Analysis ◽  
Effective Description

Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is considered as the most popular fault analysis method. While there are techniques that provide a fault analysis automation on the cipher level to some degree, it can be shown that when it comes to software implementations, there are new vulnerabilities, which cannot be found by observing the cipher design specification.This work bridges the gap by providing a fully automated way to carry out DFA on assembly implementations of symmetric block ciphers. We use a customized data flow graph to represent the program and develop a novel fault analysis methodology to capture the program behavior under faults. We establish an effective description of DFA as constraints that are passed to an SMT solver. We create a tool that takes assembly code as input, analyzes the dependencies among instructions, automatically attacks vulnerable instructions using SMT solver and outputs the attack details that recover the last round key (and possibly the earlier keys). We support our design with evaluations on lightweight ciphers SIMON, SPECK, and PRIDE, and a current NIST standard, AES. By automated assembly analysis, we were able to find new efficient DFA attacks on SPECK and PRIDE, exploiting implementation specific vulnerabilities, and previously published DFA on SIMON and AES. Moreover, we present a novel DFA on multiplication operation that has never been shown for symmetric block ciphers before. Our experimental evaluation also shows reasonable execution times that are scalable to current cipher designs and can easily outclass the manual analysis. Moreover, we present a method to check the countermeasure-protected implementations in a way that helps implementers to decide how many rounds should be protected. We note that this is the first work that automatically carries out DFA on cipher implementations without any plaintext or ciphertext information and therefore, can be generally applied to any input data to the cipher.

scholarly journals SITM: See-In-The-Middle Side-Channel Assisted Middle Round Differential Cryptanalysis on SPN Block Ciphers

2019 ◽  
pp. 95-122
Author(s):  
Shivam Bhasin ◽  
Jakub Breier ◽  
Xiaolu Hou ◽  
Dirmanto Jap ◽  
Romain Poussier ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Differential Cryptanalysis ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Side Channel Analysis ◽  
Cryptographic Algorithms ◽  
Channel Analysis ◽  
Symmetric Block

Side-channel analysis constitutes a powerful attack vector against cryptographic implementations. Techniques such as power and electromagnetic side-channel analysis have been extensively studied to provide an efficient way to recover the secret key used in cryptographic algorithms. To protect against such attacks, countermeasure designers have developed protection methods, such as masking and hiding, to make the attacks harder. However, due to significant overheads, these protections are sometimes deployed only at the beginning and the end of encryption, which are the main targets for side-channel attacks.In this paper, we present a methodology for side-channel assisted differential cryptanalysis attack to target middle rounds of block cipher implementations. Such method presents a powerful attack vector against designs that normally only protect the beginning and end rounds of ciphers. We generalize the attack to SPN based ciphers and calculate the effort the attacker needs to recover the secret key. We provide experimental results on 8-bit and 32-bit microcontrollers. We provide case studies on state-of-the-art symmetric block ciphers, such as AES, SKINNY, and PRESENT. Furthermore, we show how to attack shuffling-protected implementations.

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