End-to-End Link Power Control in Optical Networks Using Nash Bargaining Solution

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quanyan Zhu ◽  
Lacra Pavel
Keyword(s):  
Power Control ◽  
Optical Networks ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
End To End

Joint Quality Enhancement and Power Control for Wireless Visual Sensor Networks based on the Nash Bargaining Solution

2016 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 203-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eftychia G. Datsika ◽  
Angeliki V. Katsenou ◽  
Lisimachos P. Kondi ◽  
Evangelos Papapetrou ◽  
Konstantinos E. Parsopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Sensor Networks ◽  
Power Control ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Quality Enhancement ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Visual Sensor ◽  
Visual Sensor Networks ◽  
Wireless Visual Sensor Networks ◽  
Joint Quality

The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Instrumental Reasoning ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power

It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form ‘each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power’. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls’ original position.

Dynamic Subcarrier and Power Allocation Based on Nash Bargaining Solution in Symmetric Cooperative OFDMA Networks

2011 ◽  
Vol 187 ◽  
pp. 510-515
Author(s):  
Wei Liu ◽  
Jing Min Tang
Keyword(s):  
Power Allocation ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Subcarrier Allocation ◽  
Allocation Scheme ◽  
Allocation Algorithm ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
Joint Resource Allocation ◽  
Adaptive Power

In this paper, subcarrier and power allocation are jointly considered in a three-node symmetric cooperation orthogonal frequency-division multiple access uplink system. With the help of Nash bargaining solution, the dynamic subcarrier allocation scheme and the adaptive power allocation scheme are proposed for joint optimization. The joint resource allocation is decomposed and solved by dynamic subcarrier allocation algorithm and adaptive power allocation algorithm. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed cooperative scheme.

scholarly journals Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution for Bilateral Contracts in Electricity Markets

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 2397
Author(s):  
Reinaldo Crispiniano Garcia ◽  
Javier Contreras ◽  
Matheus de Lima Barbosa ◽  
Felipe Silva Toledo ◽  
Paulo Vinicius Aires da Cunha
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Price Volatility ◽  
Spot Market ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Market Pricing ◽  
Bilateral Contracts ◽  
Generation Company

In electricity markets, bilateral contracts (BC) are used to hedge against price volatility in the spot market. Pricing these contracts requires scheduling from either the buyer or the seller aiming to achieve the highest profit possible. Since this problem includes different players, a Generation Company (GC) and an Electricity Supplier Company (ESC) are considered. The approaches to solve this problem include the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) equilibrium and the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky (RKS) bargaining solution. The innovation of this work is the implementation of an algorithm based on the RKS equilibrium to find a compromise strategy when determining the concessions to be made by the parties. The results are promising and show that the RKS approach can obtain better results compared to the Nash equilibrium method applied to a case study.

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