Supply Chain Coordination with Buy-back Contract under Uncertain Demand

Author(s):  
Min Zhang ◽  
Haifeng Pang ◽  
Songtao Zhang ◽  
Juan Ni
2022 ◽  
Vol 132 ◽  
pp. 01015
Author(s):  
Dolgion Boldbaatar ◽  
Daeheon Choi

Design crowdsourcing is the largest open innovation model that can create value with potential consumers. It offers an opportunity to quickly respond to the market by obtaining instant designs from the crowd, freelancing designers with fundamental skills. In addition, it can secure globally innovative competitiveness without financial burden, which is more effective to start-up companies and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the field of seasonal product industry. Developing standardized design crowdsourcing supply chain processes and mathematical models is essential to respond to market trends and customer needs in the seasonal product industry. This study has been carried out to determine the best mechanism in the design crowdsourcing supply chain and coordinate each supply chain member whose desires meet each other. Thus, we identify contracts under which conditions can coordinate the crowdsourcing supply chain by a newsvendor model with a manufacturer and a retailer with a crowdsourcing platform. To see that, we study the coordination of the crowdsourcing supply chain through the following contracts: wholesale price, buy-back, and revenue sharing contract. For the forecasting, we present a framework of the design crowdsourcing supply chain and compare supply chain performance under crowdsourcing supply chain coordination. The summarized result shows that the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the crowdsourcing supply chain efficiently. In contrast, buy-back and revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the crowdsourcing supply chain.


2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (01) ◽  
pp. 135-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEI YANG ◽  
MINGHUI XU ◽  
GANG YU ◽  
HANQIN ZHANG

We study the coordination of supply chains with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. Different from the downside risk setting, in a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) framework, we show that the supply chain can be coordinated with the revenue-sharing, buy-back, two-part tariff and quantity flexibility contracts. Furthermore the revenue-sharing contracts are still equivalent to the buy-back contracts when the retail price is fixed. At the same time, it is shown that the risk-averse retailer of the coordinated supply chain can increase its profit by raising its risk-averse degree under mild conditions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Ravi Tibrewala ◽  
Rajen Tibrewala ◽  
Purushottam Meena

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