scholarly journals After Fukushima: The precautionary principle revisited

2012 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Huber

Etienne de Villiers, more than other theologians, elaborates on basic elements of a Christian ethics of responsibility. He distinguishes between retrospective and prospective responsibility. The prospective aspect attracted awareness after the nuclear accident in the Fukushima reactors on 11 March 2011. The question on how to respond in an ethically responsible manner to catastrophic risks was put back on the agenda. The article takes up this question and discusses the answer given in the international debate by the introduction of the �precautionary principle�. The principle is described with its background in the �heuristics of fear�, proposed by the philosopher Hans Jonas. Four criticisms are discussed in detail relating to the problems of scientific uncertainty, the burden of proof, the weight of damages and the perils of precaution. That leads to a reformulation of the precautionary principle as a concrete element within an ethics of responsibility.

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Vecchione

The aim of this paper is to review the basic literature on scientific uncertainty in its statistical paradigm in order to provide enlightenment on one pivotal facet of the precautionary principle, i.e. the allocation of the burden of proof to demonstrate that an activity is not harmful to the environment. The purpose is not to explain a new theory of statistical inference, but to show how regulatory policymaking that is properly informed by scientific expertise and designed to avoid one type of error, may actually make other errors more likely and thus expose the public to danger. This problem is explained in terms of the conceptual as well as operational conflicts that arise when knowledge about statistical-inferential methods is applied to policymaking. The paper argues that this issue can be resolved by first reconsidering the burden of proof as a burden of uncertainty.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 698-708
Author(s):  
Alessandra DONATI

Administrative Tribunal of Guadeloupe 28 March 2020, case n° 2000295 (Judge for interim relief); French Council of State 4 April 2020, cases n° 439904, 439905 (Judge for interim relief)Based on the precautionary principle and to protect the right to life under Article L. 521-2 of the French Code of Administrative Justice, the Administrative Tribunal of Guadeloupe (Judge for interim relief) ordered the Regional Health Agency of Guadeloupe and the University Hospital Centre of Guadeloupe to procure 200,000 COVID-19 screening tests corresponding to half of the population of Guadeloupe and to buy the doses necessary for the treatment of the COVID-19 epidemic with hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin for 20,000 patients. On appeal, the French Council of State, by disregarding the application of the precautionary principle and with controversial reasoning concerning the relationship between discretionary power and scientific uncertainty, annulled the decision of the Administrative Tribunal of Guadeloupe.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda Kvalsvig ◽  
Jin Russell ◽  
Carmen Timu-Parata ◽  
Michael G. Baker

Abstract Key messagesRisk assessment for children has been a polarising issue during the Covid-19 pandemic. Governments around the world are preparing to ‘open up’ before risks to children are fully quantified, with unknown implications for their long-term health.Applying the Precautionary Principle to child health requires decision makers to 1) take preventive action until risks are better understood; 2) ensure that the burden of proof rests with proponents of risk; 3) explore alternatives to the risk; and 4) use participatory approaches to decision-making.Policies relating to children must be centred on the rights and wellbeing of children. We provide a framework for comprehensive Health Impact Assessments to ensure that direct and indirect impacts upon children are taken into account in major policy decisions.Elimination strategies offer an integrated approach to the protection of children’s wellbeing, the wellbeing of the population as a whole, and health equity. Where countries are transitioning away from elimination, a tight suppression approach is preferable to loose suppression or mitigation.


FACETS ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 887-898
Author(s):  
Colleen M. Flood ◽  
Vanessa MacDonnell ◽  
Bryan Thomas ◽  
Kumanan Wilson

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the challenges governments face in balancing civil liberties against the exigencies of public health amid the chaos of a public health emergency. Current and emerging pandemic response strategies may engage diverse rights grounded in civil liberties, including mobility rights, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and the right to liberty and security of the person. As traditionally conceived, the discourses of civil rights and public health rest on opposite assumptions about the burden of proof. In the discourse of civil and political rights of the sort guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the onus rests on government to show that any limitation on rights is justified. By contrast, public health discourse centers on the precautionary principle, which holds that intrusive measures may be taken—lockdowns, for example—even in the absence of complete evidence of the benefits of the intervention or of the nature of the risk. In this article, we argue that the two principles are not so oppositional in practice. In testing for proportionality, courts recognize the need to defer to governments on complex policy matters, especially where the interests of vulnerable populations are at stake. For their part, public health experts have incorporated ideas of proportionality in their evolving understanding of the precautionary principle. Synthesizing these perspectives, we emphasize the importance of policy agility in the COVID-19 response, ensuring that measures taken are continually supported by the best evidence and continually recalibrated to avoid unnecessary interference with civil liberties.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
René von Schomberg

The precautionary principle in public decision making concerns situations where following an assessment of the available scientific information, there are reasonable grounds for concern for the possibility of adverse effects on the environment or human health, but scientific uncertainty persists. In such cases provisional risk management measures may be adopted, without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those adverse effects become fully apparent. This is the definition of the precautionary principle as operationalized under EU law. The precautionary principle is a deliberative principle. Its application involves deliberation on a range of normative dimensions which need to be taken into account while making the principle operational in the public policy context. Under EU law, any risk management measures to be adopted while implementing the precautionary principle, have to be proportionate to ensure the chosen high level of protection in the European Community.This article will illustrate the established practice concerning the release of genetically modified organisms into the environment and how the principle is implemented under hard law. The article also provides an outlook on what this may imply for the relative new case of nanotechnology and the use of precautionary principle within the context of soft law (use of codes of conduct).


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